

PSYCHOLOGY for MINISTERS and SOCIAL WORKERS

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WITH A FOREWORD BY

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Foreword

by DR. H. CRICHTON-MILLER, F.R.C.P.

To approach this problem of pastoral and social psychology the first point to be clarified is the relation of dogma to inspiration. The function of all religions should be to establish in the personality the eternal philosophic values. And these may be conveniently classified as personal serenity, social contribution, and dedication to the future. These should be attained in the ordinary course of character-development through the acceptance of dogma appropriate to the age, mental status, and experience of the individual. And since these three factors vary in all human beings it follows that the presentation of any given dogmatic religion will vary in its effective inspiration. The common ground of the religionist, sociologist, and psychologist is the spiritual maturity of the individual as evinced in his philosophic views. This conception covers the work of the pastor, social worker, and the psychotherapist. It is only in the light of maturity that we can assess the degree of inspiration experienced from a given dogma authoritatively presented to a given individual.

The human mind is so fashioned as to promote much conflict between the conscious and the unconscious, between the emotions and reason and between freedom and authority. And in these three great groups of opponents the pastoral psychologist must thread his way. On page 48 I find this sentence: 'Our thinking is far more at the mercy of our emotions than we care to allow for.' If the minister applies this much-needed warning both to himself and to his parishioner a great many mistakes will be avoided. For a dynamic vision can only be achieved through an adjust-

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ment of warring emotions, and this includes a vision of health as well as other aspects of maturity. We see this particularly in the individual's adjustment to disability and pain. And this is what the author handles so ably in this excellent book. His treatment of neurotic incapacity in relation to emotional conflict, of the unconscious will-to-be-ill, of the capacity of the mind to induce bodily symptoms, of the gainful purposes of hysteria, of the impact of authority on personality development—all these subjects the reader will find handled in lucid language and with clear thought.

Perhaps the most practical piece of advice in the whole book is on page 59: 'Every minister and social worker must learn to be a better listener than talker.' This is indeed a touch-stone for all would-be healers of the mind. The average minister is a propagandist and is liable to preach to the individual as he preaches to his congregation. The experienced psychotherapist is primarily a listener, waiting patiently for the sick man to produce spontaneously a clue to the puzzle presented by a disordered personality. Similarly, the minister who tries to help the case of acute anxiety should do little more than indicate lines of conversation and reflection. But many ministers feel—not unnaturally—that their first duty is to 'get across' a message of reassurance. This, however, is on the conscious plane, and Mr. Guntrip very rightly states on page 110: 'The neurosis will defeat the conscious resolution in the end, unless the much more vital factors of insight and understanding are added.'

But the pastoral psychologist and social worker must learn what synergy means in neurotic conditions, and his colleague, the medical man, dares not forget it. The 'working together' of mental and physical causes is the justification for a collaboration which might well be extended to the great advancement of treatment. Such cases are the co-existence of sources of poisoning of the system with emotional conflict; mental defect with an inferiority sense;

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sciatic, or other forms of pain, with an hysterical trend; a vitamin deficiency with self-pity; an allergic condition, such as asthma, with an active anxiety neurosis; and so on. Indeed, it may be said that there are few neurotic states in which good doctoring is not called for, and very few in which wise psychotherapy would not be advantageous. So let us hope for a synergy of the professions in treatment, as we recognise a synergy of causative factors in the making of the total clinical picture.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to commend this excellent book to all those who would 'minister to a mind diseased'.

Preface

THIS book is in no sense of the word a text-book. It is rather an 'appetiser' designed to give to ministers of religion and social workers a taste for psychology, and some idea of its possibilities in relation to their work. It might be considered as an introduction to pastoral and social psychology, and makes no claim to be more than that. It is based on material given in lectures at the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford, and on talks and discussions at conferences of various kinds. I would express my gratitude to the Governors and Staff of the College for their forward-looking policy in seeking to equip men for the ministry on the practical as well as the academic side; and for instituting a lectureship in pastoral psychology which created an opportunity for gathering much of the material presented here. But the book rests ultimately on clinical work; a therapist's best teachers are his patients. Psychotherapy is a co-operative effort of two people, in the dynamic personal relationship of the analytical situation, to solve the problems of one of them. In the end, medical, religious, and social work is the recreative power of knowledge applied in and through good personal relationships. The need to understand this is bringing together workers in all these fields.

Chapters I, II, and III, while written primarily from the minister's point of view, deal with situations and problems that confront all social workers. The rest of the book, it is hoped, will prove of equal use to ministers and social workers of all kinds. The arrangement of the subject-matter has been determined by the fact that a minister or social worker is primarily a practical field worker, not a research student. He wants knowledge that can be used; hence, Part 1 concentrates on practical matters. It aims at

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giving the kind of information, and the points of view, that will open up the field of tested and usable knowledge in modern psychology. Practice, however, has theory behind it, and a certain amount of theoretical understanding is required if information is to be efficiently applied in action. It seems a sound psychological approach to arouse interest by examining practical problems first, and so create a sense of need for fuller theoretical knowledge. Part 2, therefore, is devoted to some of the theoretical issues that arise from Part 1.

I take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Dr. H. Crichton-Miller for his kindness in writing a Foreword, and I feel bound to add that but for the encouragement I have received from him and from Dr. W. MacAdam (Professor of Medicine, Leeds, 1937-46) over a period of years, I should not have ventured into the field of psychotherapy. I owe an important debt to Principal H. Cunliffe-Jones, of Yorkshire United Independent College, for his constructive criticism of parts of the MS., which enabled me to clarify and elaborate some issues of major concern. My greatest personal debt in psychological matters is to Dr. Alan Maberly and Dr. H. V. Dicks (Professor of Psychiatry at Leeds, 1946-48) for helping me to understand both myself and the theory and practice of psychotherapy. I gladly acknowledge here a debt to the writings of Prof. J. Macmurray, whose approach to the philosophical problem of personality seems to me to have a great contribution to make to psychotherapy. My thanks are due to the Editor of *The Congregational Quarterly* for permission to use an article on 'The Uses and Abuses of Psychology in the Ministry', reprinted here as Chapter I.

Finally, it is a pleasure to express my gratitude to Dr. R. E. D. Markillie, of the Leeds Department of Psychiatry, for many valuable suggestions and for his careful, critical perusal of the whole MS.; to Miss E. Paul, B.A., Psychiatric Social Worker in the Department, for reading the MS. and

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making suggestions from the social worker's viewpoint; and to the Rev. L. J. Tizard, of Carrs Lane Congregational Church, Birmingham, for extensive help in literary revision. But for these friends the book would have contained many more faults than it still retains. My thanks are due to the Yale University Press for permission to quote extracts from Professor C. G. Jung's *Psychology and Religion*.

Introduction

THERE is a deliberate purpose in writing for ministers of religion and social workers together. Out of the pulpit and as a pastor, the minister is a social worker, while social work itself must rest on a love of people and sense of vocation and dedication to service which are profoundly religious. The various kinds of 'workers with human nature' cannot afford to isolate themselves from one another. Religion, medicine, and social work are all equally concerned to understand and help 'people', even though they each have their different emphases. Ministers, doctors, and social workers are learning more and more to co-operate, and, as they understand each other better, so will they more fully understand those they seek to help.

The *Annual Report* of the British Medical Association for 1947 may be considered as an epoch-making challenge to just this kind of joint endeavour. It calls for fuller co-operation between doctors and clergy in 'healing'; it holds that there is no ethical reason to prevent practitioners from co-operating with clergy, and states that 'health is more than a physical problem, and the patient's attitude both to illness and to other problems is an important factor in his recovery and adjustment to life'. Social workers who, today, are trained specialists in their respective spheres, must be included in this large and enlightened vision. But, if we are to achieve fruitful co-operation, we must learn to understand each other's point of view, and find a common language and meeting place for our different but closely allied concerns. This is just what psychology and the psychotherapeutic approach can provide. Not that psychology claims precedence over other disciplines, but rather that whatever man does he must do through the exercise of his mind, so

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that psychology deals with the one factor which is common to every aspect of human living. By understanding the psychological implications of health, social adjustment, and religious experience, workers in all these fields can learn to understand each other's points of view better, and co-operate more effectively to help men and women. This book is a series of introductory surveys of some parts of this vast field, which the reader must then learn to cultivate intensively for himself. Because of the special purpose of the book, no attempt has been made to go in detail into the psychopathology of infancy, or the types of psychoneurosis.

Psychodynamic theory is today undergoing a large-scale revision. Since the foundations were laid by Freud in pioneer work to which humanity owes an incalculable debt, research has gone far enough to discover the inadequacy of many Freudian theories. Freud was himself constantly revising his earlier views. In particular, there is a movement taking place from a biologically orientated psychology, resting on the idea of instinct or innate impulse, towards a sociologically orientated theory in which human relationships and their influence on character-formation are brought to the fore. Such names as Karen Horney and Erich Fromm; the very important, if not so popularly well known, Neo-Freudians such as Melanie Klein, Joan Riviere, Susan Isaacs, and others in this country; such workers as Alexander and French, with their collaborators in America: all these, and many others too numerous to mention, challenge our attention. A great ferment of ideas is happening.

The integration psychology of C. G. Jung may be regarded as dealing with the inner side of the process of human relationships, the development of balanced character, and the achievement of individuation without which personal relationships cannot be satisfactorily sustained. Chapters VII, VIII, and IX attempt to work out 'a psychology of the personal life' by bringing together individuation and personal relationships as the inner and outer aspects of the

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whole of human living. The subject-matter of these chapters needs to be very greatly expanded and supported by plentiful case-material. Only an outline is attempted. Since a synthesis of psychologies can only be worked out on the basis of some more fundamental account of human personality than psychology by itself can supply, Professor Macmurray's exposition of the nature of a person, and of the personal life, has been used as a guide. Research has already moved into the period when, as Dr. Crichton-Miller indicates in his Foreword, a great synergic movement is called for. The various schools of psychodynamic theory themselves need to be integrated, and this will only be accomplished—perhaps we should say grown and not artificially manufactured—in the larger setting of the integration of psychodynamic theory with political and social needs, and with ethical, philosophical, and religious insights.

This development was foreseen by Freud himself, as we see from *The Question of Lay Analysis*, first published in German in 1926, and now for the first time published in English (1947). The following quotations are highly relevant here. 'The medical profession has no historical claim to a monopoly of analysis' (p. 57). 'No one should practise analysis who has not qualified himself by a proper training. . . . Whether the person is a doctor or not seems to me of altogether minor importance' (p. 62). 'The analytical curriculum would include subjects which are far removed from medicine and which a doctor would never require in his practice: the history of civilisation, mythology, the psychology of religion, and literature. Unless he is well oriented in these fields the analyst will be unable to bring understanding to bear upon much of his material' (p. 77). 'We do not want to see psychoanalysis swallowed up by medicine, and then to find its last resting-place in text-books on psychiatry. . . . As "psychology of the depths", the theory of the unconscious mind, it may become indispensable to all the branches of knowledge having to do with the origins and

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history of human culture and its great institutions; such as art, religion, and the social order. It has already contributed to the solution of problems in these fields, but the contribution made is small in comparison with what it will be when historians of civilisation, psychologists of religion, etymologists, etc., become willing to use the new weapon for research themselves. Therapy of the neuroses is only one of the uses of analysis; and perhaps the future will show that it is not the most important' (pp. 77 f.). These quotations show Freud at his best, as a man whose genius for intensive investigation was matched by his breadth of statesmanlike vision which foresaw the possibility of 'analytical schooling for the social workers' (p. 81) in a combined attack on the problems of human living from all angles.

That Freud's disciples are following the trail he blazed is shown by the important and absorbingly interesting article on 'Psychoanalysis and Integrative Living', by Dr. Marjorie Brierley, in *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 28, Part 2, which unfortunately came into the writer's hands too late to influence the body of this book. Many who know only *The Future of an Illusion*, *Totem and Taboo*, and the last chapter in *New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis*, and have believed that Freud had stamped psychoanalysis with a purely destructive and prejudiced attitude to religion, will here find a balanced combination of sympathetic understanding with searching and critical analysis in dealing with religion and ethics. The future is rich in possibilities for both the synthesis of psychological insights and the development of a far more comprehensive understanding of living human nature than we have ever yet possessed.

PART 1. PRACTICAL

CHAPTER I

The Uses and Abuses of Psychology

I. INTRODUCTION

'SHUN the psychologically-minded parson.' A medical psychologist was recently reported to have made that statement. Perhaps it was intended as a salutary protest against the enthusiastic amateur who reads a few books and thinks he can embark forthwith on psychoanalytic treatment. Maybe, on the other hand, it expressed a rather jealous desire to fence round the field of psychological science as a monopoly of the medical profession. Probably the first reason was the true one, for the medical profession today is increasingly recognising that serious workers in the fields of educational, social, moral, and spiritual problems are bound both to study and practise the psychological approach to human nature. It is known, beyond shadow of doubt, that health, the special concern of the medical man, is intimately bound up with the patient's way of life, character, disappointments, and satisfactions, and all that life means or fails to mean for him.

Today we see developing a combined approach to human problems from all angles. Psychology is not the concern or monopoly of any one profession. It is the indispensably necessary equipment for all who have to deal with people and their needs and troubles. Here lies the answer to a question asked recently by another doctor: 'Why are so many ministers taking up psychology nowadays?' It is a matter of sheer necessity, and is a process that nothing can stop; nor is it confined to ministers. We shall fail to bring to people the adequate help it is now possible to give unless we make a wise and instructed use of the best knowledge about man that scientific study has placed at our disposal.

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It is true that many older doctors still look askance at medical psychology, and many older ministers regard with suspicion the importation of psychology into the work of the ministry. Possibly, social workers are less resistant. We may regard with sympathy and patience the doubts and fears of those who see rising around them a knowledge and technique of which they knew nothing in their own earlier days. They feel that they have got on very well without it, and it may be only a dangerous stunt. Yet the truth is that they did not get on so well without it as they may believe. They do not see what could have been done that they failed to do. It would be easy to gather evidence of patients uncured, and troubled minds unhelped for lack of psychological understanding. Moreover, this new knowledge has come to stay, and we must face its challenge fairly and squarely, and study its implications for all types of social and religious work. The Churches should particularly note that, in days when so many other professions are seriously studying psychological science, the minister who is ill-equipped in this respect will find himself outside the intellectual world of his time.

II. THE ABUSES OF PSYCHOLOGY

We return to the doctor's question: 'Why are so many ministers taking up psychology nowadays?' What is meant by 'taking up' psychology? It is widely felt that there are dangers here that we must have the honesty and courage to admit and avoid.

(a) There is the temptation to flaunt a half-baked and ill-digested psychology. This is a danger that is equally real in other departments of knowledge. Churches sometimes voice a similar complaint about ministers with an interest in economics and politics. The study of a few text-books on social science hardly equips a preacher for making dogmatic and authoritative statements in the pulpit about things of which he has little practical experience. Yet we dare not say

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that the Christian Gospel has no bearing on the social and economic structure of our communal life. What is required is that study should be thorough and not confined merely to book knowledge. If any man is drawn by natural aptitude and developed interest towards dealing with some special aspect of human life in the light of the Christian faith, let him acquire such knowledge and experience as shall command the respect of other trained minds. We do not want a Christian ministry filled with dilettante enthusiasts. In fairness it should be said that the untrained amateur psychologist is not always outside the ranks of the medical profession.

(b) There is the temptation to 'preach psychology'. It is safe to say that sermons or ordinary conversation filled with psychology will soon become nauseating to listeners, besides probably being unintelligible. We are all sinners in this respect to some extent. If any man has a special interest, whatever it be, there will be a danger of its obtruding too much into his public speech or private conversation. With some interests that is less objectionable than with others. With the psychological interest it might be most objectionable. Just as a decade or so ago preachers who had but a vague idea of the fundamentals of their religious message were inclined to preach politics and economics instead, and to substitute a biological and social gospel of evolution and progress for the Good News of God in Christ, so now there might be a temptation to regard psychology as the latest phase in the spiritual evolution of mankind, and if not to preach Freud, Adler, and Jung, then to preach Christ dressed up in psychological terminology. Psychology is not religion, and a psychological lecture is not the preaching of the Gospel.

The man who makes a psychological approach to human problems cannot, of course, remain unaffected by it in his work. There never has been a time when preachers have not drawn sermon material from their pastoral work, where

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they are thrust close up against the actual difficulties that confront their people. No one would say that a preacher ought never to use, for the illustration of his message, a knowledge of human problems that has come to him in the course of a psychologically instructed pastoral ministry. But this needs to be handled with extreme care and delicacy. Above all, the practice of 'citing cases' in detail ought to be entirely avoided. It would effectively bar any sensitive person from bringing his troubled mind to a man who might, later, display the case to public view.

The psychological lecture is different, for technical matters can often only be explained adequately by reference to 'case-histories', and the audience is mostly composed of people who have come to make a serious study of the subject. Even then it would be a breach of confidence to present a case in any form that made it possible to identify the patient; cases are presented impersonally to illustrate principles, in such a way that they might be true of any number of people. A congregation in church, however, has come to worship, not to study psychology. The temptation for a psychologically-minded preacher to cite case-histories is strong, just because they are at times dramatic, sensational, fascinating. To try to arouse a spurious interest in preaching by the use of arresting and perhaps lurid 'inside information' of a psychological order, would be a prostitution of the true business of preaching which is the proclamation of the Word of God to men. It is likely to be motivated by vanity and a desire to impress the congregation with the profundity of the preacher's knowledge of human nature. An elderly deacon once said to the writer, after listening to a sermon by a minister interested in psychology: 'He likes to make your flesh creep'.

(c) There is the temptation that comes to the minister who has acquired some facility in making the psychological approach, to advertise himself as a psychologist. If he is really a psychologist that will be done for him by other

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people, and he can afford to keep quiet. Once a reputation has grown around him he will have to accept it. But the man who is most eager to push himself forward as a psychologist is likely to be the man who cannot get himself accepted by the quality of his work in this field. Let a man use the knowledge, insight, and experience he is gaining quietly and wisely. As soon as he has given really effective help to a few people he will be surprised to find that folk he has never heard of will come to him. Somehow it goes round that 'so-and-so is the man to help you'. It would not be a good thing for the Church, for ministers to fall into the habit of giving themselves out to be psychologists. If a man can really help people, he will soon find that far greater demands are being made on him than he can meet. If he reaches the point where he feels compelled to specialise, he will be wise to submit himself to one or two competent judges. We recently heard from a senior probation officer that a minister (whose name was not disclosed) called on him to say that he was setting up as a psychologist, and asked if he would send him cases. The probation officer wisely answered: 'No, and I'll discourage anyone else from doing so.' That is not the way to make use of psychology in the ministry. It is likely to bring discredit on the Church and on non-medical psychology in general. The psychologically-trained social worker does not pose as a psychologist, and the minister should believe that the most important thing for him to be is a minister.

In religious work, both preaching and pastoral, the place for psychology is not in the shop window but behind the scenes. It should be part of the well-digested substance of understanding on the minister's part, and the less it is paraded the better. So far as preaching is concerned, technical material of any kind, not only psychological but theological and metaphysical, is out of place. It is doubtful if a congregation is greatly helped by a dissertation on the Logos in the light of Greek philosophy, even though all that lies behind the first chapter of St. John's gospel. 'Com-

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plexes' and 'the unconscious' should be just as sparingly dealt with.

(d) Lastly, there is the danger of making superficial snap-judgments on the basis of a little psychological knowledge. Modern psychology provides us with ideas and theories which, at first, look deceptively simple and easy to apply to human behaviour. The beginner may feel that he knows much more about people and their motives, and the reasons for their actions, than he really does. But amateur psychologising is irritating to those on whom it is practised, and is not the same as deep insight into human nature. The trained analyst begins with a provisional diagnosis which he is always refining and correcting. Often what is explanatory of a given character or type of behaviour only emerges with great pain and difficulty after a long investigation. It is a great temptation, when one possesses a little knowledge, to use it on other people, and one should certainly use it in the privacy of one's own thoughts as an aid to accurate observation and growing insight. Yet the urge to be for ever 'psychoanalysing others' is itself a sign of immaturity. A mature person simply accepts others as normal people, and works with them, unless problems arise to call for a different approach.

We should begin by using knowledge to face honestly our own problems. Sigmund Freud says: 'Psychoanalysis is learnt first of all on oneself, through the study of one's own personality'.¹ Let us be prepared to accept this discipline, and only when knowledge and experience are extensive, and then preferably under skilled guidance, begin to use it on other people. The writer once heard Dr. J. R. Rees say in a lecture that teaching, medicine, and the ministry are the three patronising professions. They certainly can minister to our self-esteem and inflate our egotism, unless we are on guard. The possession of psychological knowledge increases the danger unless it is very honestly used first on oneself.

¹ S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 14.

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That is why those who psychoanalyse ought first to have been psychoanalysed themselves. The further you go in trying to understand human character and conduct, the more complex, deceptive, and subtle you see its structure and motivation to be. It would be disastrous for ministers with a smattering of psychology to go about discovering complexes in members of their flock, or for social workers to attempt specific psychotherapy—a good recipe for losing people's confidence. Such efforts may only be an unrealized way of working off one's own problems on other people. Genuine understanding of human nature is a much profounder thing, and only acquired after much toil.

III. THE USES OF PSYCHOLOGY

(a) Pastoral Psychology

(1) We may now turn to the positive part of our subject and ask: 'What are the uses of this modern science first in the work of the minister of religion?' Here we must at once make an exceedingly important distinction between pastoral psychology and psychotherapy, a distinction equally important for social workers. Psychotherapy is the systematic treatment of neurosis by psychological techniques. Pastoral or social psychology is the impregnation of the minister's or social worker's work (in advising, guiding, warning, and forewarning), with a thorough understanding of human nature from the psychological point of view. The psychotherapist is a specialist. The relationship of the minister and social worker to him is much the same as that of the medical general practitioner. All medical students nowadays are to have some training in psychological medicine, though only a few of them will become specialists in psychotherapy, a type of treatment for which the general practitioner would have no time in any case. But he will have been made aware of the importance of emotional factors in illness, he will be in a position to detect early the signs of emotional mal-

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adjustment and forestall nervous breakdown, he will know how to treat the simpler anxiety states and teach patients how to recognise the relationship between some of their complaints and their environmental and personal difficulties in life. Finally, he will be able to recognise when a personality is so maladjusted that the help of a psychotherapist for more lengthy treatment is required.

In an analogous way the psychologically-trained minister can also perform some of these very functions in the ordinary course of his pastoral work. It is not his job as a minister to embark on lengthy treatment of serious maladjustments of personality. Moreover, he has his own speciality, which is the religious life rather than the emotional health of those he serves. Yet as he moves all the time amongst his own people, watching them in their homes, at their work, in the fellowship of the church, and in their recreations, he is ideally situated to be of great help. If he understands the significance of things and knows what to look for, he may nip many a trouble in the bud. He will detect the first signs of rising anxiety long before a person ever thinks of going to a doctor. He can help people to adjust themselves to business worries and domestic troubles and forestall the onset of 'nerves'. He will often find parents worried about their children, and can give valuable guidance about parental handling. All this depends on his knowing what he is about in more than a rough and ready way. Similarly, the social worker goes into the homes of the people, which the specialist psychotherapist rarely does.

Let us illustrate. The pastor may come across a man who is full of complaints and criticisms, who is constantly grouching that things are all wrong at work, at the church, in the Government. This omnivorous grouse that devours the whole of life is never rational. It is the spilling-over of a subjective discontent. Instead of dismissing the man as an awkward fellow, he will wonder what secret trouble is gnawing at the man's personality. Perhaps he is unhappily

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married and has never dared tell anyone. He will never touch on the sore point himself; he will rather ease himself by grumbling and finding fault with everyone else. Yet he is likely to be longing to unburden himself, and to be grateful for an opportunity tactfully given to open up his troubled mind. 'Look here, old chap. I'm concerned about you. I don't think the things you are always tilting at are really the things that upset you. You seem to me to have a burdened mind.' That may be enough to give him the chance. Then, if he takes you into his confidence, everything depends on how far you really understand what he reveals.

The following is a quite different type of case. Some years ago a young man went to an experienced minister to seek help because he was troubled badly with masturbation. The minister talked to him, did his utmost to strengthen the lad's feeling that masturbation was an evil habit that he must have the moral strength to overcome, and prayed with him. The lad went away to wrestle and pray in secret, but the habit remained unbroken, and a source of chronic feelings of shame, guilt, and self-accusation over the belief that he was weak-willed. Time passed, the lad grew up and suffered a bad nervous breakdown, which brought him to a psycho-therapist. Then the real story came out: a tragic story of ill-treatment and loneliness in childhood. The masturbation was merely incidental, a superficial sign of serious environmental difficulties, a fleck of foam on the surface of a stormy sea of emotion. What a pity that experienced minister was not also psychologically instructed! Years of futile struggle and eventual breakdown would have been saved if he could have said to the lad, in effect: 'Masturbation as a physical fact does no harm and is of little importance.¹ As an emotional fact it is important because it is most often a

¹ Sir J. Paget, quoted by Dr. K. Walker in *Sex Difficulties of the Male*, says: 'You may teach positively that masturbation does neither more nor less harm than sexual intercourse practised with the same frequency.' This refers to physical consequences.

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symptom of chronic anxiety. Let us forget about the masturbation: that will die away when its cause is dealt with. What grave anxieties are upsetting you and driving you to seek comfort in this way?' An investigation of the boy's home life, possible resort to the N.S.P.C.C., a sympathetic treatment of the hopes and fears of his disturbed mind and their effect on his development, would at that stage have prevented a major calamity later on. But the minister did not possess the knowledge to make that approach.

(2) The distinction between pastoral or social psychology and psychotherapy, though fundamental, is, however, not quite so simple as stated above. A human being is a 'whole', and the various aspects of his life—physical, intellectual, social, ethical, and spiritual—are but aspects of that one undivided whole. They are not separated parts of a person's life, having no bearing on each other. It is quite impossible to split up a human being into unrelated parts, each assigned to a different profession for treatment or cure when disorder sets in. Rudolf Allers, an eminent Adlerian psychiatrist and a Roman Catholic, writes: 'Human nature is what might be termed a "dynamic whole". . . . The concept of totality is of the greatest importance for the study of human nature.'¹ This truth is characteristic of the modern approach to man, whether in philosophy, psychology, medicine, or the practical handling of social problems. It needs even stronger emphasis in theology and religious thinking generally than in other spheres. Just because the religious thinker deals with human functioning at the highest level, he is in danger of abstracting the spiritual life from the other aspects of personal existence, and dealing with it as something self-contained and apart. The day has long gone by when it could be said that the doctor deals with the body and the pastor with the soul. The pastor who has eyes to see will often recognise in some forms of illness the symptoms of spiritual disharmony, and the doctor who knows that his

¹ R. Allers, *New Psychologies*, p. 53.

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patient is not a 'case' but a 'person' will often realise that the 'person' would lose his tendency to illness if life were more satisfactory to him.

Whether an individual is ill, or in a state of spiritual crisis, he is always a person with a given constitution, a disposition and temperament largely determined by heredity, a character built thereon; and finally, with a social situation made up of his relationships with people in the home, at work, and in his social, political, and recreational interests. A disturbance at any point will ramify until it affects every other point in the whole of his personal life. The answer to his troubles must be in terms of his 'wholeness' as a person.

(3) Thus the nervous symptoms that send a patient to a doctor may be largely due to a difficult environment, for we all have our breaking point, and there is a degree of social pressure beyond which we all react with irritation, anxiety, and intolerance, perhaps mounting into neurosis unless we are helped. A minister, in the course of his visitation, may come across a middle-aged unmarried woman, off work with, let us say, shingles. Her doctor will be treating that complaint with the appropriate physical remedies, but he knows that nervous tension lies behind it. The minister sees that her recent history is a clue, not only to the shingles but to her generally worried state of mind. She has lived for years with her mother, who not so long ago died; now she comes home from work to a cold, empty house, with no fire, no meal ready, all the housework to do after her wage-earning is done. But she is a gallant soul who refuses to complain or bother other people with her troubles, and so she has accumulated an amount of pent-up anxiety which spills over into the body to upset that. After the doctor has cured the shingles, she may be in great need of the minister to help her to talk out her troubles and, perhaps, readjust her attitude to herself and to life so as to eliminate the spiritual friction which has been taking toll of her.

Environmental pressure may be due to unemployment or

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to domestic unhappiness and strife. A maladjusted marriage hidden from the outside world, or the presence in the home of relatives or 'in-laws', who do not fit in too well, may mean that the patient lives in a state of constant mental tension, which transmits itself to the body as nervous and muscular tension. There will be an inability to relax, poor or unrestful sleep, a subtle disturbance of the metabolic processes in the body, and ultimately some illness or other. Again, the disappointment of ambitions, the frustration of early hopes, an undermining sense of failure, loss of interest and initiative, aim, and purpose, and in the end loss of the sense of positive significance in living, will bring a steady lowering of vitality and vague illness.

Any number of problems of this order have major or minor effects in the disturbance of health. The doctor may give a tonic or sedative; in the more leisurely days of the old-fashioned 'family doctor' (fortunately not altogether gone, even in these hurried times) he gave much more than medicine, and what he gave of himself, of his experience of life, sympathetic understanding, and sage advice, was far more important than the drug. Yet the doctor, faced with a crowded surgery, has all too little time to go deeply into the human background of illness. Furthermore, not every member of the medical profession, or of any profession, necessarily possesses either the natural flair or understanding to do so. Here is a real sphere of ministry. Provided the pastor or social worker can give genuine help there is today an increasing disposition on the part of doctors to recognise the value of medical co-operation with religious and social services. The minister who can do a first-rate job in pastoral work cannot keep clear of a concern about the illnesses of his people. This means more than simply comforting and encouraging them till the doctor has cured them. It will, in a number of cases, be rather a matter of the doctor keeping the patient going and lessening the pressure of physical symptoms, until the minister has dealt with the real root of

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the trouble by helping the patient to readjust to his situation in life. The minister's work is the more radically curative of the two.

The Christian minister ought not to need persuasion that a large part of his work is of this order. Christ healed the sick, and related illness in a number of cases to the condition of the sufferer's personality, so that instead of saying: 'Rise up and walk', He said: 'Thy sins are forgiven thee.' He allayed the paralytic's sense of guilt and so rid him of his symptom. No one who understands neurosis will limit that word 'sins' to a purely theological sense as meaning 'wilful disobedience to the known will of God'. We may take it as covering all those problems of a mental and emotional kind, all those defects of, and conflicts within, the personality out of which illness arises. No minister who is devoid of understanding and some special training for this work can be said to be properly equipped for his ministry.

Yet more equipment is needed than common sense, religious earnestness, and a love for men and women. Without these, technical knowledge will be largely useless, but without some technical knowledge these qualities will often be wasted in merely giving futile advice. A profound understanding of the working of the human mind is needed to help people to achieve that positive, courageous, effortful attitude to the difficulties of life which will lift them out of the tendency to fall into illness, and bring them into a condition where problems stimulate them rather than depress. Courage and confidence cannot be pumped into folk. One must know how to remove the inner obstacles to the development of their own natural courage. One must know how to help people to talk out their problems, and ease their feelings and understand what has been happening to them. They may not talk out their troubles because they do not like to, but often it is because they do not know how things are connected, and so push the painful things into the half-conscious mental background, not seeing that this is

what upsets them. The correct attitude and approach on the minister's part determines whether they can talk to him. His knowledge of what to look for decides whether he can help them. Ministers have, of course, always done this work. In the past, men of great intuitive understanding of human nature and wide experience of life have exercised a pastoral 'cure' or 'care of souls' of the highest order. But not all of us have these natural gifts, and both those who have them and those who have them not will find their power to help greatly increased by the knowledge that modern psychology puts at their disposal.

(4) So far we have mentioned only troubles arising out of environmental pressures. A minister who knows something of a person's life-story, and much about his work and family life over a period of years (hence the need for long pastorates), is in a fine position to help, in a better position to foresee and foretell possible trouble than even the social worker. But personality problems have deeper roots than present and recent environmental pressures. Character has a causal relation to nervous illness. By character, psychology understands not the ethical quality of a person, but his basic emotional organisation, the conscious, and still more unconscious, motives, desires, feeling-attitudes, and conflicts that determine his reactions to events and people. It is not what happens to us but what we feel and do about it that matters. When we handle life badly, and so suffer not only in happiness but often also in health, it is because at that point the defects of our character have let us down.

Here we enter deep waters. The foundations of character are laid in early childhood. Faulty reaction to life due to some unrecognised character-trait, probably of a childish order, may prove open to quick and sympathetic treatment. Often, however, it goes far deeper; the whole personality needs to be spring-cleaned of the accumulated tensions of the years, and reconstructed after deep investigation, before the sufferer can arrive at freedom and peace. Neither the

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medical general practitioner nor the minister of religion or social worker has the time or specialist training for this work.

IV. THE USES OF PSYCHOLOGY

(b) Psychotherapy

The deep investigation of personality problems has become the special field of operations of the medical psychotherapist, i.e. the psychiatrist who specialises in psychoanalysis rather than in the physical treatment of the insanities. Into the field of psychotherapy a number of ministers have already been drawn and have proved their ability to do good work. There exists a lay, i.e. non-medical, psychotherapy in the case of the Freudian Society, which trains a small number of carefully selected people to carry out psychoanalytical treatment under the direction of medical analysts. Indeed, many of the leading contributors to Freudian theory have been, and are, non-medical analysts. The entirely legitimate concern of the ministry with character problems makes it inevitable that men from the ranks of the ministry should gravitate towards this work. Psychotherapy is the systematic treatment of neurosis by psychological techniques. These vary from hypnosis, high-pressure suggestion and persuasion, and re-education, to minor or major analytical investigation of the personality-type, character-structure, and unconscious conflicts and motives of the person who is ill. As 'treatment for illness' psychotherapy is the concern of the medical profession, not of the ministry.

But we have seen that the matter is not so simple as that. Where ill health results from emotional disturbance and character-defect, it is as much the concern of minister as of doctor. In fact, the personality of the psychotherapist is more important than his profession. Not all doctors and not all ministers could make good psychotherapists. Men of the right type with a real gift for such work, out of the ranks of

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all professions concerned with human problems—the medical, ministerial, educational, and social workers' professions—have both the right and duty to be properly equipped for this work. A recognised 'Association of Lay Psychotherapists' is needed, which is not tied to the doctrinal orthodoxy of any particular school of theory, has a standard qualification, and binds its members to carry out treatment only in conjunction with the medical profession. This would rule out irresponsible dabbling.

The medical profession must know that any non-medical psychotherapist with whom it works is qualified, efficient, and reliable. Further, no non-medical psychotherapist, whether he be a minister or anyone else, ought ever to undertake definite treatment except in co-operation with a doctor. The reasons are clear. There may be character-neuroses that do not reveal any obvious physical symptoms but only distorted emotional reactions and difficult personality-traits. One cannot assume that these are not a medical concern; such cases can be deceptive. Physical symptoms may emerge during treatment; the difficult character may be the preliminary phase of a psychotic condition. Even with common nervous symptoms it is sometimes hard to decide whether they are purely neurotic (due to emotional conflict) or whether they are psychotic (one of the insanities). What at first looks like neurotic depression may be an incipient melancholia, or the depressive phase of a manic-depressive psychosis. Morbid fears and worries in middle life may be due to involutional melancholia. Such facts make it imperative that no 'psychotherapeutic treatment' should ever be given by a non-medical psychologist except in close co-operation with a medical man, ideally a psychiatrist.

Psychotherapy is a speciality, requiring sound training both in theory and practice. The essential part of the training is the personal analysis that everyone ought to undergo before analysing others, a requirement that should be accepted as much by medical men as by other aspirants to

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psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is not the job of ministers in general. Here and there a minister will discover gifts for the work, just as some doctors will, and be drawn to specialise. He must be prepared for long and hard reading in the study, for the discipline of being himself analysed, for submitting to the judgment of qualified people as to his fitness, and for binding himself to work only with the medical profession where actual treatment is indicated. There will naturally be cases where all that is wanted is advice, or explanation, or unburdening, that falls short of psychoanalytic treatment. This is the normal work of pastoral psychology and raises no question of medical co-operation. Psychotherapy in the special sense goes beyond this. There is a real place for the psychotherapist in the ranks of the ministry, for the Christian minister's business is the 'cure of souls', and psychotherapy is a real cure of souls. The Church has not yet evolved the right method of using the services of those who thus specialise. Meanwhile, they might well band together to see that the work is responsibly done and a high level of qualification maintained. To do this the backing of the medical profession and its active help is needed. It is not likely that this support will be forthcoming unless workers are prepared to attain a tested standard of efficiency, and accept fully the obligation not to work independently of the medical profession.

V. THE TEACHING OF PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY

This book closes with a suggested short reading scheme. It may therefore be stressed that knowledge of human nature comes in other ways than by a study of psychology. He who knows nothing but technical psychology may know little of living people. Knowledge of man is to be sought in literature, art, in social, political, and economic studies, in the ethical and spiritual conduct of life, in the mystery of worship, and simply in mixing with people. Yet the psychological approach

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is essential to a real understanding of man in all these other ways.

The most momentous fact established by the scientific study of the mind is the existence, ramifications, and power of the unconscious motive. Our egotism feels a strong distaste for admitting this, but a fact is a fact, even if we do not like it, and we cannot escape it by ignoring it. We shall not understand human beings in their manifold activities, even in their religious life, unless we know what goes on behind the scenes of consciousness. Those who have first-hand knowledge of psychoanalysis realise the extreme subtlety and all-pervasive influence of unconscious motivation in a way that is hardly possible to those who have only book knowledge of psychology, however wide their experience of life. The psychoanalyst realises that many of the fears about, and objections to, modern psychology would fade away if theoretical information were changed into direct experience. Life can only be known from the inside, and the religious man feels the same about those who make intellectual objections to his faith.

The psychological approach to man is searching. It exposes, as nothing else does, our habitual self-deceptions, and challenges us to a self-knowledge from which we usually shrink. For that very reason it has profound religious significance. When the scales fall from our eyes as we look at ourselves, we begin to be open to a genuine religious experience. There can be no adequate knowledge of human nature today if the fruits of psychological investigation are left out of account. We plead for a more wholehearted recognition of the place of psychology in training men for the ministry, as well as for other professions. It would revolutionise the teaching of pastoral theology, which, with psychology, should be treated as a 'clinical' subject, and taught by men who are actually engaged in pastoral work and have the requisite scientific knowledge.

The most serious lack in ministerial training is the absence

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of anything corresponding to the clinical training for medical students. In a medical school, in addition to whole-time professors who are both teachers and specialist research workers in pre-clinical subjects, there are 'clinical professors and lecturers'—doctors who are in practice and able to teach out of their day-to-day experience of patients. Theological colleges have always made a casual and occasional use of the 'clinical lecturer' in inviting men in charge of churches or from the mission field to talk about their work. The time is now ripe for something much more systematic in this direction in every theological college. Men ought not any longer to be left to their own unaided enthusiasm to acquire an adequate knowledge of psychology and its bearing on pastoral work. One would not for a moment undervalue the fine work done in these colleges for many generations, or the work of teaching and training that is being done now. It is simply that life does not stand still: times change and new methods and procedures become possible that enable us to do even better than has been done in the past. May we not hope to see the corporate church-life of all denominations growing in its midst a group of men who have just that specialised psychological knowledge and experience which would prove invaluable in training men for the ministry? This is no doubt a development that the future will see. There are men, whose names are well known amongst the Churches, who have pioneered, and made the first explorations, in this field of service. The task is to go ahead from where they have brought us, in a much more systematic and fully responsible way.

CHAPTER II

The Scope of Social and Pastoral Psychology

IN this chapter we must somewhat expand the treatment of matters introduced in Chapter I, and, because of the extreme importance of the practical issues involved, we must risk some repetition in restating the difference and division of labour between pastoral or social psychology and specialist psychotherapy. Whereas psychotherapy is the specific treatment of neurosis and must remain related in the closest way to medicine, pastoral and social psychology is the application of the best modern psychological knowledge to the normal work of the ministry or of social service, to increase the efficiency of the handling of human problems, and deepen insight into, and understanding of, human nature. These two spheres of interest cannot be absolutely separated in theory, nor even altogether in practice, but a fairly clear distinction can and must be made between them for practical purposes.

We do not want to turn every minister or social worker into a psychotherapist, even if all were suitable, for who would then do their own proper work? It may not be out of place to consider the fact that some over-discouraged ministers, feeling that the Church as at present constituted is failing to meet the needs of men and women in this restless age of transition, might be tempted to turn to psychotherapy as a way out of the sinking ship. After all, ministers are human, and are liable to feel, in their own particular setting, the pressure of security-motives and prestige-motives that operate in people elsewhere. Ministers not in-

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frequently suffer from the feeling that their profession is accorded scant respect in the world generally, and seek to sustain their sense of their own value and obtain recognition from others by branching out into some not directly ministerial activity. Needless to say, this is not a sound motive for taking up psychology. In fact, of course, a minister is accepted everywhere at his real value as a man, and if he is worth his place in the ministry he will be respected and his help sought by all kinds of people who might never think of going to a church service. There is no position that has greater strategic value or offers more infinitely varied opportunities of practical service to men than that of the Christian minister. It is urgently necessary, not only for the Church but for the community, that there should be ministers as fully equipped as possible, not only spiritually but scientifically, to do their work.

A minister's job, then, is primarily to be a minister, to minister to the emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually storm-tossed men and women and young people of this confusing period of history. All around are folk whose minds are being eaten into by scepticisms, cynicisms, doubts and fears, whose faith in human nature, in themselves, in God, is being undermined by a sense of helplessness and hopelessness, who are hungry for convictions, yet in danger of drifting into the feeling that life has little or no meaning. Here is the minister's field, not in working with those who have broken down with neurosis, but with those who are carrying on bravely, if often very anxiously, in the midst of the pressures and puzzles of a disturbing and confusing social, cultural, political, and international scene.

Similarly, the social worker's job is the concrete, practical one of helping people over their difficulties of social adjustment and rehabilitation; it may cover every kind of problem, from rent, housing, or finding a suitable job, to the domestic relationships of husband and wife, parent and child, age and youth. From the psychological point of view the work of

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both minister and social worker aims at supporting the conscious mind, building up the ego-defences, guiding the ego-adjustments, and not at probing into the unconscious. It is spiritual and social therapy, not psychotherapy in the narrower specialist sense.

A psychotherapist's business is primarily to restore a nervously ill person to working capacity and to adjust him to his fellow-men. That latter part of the task is, of course, a profoundly religious aim. Professor John Macmurray writes: 'The field of religion is the field of personal relations, and the datum from which religious reflection starts is the reciprocity or mutuality of these. Its problem is the problem of communion or community. Religion is about communion or community, which are facts of direct, universal human experience.'¹ We shall have more to say about that later. But the psychotherapist's task, though it is in essence a truly religious task, is not the whole of religion, though the humanist might claim that it is. The New Testament teaching is that 'thou shalt love the Lord thy God', as well as 'thy neighbour as thyself'. Adjustment to the finite and the infinite, to man and God, are interrelated and inseparable, but that does not warrant us in merely identifying the two. The work of the minister goes beyond that of the psychotherapist into the region of the ultimate issues and meanings of human existence. That is the real reason why we do not want simply to turn every minister into a psychotherapist.

There is also a practical reason, namely, that it is impossible to run a highly organised and busy church that caters for the needs of children, young people, adults, and old folk in a many-sided life, and at the same time carry on a full practice in psychotherapy. Sooner or later one or the other must suffer, and a man has to choose. By far the great majority of ministers ought to choose first and foremost to be ministers; only here and there will a man be pushed inexorably along the path of psychotherapy in a specialist way.

¹ J. Macmurray, *The Structure of Religious Experience*, p. 43.

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After all, the ministry is itself as much a speciality as psychotherapy.

We may, before we finally leave this important issue, note that a different training is necessary for the two distinct, if allied, spheres of work. Psychotherapy must remain very closely linked to medicine, which is not so true of pastoral psychology. The psychotherapist, if he is not a doctor, must have some medical knowledge in order to help a patient to understand the nature of his physical symptoms and what is meant by their being emotionally caused. Often during the treatment of serious neurosis the severity of emotional reactions may call for some physical alleviation by drugs. The general public has by now become aware of the phenobarbitone that may be prescribed for a patient who is inclined to panic through fear of loss of self-control. Benzadrine or even, in severe cases, electroplexy may be needed to lift a state of depression. This, of course, lies outside the sphere of the non-medical psychotherapist, who must work with a medical man. Again, the overlapping of neurosis and psychosis (insanity) is such that even the specialist cannot always at first decide whether a psychotic condition is present or not. Certainly no one today should set out to practise analytical therapy without first having a personal training analysis, and even then he should take his first cases under experienced supervision. For all these reasons, therefore, no one should deem it right to plunge into the treatment of neurosis by analysis without such special training for the task. If we are asked how a man who indisputably discovers special gifts for dealing with people in the course of a psychologically-instructed pastoral ministry or social work can acquire this more specialist preparation for more intense psychological work, we can only say that at the moment there is no official provision made. But the training in theory can be accomplished by adequate directed study, a personal analysis can be obtained even if at some financial sacrifice, and when a man has once won the confidence of doctors in

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his own locality he will find many of them very glad to use his services. If he is intent on learning he will learn much by his co-operation with them in addition to special study. But let us finally say that the ministry is the work of primary importance.

What use, then, can a minister make of psychology in the course of the normal work of pastoral visitation, receiving people who come to seek help and advice, and preaching? Some hints as to the possibilities have already been given in Chapter I. We may here set out somewhat more systematically the chief directions in which opportunity lies. These may be summarised as: (1) Understanding character; (2) Religious problems; (3) Preventive work; (4) Relieving simple anxiety states. These will be dealt with from the point of view of the minister of religion. Social workers will be able to make their own selection of relevant material.

I. UNDERSTANDING CHARACTER

It is in the region of character-analysis that modern psychology and the theories of psychotherapy come closest to the concerns of the ministry. The behaviour patterns in which character is revealed, the motives, open or hidden, that produce them, are naturally something of which no one can afford to be ignorant. An understanding of human nature is needed by business man, professional man, and politician, as much as by teacher, social worker, doctor, and parson. The common attitude to the more difficult character-traits that people reveal is, however, the moral rather than the psychological one. We are more apt impatiently to condemn those characteristics that annoy us than to seek an understanding of their origin and inner meaning. We usually jump to the conclusion that people could behave differently and be more co-operative and friendly and reasonable without any difficulty, if only they would, and thus our attitude of judgment is further hardened.

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Possibly in the rush and hurry of the workaday life of the world this attitude is inevitable. A business man engaging an employee or having to decide whether to dismiss him or not, hardly has time for much extended research into the man's early history or present domestic background or obscure motivations. What concerns him is whether this man can or cannot co-operate with his colleagues and do his work efficiently; though even in business the best service is only likely to be got out of people if they feel sympathetically understood. The boss or employer who has intuitive insight into character will manage his staff with far less friction than the ruthless, hard man who blunders roughshod over everyone's susceptibilities.

The minister has a two-fold need to understand character, and, much more than is the case with the business man, it is an integral part of his work. The business man's task in the end is to make a financial success of his business. The minister's task is to help people of the most diverse types to achieve spiritual fellowship and the motive of community service, and to help them solve their personal problems in such a way as to remove the inner hindrances to a true religious experience. Therefore the need to understand the character-structure that lies behind their conduct of life is really central in his work, and is felt at two distinct, if not really separate, levels of concern. He must understand people as individual members of a church organisation who may be working happily or else in difficult relations with other church members. He must seek to keep his church life free from internal frictions and disrupting disagreements. The awkward person who upsets those he works with, who is jealous, petty, hungry for praise, eager for recognition, who takes unreasonable dislikes to certain other people in the church; the aggressive member who must have his own way, who tries to dominate every committee, who takes offence if he is not agreed with; the hypersensitive person who is always liable to feel ignored or slighted; the nervous

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person who has gifts but lacks the confidence to use them: such people constantly weigh on the minister's mind.

It is easy to get impatient or cross, to fall back on judgment and condemnation, but for the minister that is a failure to understand. He puts it out of his power to help these very people who most need his help. For his concern for them goes even deeper than his need to help them to fit happily into the organised church life. He is their pastor charged with a 'cure of souls' in relation to them. Their personality problems not only upset the church fellowship but frustrate their own moral and spiritual growth. For their own sake, as well as for the sake of the church, he cannot afford simply to turn them down; to rid himself of the awkward member is to fail in the very charge he is entrusted with. Not that he is in the least likely to succeed in helping everyone. The psychotherapist does not cure every patient, and sometimes the reasons for that lie in the therapist's own personality. It is in order to minimise the liability to such failures that the therapist himself first undergoes a personal analysis, and for the same reasons a minister must first use his psychological insights on himself. Psychology needs first to be a personal discipline and instrument of self-knowledge. But the minister must leave no stone unturned to understand his people, and most of all the difficult ones.

Here then is the first use for psychology in the ministry: to help the minister to understand character in himself and other people. The adequately trained minister will learn much from little matters that otherwise he might not take much note of. Here is a man who is the stormy petrel of the church or deacons' meeting, a man who can always be relied on to take an oppositionist line in a committee; some squander-bug of internal irritation bites him and makes him waste his own and other people's time and energy in antagonistic argument when everyone wants to get on. Why does he do it? Is he just cussed? Is he seeking the limelight? Perhaps he cannot make constructive suggestions and so,

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needing to overcome a gnawing sense of inferiority, is he forced to burst in with destructive criticisms? or has he got a hidden accumulation of undischarged resentments that are always looking for a way out? The minister visits his home and his wife drops the chance remark that her husband is not sleeping too well; he has disturbing nightmares. That is important and extremely relevant. The man is struggling to suppress some inflamed aggressiveness, not always successfully in the church life, but far more successfully than he is given credit for, and it breaks out where it does least harm: in sleep. He is not just a nuisance; he is a man with a problem who needs to be understood. Perhaps that very inflamed aggressiveness, which is his primary problem, is creating fresh difficulties; he is getting people up against him and beginning to feel misunderstood and isolated, and so more aggressive. One day the minister finds or makes an opportunity to guide conversation into some channel that may reveal the source of this man's basic anger against life. Perhaps it will turn out that he was early forced into a job he did not like and has always felt frustrated; or he had a very unhappy childhood and the iron got into his soul. In a quiet and friendly way the minister helps this man to unburden himself, and he begins to feel that he is understood. A pastor may do that out of native sympathy and insight, but he will do it far more effectively if he has accurate psychological knowledge at his disposal.

Work of this kind is bound to have a far-reaching effect on his preaching. Whenever he is led to touch on the faults and follies of men he will be far less likely simply to take a denunciatory line. It is easy, but not particularly helpful, to denounce sins from the pulpit. Either the listener will apply the condemnation to someone else, or he will feel deeply discouraged, knowing that he has struggled for years against some weakness, prayed over it, wrestled with it, with but little success, and nothing in the sermon gives him any fresh or helpful line of approach. Nor does the preacher's mood

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and manner encourage him to feel: 'Here is someone who understands; maybe I could talk this over with him and he could help me.' Whereas a sympathetic and explanatory way of dealing with human failures, not in technical psychological terms, but with genuine psychological insight translated into common-sense language, may well bring new hope to the burdened mind. Psychological knowledge as an aid to understanding character-structure and personality problems is, perhaps, the fundamental application of this science to the work of the ministry.

II. UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

This is an extension of what we have been discussing into the special field of religious belief and experience. Psychology does not undervalue thinking and the intellectual life of the mind; it could not consistently do so, for it is by intellectual research that this science has itself been built up. But psychology does make it plain to all who are willing to see, that our thinking is far more at the mercy of our emotions than we care to allow for. The causes for our general intellectual point of view, for special beliefs or doubts that we may cling to, and for some of the difficulties we feel, are more often fruitfully to be sought in our emotional life than in our logical and rational activity. It would be easy to provide any number of illustrations of this. A young man suffering from hysterical faintings, secret self-pity, and a sense of inferiority proclaimed himself a scientific materialist. He had read widely, had a real grasp of the subject and could marshal arguments convincingly; yet the real reason for his scientific materialism was that he had the idea that that was an intellectually tough philosophy, a 'man's point of view', and his faith or scepticism was a pathetic attempt to keep up his prestige in his own eyes. Since the disproof of his views would throw him back on a redoubled sense of his own inadequacy, he was compelled

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to remain unconvinced by all argument against his position. A direct intellectual attack on his materialism would have been foredoomed to failure because, in self-defence, he could not allow it to succeed. It is necessary to help people to see that unless they can believe a thing with their whole self, and not merely with their intellect divorced from their emotional life, they are not really coming to grips with life.

It is not, however, only anti-Christian faiths that can be held on the basis of inadequate or wrong motives. Often a person may profess the Christian faith itself without realising how immature are his real reasons for doing so; the result is then a religion in which there is no progressive growth of character or insight, no real building-up in true Christian living, but rather stagnation, rigidity, and externalism. A striking instance of this has recently come to the writer's notice. A young man in the throes of a too-long-delayed development of adult self-reliance complained that out of the home he was inclined to feel too aggressive, but that once back again in the home with mother and father he would feel childish and dependent. He fancied that at home he looked childish in the face and spoke with a childish voice. In the course of treatment he began to be emotionally weaned from mother, and presently displayed a greatly increased interest in religion and church-going, and started to say his prayers. He had previously had some nightmares in which he called to mother for help. Now he had had a talk with his parents and told them he must fend for himself more, and he reported: 'I am more interested in religion now. I seem to have another mother and father, a Father in Heaven. I keep talking to God, asking Him to give me faith in Himself.' He then produced a nightmare with a rather different emphasis. He says: 'I dreamt I was lying in bed and I saw mother come in and make towards me in a ferocious manner. I turned to God and cried for help.' Clearly God was functioning as a substitute for parents for his dependent and mother-fixated self. There is no need to

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rule out altogether, as wholly spurious, a religion of this kind, but its immaturity is plain, and a religion that stagnated at that level would frustrate all true development.

The religious problem of 'guilt' is of such far-reaching psychological importance that we must reserve it for separate treatment. A somewhat different example of a psychological approach to an apparently religious problem is provided by the case of a man suffering greatly under the conviction that he had committed the unforgivable sin. All the relevant texts were expounded and discussed and still this disturbing conviction retained its hold over the man. His distress was such that at times he could hardly restrain tears. The true explanation of the matter was arrived at, not by a scriptural or theological, but by a psychological approach. The man had been a non-churchgoer and had recently lost his wife, a very fine woman who was also a sincere Christian. Her death brought home to him the fact that he had never in any way shared in her religious interests and that they were far apart in their fundamental spiritual attitudes to life. He had deprived her of understanding and companionship where it would have meant so much to her, and now it was too late. He could not make it up to her in any way. He could not forgive himself for what he felt was blindness, lack of perception, and selfishness. But it is a very painful thing to feel unable to forgive oneself in such an important matter. He could not tolerate that, and automatically projected the inability to forgive on to God. Now it was God who could not forgive him; he had committed the unforgivable sin. Note, however, that by generating intense anxiety over this fictitious issue he succeeded in distracting his mind from the real issue, which was his own absorption in his own concerns and careless failure to recognise what this involved for other people. When this was pointed out the problem was solved in a constructive way. He underwent an important change in himself, and from then on no longer treated home as an hotel that existed

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only for his convenience. He became considerate and unselfish towards other members of the family and lost his anxiety about the unforgivable sin. It should be added that this conviction of having committed the unforgivable sin is a not uncommon depressive reaction, and is then a more serious symptom.

It is not adequate to deal with the enormous field of the application of psychology to religious problems in this piecemeal fashion. Basic principles in the psychology of religion need to be established. Meanwhile, enough may have been said to indicate practical possibilities in this field. It may be that only by the pooling of the experience of psychologically instructed pastors will an adequate psychology of religion be worked out.

III. PREVENTIVE WORK

Here again we are indicating the nature of the opportunity rather than giving a systematic treatment of the subject. The minister moves about in intimate contact with many people, in the fellowship of the church life and in their homes. Unless his pastorates are of the short and fleeting variety, he is able to follow the course of their lives over a period of years. He knows their work, illnesses, good and ill fortunes, family joys and sorrows, failures and successes, fulfilments and frustrations. He has far more constant contact with them than their doctor, who is only resorted to when they are already ill. If the minister sustains a long pastorate, which is essential for the best pastoral work, he will see many people grow up from childhood, get married, and raise their own families. Here is an incomparable opportunity for the pastor who knows what to look for, and who can read the meaning of little signs, to foresee the development of anxiety-states.

Many people in a condition of incipient neurosis have slipped out of church fellowship into an unhelped loneliness,

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just at the very time when an understanding pastor might have saved them from serious breakdown. It is a not infrequent thing to discover that Mrs. So-and-So has given up coming to church because the singing of the hymns upsets her feelings and makes her want to cry. That is an indication of a condition of emotional instability that needs attention. Perhaps important disappointments about the way life has been developing for her and her husband have been thrust into the mental background over a long period. She is dissatisfied and more unhappy than she admits to herself or to other people. Vague ill health arises, and is most valuable as a means of distracting her attention and that of her friends from the real trouble that she is afraid to face. A tactful and trusted pastor may be able to get her to open up and talk out her discontents, and prevent a steady decline into 'nerves'.

The minister has the opportunity of being with people at the times of bereavement and watching how they deal with their sorrow. It may happen that a husband, wife, or parent loses a partner or child, and thereafter is unable to come to the church where he or she was so often present with the lost loved one. People will say: 'It brings back too many memories and upsets me.' So they may slip away and are forgotten. Here is the pastor's chance. He may observe that they seem to show little outward sign of grief in the ordinary way, and that it is only at church, where their emotions are played on by social gatherings, public services, or singing, that any sign of deep feeling appears. He may learn that they are tending to become recluse, and dropping other contacts with the outer world besides church. He will recognise that they are struggling to stifle grief instead of facing it clearly and openly, and he knows that this leads to disaster. Perhaps it is particularly a British trait to think it weak to show emotion. Howbeit, very many people defend themselves against nothing so stubbornly as their own disturbing feelings, thus bringing unforeseen ills on

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themselves. A parent may even ban all conversation about, or reference to, a dead child in order, as he or she believes, 'to spare the other's feelings'. But as the anniversary of the death comes round each year, some signs of nervous tension begin to appear, and the anniversaries may even be celebrated by recurrent nervous breakdowns of a minor order. The wise pastor can see and understand and help people back again to the high road of mental health by getting them to handle their griefs frankly and openly.

Often, when actual illness has arisen, there is either a large emotional factor among its causes, or else the organic illness itself generates new anxieties. There is bound to be anxiety in every illness, either as effect or cause. The person with an organic disease is quite likely to be secretly nursing frightening fantasies of its future course and outcome, its effects on work, income, the family fortunes, ambitions, and so on. Gently and without any untactful curiosity or blundering demand for confidences, the experienced pastor will know how to unburden the anxious mind. That tact can only be learnt by experience. No psychological text-book can give it, but psychological knowledge of the nature and physical and mental effects of anxiety-states is essential if maximum help is to be given.

Preventive work includes advice that saves people from falling into mistakes they might otherwise make. There is an enormous field of opportunity here for the minister who will take the trouble to equip himself with real knowledge. His work is necessarily much bound up with the family life of those to whom he ministers. He christens the children, watches the parents handle them when he visits the home, sees the problems that arise between parents and their adolescents in the 'awkward age', and observes the pairing off of courting couples who will presently come to him hoping that he will recognise the nature of their errand and save them the embarrassment of saying that they want to get married. At all these turning points of human life—

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adolescence, courtship, marriage, parenthood—ignorance can betray well-meaning people into tragic mistakes. We have hardly yet begun to realise the urgent need for instruction in such matters as sex, the psychology of personal relationships, and parenthood. One can see people *all around heading for unhappiness because of the most elementary errors of judgment in all these things.

Sex education is at last beginning to be taken seriously, but the minister has a unique chance of helping young people here if he will really make a proper study of the subject and not just work from general or conventional ideas. During twelve years as minister of Salem Congregational Church, Leeds, apart from wartime marriages where it was often not possible to find an opportunity to offer help, the writer made a practice of asking all young couples who came to be married whether they wanted any help in understanding the physical side of the relationship. During that time the number who said 'No' could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Quite a number said: 'Well, I think I pretty well know what's necessary, but a talk might be useful.' After a talk usually lasting over an hour the invariable reply would be: 'I never realised there was such a lot to know.' A minister would not be well advised to plunge at once into advising people in these matters as soon as he is ordained. He should wait till he has had adequate experience as a married man himself, and as a parent, by which time he will be in the thirties. He will find the literature that can be obtained through the National Marriage Guidance Council¹ fully adequate for a thorough study of the subject of sex, though there is less material available on the psychological side than is needed.

Education for parenthood has hardly begun to be seriously considered yet. Here is a field in which the churches and ministers can help. The baptism or dedication of

¹ National Marriage Guidance Council. Secretary, Dr. D. Mace, 78 Duke Street, London, W.1.

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children give an opportunity. Every church ought to have its 'Young Parents' Association', where the mothers can meet together to discuss and hear talks on the many-sided problems of bringing up children. The literature on the psychological problems of the child is voluminous and needs careful sifting, but here again the man who is determined to be in a position to help and advise can come by the factual knowledge he needs. An adequate grasp of the psychology of childhood will serve him well, not only in helping individual parents who may seek his advice, but in the work of Sunday School and clubs. The minister must, of course, guard against rushing around as a busybody know-all, who gives the impression that he can put everyone right. He will find that as soon as it comes to be realised that he has understanding and knowledge and the gift and experience to apply it wisely, his help will be sought by many an anxious parent who is wondering what on earth to do about Mary or Willie.

Children bed-wet, suck their thumbs (a habit parents are usually over-anxious about), have temper tantrums, bite or hit other children and are quarrelsome in play, tell lies, sit and rock themselves, go into their shell and sulk, are shy, afraid of the dark, and so on. Little or nothing is done to help parents to understand the emotional problems that lie behind these manifestations. Often they are able to do little beyond try to scold or badger the child out of its 'bad habit' and succeed in making it worse. Few parents have any clear idea of the stages of emotional development through which their child will pass, and how its needs and problems change from age to age. By the time adolescence is reached, so often a regrettable but real struggle for power arises, a fight to retain control on the parents' side and to secure freedom on the child's, and lack of understanding heads the family into unhappiness. The minister is in the best of all positions to help here, if only it is known that he really knows what he is talking about.

IV. RELIEVING SIMPLE ANXIETY-STATES

There are anxiety-states that may at first sight look like the outbreak of a serious neurosis, and which if not taken in time may well degenerate into a serious condition, which yet are essentially simple in their causation. Their reference is to the present-day situation in life of the person concerned, whereas the origins of deep-seated neurosis are always in childhood. Dr. Karen Horney distinguishes these as 'Situation Neuroses' and 'Character Neuroses'. The character neurosis may or may not have any physical symptoms, but there is always a far-reaching distortion of the character-structure revealed in the difficult and abnormal attitudes of mind displayed. Suspiciousness, resentment, aggressiveness, callousness, or self-pity, a complaining attitude, an incipient demand for consideration and help from others, evasion of responsibility, chronic dependency, or else aloofness, lack of overt feeling for or interest in others, solitariness, all these 'neurotic character-trends' are hall-marks of the deep-seated neurosis.

But sometimes a person whose character (as revealed by his capacity to mix and to co-operate in easy, friendly ways, to shoulder responsibility, and to enjoy activity) is essentially normal and well-adjusted may get into a situation in life which involves matters that are extremely hard to face. Conflict situations arise because of incompatible wishes and desires, which may affect the happiness and wellbeing of others as well as the person primarily concerned. Some course of action, which is quite good and legitimate in itself, may, if followed out, be an act of selfishness that would make both other people and the doer unhappy. Yet such wishes will not obediently and meekly depart out of the mind just because they are seen to be, on the whole, unacceptable. Often such a conflict is not openly and squarely faced. We do not like to think we are capable of wanting what we cannot wholeheartedly approve of. Such

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desires are thrust into the vague mental background, there to set up gathering anxiety lest they should break out against our will. Some of the common physical signs of a body upset by an anxious mind, such as headaches, palpitation, breathlessness, lassitude, diarrhoea, may arise, and anxiety is then switched on to the symptoms, which become further exaggerated and maintained. A vicious circle of anxiety, symptoms, more anxiety, worsening symptoms, may be set up. Yet there need not be any serious neurosis in all this. A few hours spent on honest and frank examination of the sufferer's life-situation may bring all the relevant anxiety-creating factors into view, and then, instead of repression and evasion, a real solution and a complete adjustment is found. These 'situation neuroses' are well within the sphere of any wise and experienced and psychologically instructed minister (or medical general practitioner or social worker) to deal with.

There are some stock situation-problems that frequently give rise to this kind of difficulty. One of them is the clash between marriage and a career in the case of a capable, energetic, and trained woman. She will fall genuinely in love, and finds no immediate difficulty in preferring marriage and the satisfaction of her natural demand for motherhood as against the prospect of economic independence in a career that may run out into a somewhat bleak prospect of spinsterhood. She will marry and have one or two children, and all goes well for a time, but she has not counted on the fact that ambition and a love of freedom are stronger in her than she realised. As time goes on there is a quietly gathering mass of suppressed irritation, and an unrealised straining at the leash, until presently some sudden or threatened increase of the normal pressures of life stirs up an impulse of revolt. The conflict becomes acute. Love of husband, children and home will not permit an open expression of the rebel feelings, and the severity of the inner tension brings on an anxiety attack, a sudden feeling of faintness or an

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attack of trembling. Maybe this came on while she was queueing at the cake-shop, and when the matter is discussed she will remember that she had been feeling a rising tide of irritation at what seemed such a frustrating waste of time. But more important matters lie behind this. The previous evening she and her husband had been wondering whether they should have another baby. She would like another baby, and cannot quite understand why she is so reluctant about deciding in favour of it, not having realised how much she was already feeling limited and tied down by the family situation. All that had been suppressed from the best of motives, yet that was not the wisest way of dealing with it, and now the inner resistance bids fair to take its revenge and burst out willy-nilly. It is a real emotional crisis, but it is not a deep-seated neurosis. An essentially well-balanced mind needs only to face all the facts to work out a mature adjustment based on a realistic postponement of the pleasures of freedom in favour of the solid satisfactions of marriage and motherhood. It does not really need an expert psychotherapist to help in the talking out of such a problem if a minister, social worker, or doctor is at hand who knows enough of the ways of the mind to recognise signs and symptoms, and who can assess sufficiently accurately the basic personality type of the person concerned to guess where the shoe pinches.

This is only an illustration of one of many such situations in which simple anxiety-states can be set up in fundamentally well-balanced people. Karen Horney cites a typical case of situation neurosis in *The Neurotic Personality of our Time*. A woman in the forties is married to a man very much older than herself. It is a good marriage, and she is very fond of her now elderly husband, who is, however, increasingly unable to give her either the physical satisfaction, social life, or general companionship that she is still quite capable of enjoying. A marriageable man of her own age enters her circle and a friendship grows between them, and she

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pushes out of consciousness the fact that he is playing on her unsatisfied desires. Her affection for her husband as well as her sense of duty will not let her face the facts, and an anxiety-state results. A few talks sufficed to help her see clearly how matters stood, and face her problem openly with herself, with the result that the physical signs of nervous tension died away.

Many business worries that play on the minds of basically well-balanced men produce anxiety-states of this order. If a minister has the confidence of the male members of his church he will often have the opportunity of helping them to ease their minds by drawing them into a frank discussion of their problems. It is impossible to give illustrations to cover the whole field of possibilities in any one department of the application of psychological knowledge in the work of the ministry. This chapter could do no more than give hints as to what the possibilities are. No claim is made to have covered the field exhaustively, even in the enumeration of the four major types of application. Much independent and co-operative thinking needs to be done to map out the whole field.

Meanwhile, one last point may be mentioned. There is a psychological and spiritual ministry that consists of simply listening. Every minister and social worker needs to learn to be a better listener than talker in private dealing with troubled people. To men much given to preaching, lecturing, and talking in public, it is easy to slip into the same attitude of mind in private conversation and to assume that one is always expected to make pronouncements. But it not infrequently happens that all people need is an opportunity to escape from the isolation of being shut up alone with some problem or trouble. They do not need advice or comment, but perhaps only a leading question to get them talking again when they halt in their narrative. The very act of talking out what is on their minds enables them to get it in perspective and so to adjust to it. Such a conversation may

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end, not with an analysis of the situation by the minister, but with a simple statement by the one who has been feeling so strained and anxious: 'Well, I feel better now I've talked it out with you.' There are people all around who are keeping their difficulties in to themselves. If they think we can do nothing but preach at them, they will give us little chance of helping. To be able to be a sympathetic listener is the very first qualification for being of service to other people.

V. MOTIVES

A word may be added on a matter that calls to be considered by all who undertake to help, guide, lead or cure their fellows: 'Why do I want to do this work?' We naturally give ourselves an answer in terms of the conscious and rational motives of which we are aware, and these need not be disparaged. Genuine feeling for those who suffer and a certain measure of disinterested desire to help them, is real enough in every average normal personality.

There are, however, unconscious motives that hide behind the consciously acceptable ones, and use them as a 'rationalization-screen'. One may have unconscious motives for doing anything, but when our work consists in exercising a direct influence on the personality and behaviour of other people, these unconscious motives assume tremendous importance. They may cause us to make mistakes in the way we handle people, so that we frustrate and misdirect them with the best of conscious intentions.

This is considered in the next chapter in relation to the preaching ministry. With regard to social workers we have to draw a distinction between short-term help such as finding jobs, or institutional accommodation, or information, and long-term help such as that given by the moral welfare worker or the probation officer dealing with delinquents, unmarried mothers, etc. In the former, the social worker does not 'carry' people for long. In the latter, personal

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support of a directly friendly kind is given, and it is friendship more than anything else that the person helped stands in need of. Inevitably, a dependency on the social worker develops and his unconscious motives will determine how he handles it. Does he like the feeling of having people depend on him and tend to foster their dependence and keep it going too long? Does the situation afford him a pleasurable sense of power? Does he himself lack the capacity for making really personal contacts and turn to 'doing things for people' as a substitute? Does he himself possess stronger dependent tendencies than he realizes, so that he derives an unconscious support from those he helps, just as many parents are emotionally dependent on their children and unable to reconcile themselves, therefore, to the children leaving home to live their own lives?

It is possible, given reasonable objectivity and honesty towards oneself, to get some inkling as to one's deeper motives in these matters: and a minister or social worker who finds that this work creates any kind of emotional problem for himself, would be well advised to seek at least a short exploratory analysis, for the sake of both himself and those he seeks to aid.

CHAPTER III

Visiting Homes, Preaching, and Public Speaking

I. VISITING HOMES

It would seem that any reasonably systematic handling of the problems of pastoral and social psychology ought to deal with the subject of visiting in people's homes. The initial difficulty is to decide what sort of contribution the psychologist has to make in this matter. Psychology can hardly be treated as a 'Ready Reckoner' which one may look up to find answers in detail to this or that particular problem or situation. In the actual work of visitation the tact, wit, and wisdom of the visitor must decide how to react in each of the multiplicity of situations in which he finds himself. No book or lecture or theory can substitute for the experience and adequacy that the pastor or social worker must develop for himself. No general rules can be laid down on such matters as how to introduce oneself, how to open up a conversation and guide it on to matters of importance. The correct approach to one person is not necessarily the correct approach to another person. The personality of the visitor himself is a determining factor, since it may lie quite outside his range of powers to make personal contacts in the way that another man of different temperament and outlook would. Each man must find his own way and learn by his failures.

It is, naturally, necessary to make people feel at ease in our presence, and therefore the less formal we are the better. A pastoral visit should not be a 'state occasion', but a friendly call. The writer, in the early days of his ministry,

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adopted for a time the practice of announcing on Sunday which streets he would visit in the coming week, so as to obviate the waste of time in calling and finding people not at home. But this practice was soon given up. He found that those who stayed in to receive him were much too prepared for his visit. Best clothes, and the best tea-set, and a partially spring-cleaned house did not make the best setting for easy and natural conversation. It was better to drop in and catch folk under normal conditions. One could gently wave aside the inevitable apologies for the house being in such a state, or for the housewife having been found in the middle of some household chore. The minister is a family man and understands these things. But in the end the best preparation for pastoral visitation is not to think out some technique of approach, but to develop a human, easy, approachable personality and trust to it to do its own work. This applies just as much to the social worker, even though his or her visit will more often be for some specific practical purpose.

What may be profitably thought out is the general question of the nature and purpose of pastoral visitation in the case of the minister of religion. There was a time when he would call upon his parishioners or church members with an almost overwhelming seriousness of religious purpose. The household would be gathered together to be catechised, he would deal faithfully with their spiritual condition and welfare, and oversee the religious life of the family. That type of visitation is no longer possible. The times have changed, the attitude of church members and adherents to the minister has changed, and priestly dictation would not be accepted.

One fears that a great deal of pastoral visitation has now degenerated, in fact, into a somewhat trivial opposite from that earlier ministry in the home. The minister drops in for a friendly social call, or at least the church member regards it largely in that light. There will be a cup of tea, a bit of

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chatty conversation about this and that, some discussion of church business, some trite references to the weather and politics and the state of the world, and the picking-up of a bit of information about some other family. 'Did you know that Mrs. Jones's little boy was taken to hospital the other day?' or, 'I hear that Mr. Smith was a bit upset at what was said at the church meeting last week.' Nothing more really happens. Quite likely the pastoral call may take place because Mrs. Brown remarked that 'You haven't been to see me lately', or because Mrs. Green was reported to have said to a friend that 'the minister was in our street last week, but he didn't call to see me'. The conception of pastoral visitation that exists in the minds of church people amounts to little more than a somewhat demanding expectation that the minister shall keep on 'looking them up'. The main purpose of it, from the deacons' or church officers' point of view, is that of maintaining the organisation. Adherents must not be lost. As soon as they show any tendency to fall off, they must be hunted up again. There is, of course, a practical necessity in this, but, as a conception of the nature and function of pastoral visitation, it cultivates a childish attitude in church members of 'wanting ministerial attention' and 'expecting to be waited on'. It is too akin to the attitude of a demanding adolescent to a devoted mother. It does not breed a vigorous and robust fellowship which works together as an army of evangelists with a mission to the neighbourhood. A virile and adventurous church will never be made out of people who believe that the minister's main job is to keep on 'looking them up'. From the minister's point of view the whole thing becomes trivial. A man cannot really respect himself in doing it.

A much more serious view of pastoral visitation is required, and church people need definite education in the matter. If we may be permitted the expression, the minister has two main laboratories in which he carries on his work: one is the activity and fellowship that goes on in the church

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buildings, the other is the homes of his people. When a minister goes into a home he has important work to do. That does not mean that he will enter it in a portentous manner. His actual manner of calling can and should be easy and informal, but he goes with an exceedingly serious purpose in mind. He wants to know, to understand, the people who live in that home, both as individuals and as a sample of the life of the community. He goes in a twofold capacity as both a Christian friend and a student of human nature. It might be well if ministers regarded themselves, without any loss of the sense of a divine vocation, as social workers who, in the fulfilment of their special responsibilities, are also carrying on research into the conditions and problems of human living in their area. That is what the ablest and best ministers have in fact always done, and theological students should be trained to regard their work in this way. Such work must be patient and thorough, and the minister must find out how to get beneath the surface of the life of his people.

If pastoral visitation is carried out in that spirit, it will be seen that it cannot be hurried. A few thorough visits in a week, in which the pastor has really got to know the life of one or two families, is far more valuable than an imposing list of people who have been 'looked up'. Little is achieved by simply 'popping in' and having a cheery chat and 'popping out' again. The minister has to feel his way into the life of the people. The necessary organisational business of keeping constant touch with everyone who is either closely or remotely connected with the church should not be regarded as the minister's responsibility primarily. That work ought to be done by the church members. The hunting-up of slack or lapsed adherents should be regularly provided for by a Church Visiting Committee, which will report to the minister any cases that need his special attention. That is not strictly pastoral work, and if it is loaded on to a busy minister he will have no time for really pastoral

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visitation. He will be exhausted and his time absorbed in a great deal of casual calling on people that may or may not be productive of any decisive results. Too many churches just leave this whole matter to their minister. It is regarded as 'his job', and the church's only contribution is to grumble because he hasn't called yet on this or that individual. Churches have fallen into the habit of expecting to be spoon-fed in this matter, and have lost the true view of the high and important work the minister has to do.

The visits a minister pays to the homes of his people will fall roughly into three classes: purely business calls in which someone has to be seen about financial or organisational issues, sick-visiting—which has the first claim on the pastor's time—and general pastoral visits. The last two will to some extent overlap, for both give an opportunity for the careful and intensive study of personality in the domestic setting, which reveals the stresses and tensions to which people are subjected, not only in the home, but also in their business and social life. Sick-visiting is a first call on the minister's time, because where there is sickness there is always anxiety. It should not be forgotten that often those who are nursing the ill person need pastoral attention as much, and sometimes even more, than the person who is ill. A reference to what is said in Chapter VI about illness being a retreat from life will make plain the fact that the person who is ill has in fact shelved many of his major problems in life for the time being. The extent to which this is true will vary with the nature of the illness. The greater the emotional or functional element in the illness, the more it is being used as an escape from responsibility. The greater the organic factor the more likely is it that the sick person has increased worries of a quite conscious kind; worries about the effect of the illness on work and future prospects. Yet even then physical pain and distress can be unconsciously used to divert attention from life problems. Where the illness contains a pronounced element of neurosis, it can be

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assumed that the burden is falling as hardly on those who do the nursing as on the patient. Their patience is being tried, their liberty to get on with their own living is taken away, they are being forced to devote themselves to the support of one who cannot support himself. This may not be at all realised, but it is very often sensed vaguely, and is a source of frustration. The pastor must then visit the sick, not only for the sake of the sick, but to appreciate the total family situation as it exists around the sick person, and to give help to others involved in it who are feeling the strain.

It is in sick-visiting that co-operation with the doctor is of such great value. One has to recognise that not all doctors will co-operate. There are many older doctors who are quite ignorant of and unsympathetic to psychological medicine, and who have no interest in the emotional state of their patient. With such, co-operation is not possible. But their number is decreasing, and there are very many large-minded men in the medical profession who will gladly avail themselves of the co-operation of a pastor in whom they themselves have confidence. This co-operation of doctors and ministers should be carefully fostered. Such co-partnership between doctors and social workers is already an accepted fact, especially in psychiatric units and in the work of almoners and health visitors. The minister will often learn from the doctor what he feels would be the most useful line to take with the patient. The minister, as he gathers his own experience, will often be able to tell the doctor of the troubles that retard a patient's recovery. It must be remembered, however, that there are things a person may not want to tell his general practitioner, and the patient's consent to the minister's contacting the doctor must first be obtained. If he trusts both, he will agree to their working together to help him.

It should hardly need to be said that the minister must go about this work with tact and delicacy. If he starts fishing for confidences he will only meet with rebuff. He must learn

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the art of making the sick person feel that he is a man one would gladly confide in, a wise and understanding friend to be turned to in time of trouble. He can create opportunities for people to talk to him. Whether they take them or not will depend on his personality. It is useless to try to lay down rules concerning 'manner of approach' or 'bedside manner', beyond saying: 'Be yourself; don't pose or play a role; be simple, sincere, natural, and not fussy. Be more concerned to understand how the patient is feeling and what is going on in his mind, than with ideas of your own that you want to get across to him.'

As regards general home-visitation, it is necessary to combine skilfully and sincerely the two different functions of friend and psychological observer. On the one hand, one is moved by a deep care, a Christian and pastoral care for those visited, and, on the other, one is a student of human nature and conditions of living. The informal atmosphere of a friendly chat is good so long as serious work is going on in the visitor's own mind. He must be learning all the time. He must keep a sharp eye open for signs of worry or strain. He must train himself to see the small beginnings of emotional disturbance. Some clue to a worrying problem in the background will emerge out of general conversation pretty soon, if the minister or social worker is known and trusted as both friend and wise adviser. Doctors, psychotherapists, and many types of social worker have to keep 'case notes', and though that is not practicable in the case of the minister's pastoral work, he may be well repaid for making, in his study from time to time, detailed social, psychological, and religious studies of his people. Thus he will garner properly the fruits of his experience, and gain far deeper insights into human nature than if he is merely content to allow unsifted surface impressions to collect in his mind. If written studies are made, naturally they should then be either destroyed or kept under lock and key; they will not be for any other eyes to see.

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One may make a distinction between helpful hints about personal bearing and behaviour in home-visitation such as any experienced worker could give to the inexperienced beginner; secondly, pastoral and social psychology; and thirdly, pastoral theology. Pastoral and social psychology is concerned with the emotional condition of the people ministered to, and its relationship to their life-situation. The application of specifically religious teaching to the practical problems the pastor will come across is the province of pastoral theology, and is not dealt with here.

II. PREACHING AND PUBLIC SPEAKING

The psychology of preaching is a far more difficult subject. Much of what can be said about it applies to any kind of public speaking, though preaching has special problems. Once again it is of little value to reduce it to a consideration of tricks of technique that may help one to get a message across to a congregation. The psychology of preaching is not a kind of glorified elocution lesson, but a study of the dynamics of the interaction between the personality of the preacher and personalities of individuals in the audience. No general rules, for example, about style, delivery, tone of voice, and type of subject-matter can be laid down. The manner and delivery which naturally suit and express the personality of one man would be entirely artificial in another. 'Aping the famous preacher' is the surest way to failure in the art. There is only one thing that can be said with complete confidence as to its applicability and truth, and that is: 'Be natural, be yourself.' There is no substitute for a well-poised personality which, without self-conscious art, and because of the reality, earnestness, and genuine conviction which are expressed, speaks straight home to the hearts and minds of the listeners. Such genuineness can overcome the most obvious disabilities in voice, manner, and delivery. When the hearer is really gripped by what is said, and by the

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personality of the man who says it, secondary things are lost sight of.

There is, of course, every reason to take pains to correct faults of the kind that a sound elocutionary training can eliminate. There is no excuse for slovenly speech, but there is also no place in preaching or in any kind of serious public speaking or lecturing for a merely elocutionary style. The best technique is, apart from the correction of elementary faults of speech, the natural vocal self-expression of a mature personality with a real message. As in visitation, it is the development of the personality and character of the preacher or lecturer that is the basic condition of good work. Let the well-balanced mind speak unselfconsciously for itself. The special characteristic of preaching is that it is the most personal and intimate of all kinds of public speech. The personal experience and feeling of the speaker enter into it. Yet a social worker addressing a public meeting on some such subject as 'Mental Hygiene' or 'Home Life' is in much the same situation. When it is said that the preacher must above all things be himself, however, that is not saying that he is to thrust himself as such upon his congregation. That is just what the immature personality in the pulpit will do, and what the really mature preacher will not be guilty of. The preacher is the servant of the Word of God, and he comes with 'Thus saith the Lord'; and not with 'These are my opinions'. It is at this point where the complexity of the preacher's own psychology becomes manifest. Preaching is a psychologically dangerous task to undertake, and this is only a little less true of lecturing on social and psychological problems. Few vocations can so subtly lay a man open to insincerity, egotism, over-estimation of his own importance and wisdom, intellectual and moral arrogance masked and disguised as religious fervour and conviction. The perhaps inevitable tendency to cocksure dogmatism in the twenties may be moderated by growing experience of life in the thirties and forties. But the advance of the years may

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bring, not a mellowing humility with deeper insight, but a loss of early freshness and zeal; then there are such enemies as monotony, routine, staleness, and professionalism to combat, and it is a pitiful business trying to manufacture and express emotion and enthusiasm which are not felt. Only by a very radical honesty towards himself can the preacher or social lecturer preserve his personality from the subtle insincerities that would make it an unfit instrument for his work.

Preaching is generally understood to be truth mediated by the personality of the preacher. The man in the pulpit is no lifeless pipeline from which the fountain of the water of life flows mechanically to his hearers. The Word of God has one emotional tone and emphasis in Hosea, and a quite different one in Amos; one temper and emphasis in St. John, and quite another in St. Paul. It takes a mature personality in both the psychological and spiritual senses to mediate and express Christian truth without distorting and adulterating it. If we are honest we shall admit that we never rise to such a height. God entrusts His truth to earthen vessels, but is that not all the more reason why we should see that the earthen vessels are as clean as our diligence can make them? A preacher's sound psychological insight into his own motivations is an absolute necessity. If he lacks the moral courage to see and know himself, he will make use of the congregation, exploit it in the service of his own narcissistic ego. To preach to others provides us with unique opportunities for running away from ourselves. Religious and social workers are equally open to the dangers of working out their private emotional problems on those they minister to.

It is impossible to explore all the dangers that confront men in the pulpit, but in dealing specifically with preaching we may single out for some examination three types in which the preacher's motives need especially careful scrutiny: the denunciatory, the dogmatic authoritarian, and

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the popular topical types. With regard to denunciatory preaching, we should do well to ponder carefully the following words of Carl Jung:

‘In view of the fact that every man does not live in his psychic sphere as a snail in its shell—i.e. separated from others—but is in reality bound to his fellow men by his own unconscious humanity, a crime can never happen as our consciousness sees it exclusively in and for itself—i.e. as a psychic factor which is, and can be, isolated. On the contrary, it happens in a wide radius. The sensation which every crime arouses, the passionate interest shown in tracking down the criminal, the eagerness with which the trial in court is followed, all go to prove that crime has a peculiarly exciting effect on practically everybody who is not abnormally dull and apathetic. People seem to move with it, to feel themselves into it; they try to grasp it and explain it. Something has been set alight in them, and this something is a part of the great fire of evil which has flared up in the crime. . . . Indignation leaps up, angry cries of “Justice!” pursue the murderer, and they are louder, more passionate, and more charged with hate, the more fiercely the spark of evil glows in one’s soul. . . . Our very moral indignation is a sign that evil has lit a fire in our heart, and the more fiercely this fire burns the more poisonous and revengeful we shall be.’¹

This is a timely warning. Moral indignation has its roots in our struggle against evil in ourselves. We tend to wax hottest against those evils towards which we ourselves have secret and repressed tendencies. Moreover, we often find a pleasure in moral indignation and denunciation that we would be slow to admit. It provides a socially permissible outlet for our own aggressive feelings. The belligerent pacifist secretly enjoys his verbally militant attacks on warmongers. The sexual prude finds an only thinly disguised

¹ *Essays on Contemporary Events*, pp. 49-50.

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sexual pleasure in fiercely condemning the licentious behaviour of the times, for that gives an opportunity of talking sex, if not of acting it. No one condemns the totalitarian Nazi more destructively than the equally totalitarian Communist. These things are known to us all, but we all fall into the trap more easily than we like to admit. It is so much easier to project our own faults on to other people and attack them there, than it is to face them in ourselves and undergo a change of character.

All this has an important bearing on pulpit and platform attacks on sins, private and social. The preacher who has to struggle along on a small and inadequate income will find it much easier to pour forth righteous wrath on the Sabbath against capitalists and the evils of a competitive society, than the highly paid minister of a church in a wealthy suburb or seaside resort. The minister who is himself of an over-assertive temperament that has not been well corrected by a more balanced development of character, will find himself reacting to normal opposition or disagreement on matters of policy as if it were an ill-natured major frustration of his ministry by unsympathetic deacons and church members. He will be very likely to find that his anger, which he suppresses as well as he can so as to prevent direct manifestations, finds a legitimised outlet in the belligerent tone of his preaching.

What minister, after a difficult church or deacons' meeting during the week, has not felt the urge to ease his mind on the Sunday by a sermon that is a perhaps thinly disguised and somewhat resentful blow aimed at the 'conscience' of those who seemed to him so obstructive? But the matter goes even deeper. Preachers, like other people who earnestly seek to live the Christian life, often have to maintain an inward resistance against smothered rebellions. Their whole self is not necessarily behind their religious vocation. It is not unusual for them to have dreams of having to conduct a service and being unprepared to do so; they are not properly

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dressed for the occasion, or they get into the pulpit and find they have not chosen the hymns or have left their notes behind them; or even that they set out for the church and never seem able to get there, or arrive too late and someone else is carrying on in their place. Such dreams are expressions of some variety of repressed antagonism to their task. We are all human and have no need to think too harshly of ourselves for such manifestations of an internal passive or active resistance to a life that aims solely at unselfish devotion and sacrificial service. Yet if the inner rebel is too strong the preacher may be driven by a need for strict self-discipline and even self-attack, which he unconsciously expresses by working it off on his congregation in the form of preaching an intolerantly exacting idealism or a constant harping on the themes of sin and repentance. The exhausting energy that may make a preacher flog himself, overstrain his voice until at some high pitch of intensity it breaks or stifles itself, and makes him feel he must drive home his message with all the force at his command in order to impress stony hearts, is easily rationalised as zeal; but it may be the measure of what the preacher has to fight in himself. An 'unconverted area' of a preacher's own emotional life is revealed in the following two dreams: 'At the end of a long deacons' meeting, one deacon got up and began to sing "Roll out the barrel". I had to explain to him why he should not sing it.' 'I was conducting a service when a man came in on the left and began to talk and create a disturbance. I resented it and challenged him and told him he ought not to create a disturbance while I was praying. He said if he wanted to he would. I told him he would not, and I took the law into my own hands and put him out.' In dream symbolism, the left as opposed to the right usually means the wrong, unconscious, repressed side of the mind. Something of the minister's own unconscious rebellious self-will is here intruding into the activity of his religious life, and he is having to resort to strong measures to expel the intruder.

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These are some of the hidden problems that lie behind too marked a tendency to denunciatory preaching, which may be a 'sublimation' of the preacher's own conflicts with himself. That naturally raises the question of the genuineness of moral indignation. It would be a grave mistake to conclude that because our own personal problems are so often the source of our urge to condemn others, that therefore condemnation of wrongs is too suspect to be indulged in. Of course, our attack on evil anywhere and everywhere must have its roots in our need to deal with it in ourselves. Selfishness and aggression must be met by a strong moral reaction against them; they are evil things and must be rejected by the conscience of humanity. The danger lies not in attacking evils, but in attacking them outside ourselves so as to divert our attention from the evils inside ourselves. There will be times when plain words ought to be spoken from the pulpit against social abuses, and socially and morally dangerous and undermining vices. Yet when a preacher feels he must speak thus, let him preach frankly to himself as well, let him include himself honestly in the humanity to which he preaches, let him cause the congregation to realise that he is not thundering at them or at the world from some lofty but dishonest height of imaginary saintliness in himself. Let no taint of 'moral superiority' or of 'preaching down at sinners' adulterate the spoken word. In no type of preaching is there more need for sympathy, love, and humility than in that of judgment upon sins. If a man finds himself driven to dwell with too frequent and insistent repetition on such themes, let him stop and search his own heart. All these considerations apply with equal force to the social worker (and, we may add, the politician) when he has to attack social evils.

The dogmatic authoritarian type of preaching raises different questions. Here the subtle danger is that of 'sublimating a lust for power'. A man who, in private life, is intolerant of contradiction and disagreement, who gets heated

in argument against those who will not accept all his views, who must be always right, who identifies himself with fixed opinions and is not prepared to change or learn, can find an easy rationalisation for all these stubborn, resistant, and at bottom anxious attitudes by identifying himself with an unchallengeable Word of God which he proclaims, and for which he demands unquestioning acceptance from his hearers. The intolerant championship of an orthodox creed and the attempt to impose it on others provides what seems a justified religious outlet for the urge to dominate. This tells us nothing about the question of theological orthodoxy, but much about some temperamental weaknesses that can shelter behind it. We may observe that there is a danger of medical, as well as of theological, authoritarianism.

The popular topical type of preaching again has quite other dangers to strew in the path of those who do not know themselves too well. It is, naturally, necessary for the preacher to relate his message to the daily life of his hearers. An abstract theological gospel will soar over the heads of the majority of the average congregation in which even the intellectually able people, whose minds are trained in other respects, are not trained to abstract thinking. In these days, when we are familiar with the fact that intelligence is an inherited and fixed capacity, measured by tests and expressed in the intelligence quotient, it is well to remember that many excellent people in every congregation have not got an 'academic intelligence', and that many of the people who have quick and capable minds nevertheless think practically and concretely rather than abstractly. They will be more helped and instructed by practical applications than by doctrinal definitions. They will see the truth that is taught by having it vividly portrayed to them in action in the life of the times. The preaching of Jesus in the Gospels is the perfect model of concreteness, topicality, simplicity, and at the same time profundity; and it ranged widely over both the personal and public problems of the life of His day. So, too, the

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preacher of today must apply his message all the way along the line of life from personal problems of sorrow and temptation to international questions on which a Christian conscience must be formed.

Yet this has its dangers. The preacher may play to the gallery, may court popularity with the 'men' by attacking the 'masters', or bask in the hearty approval of his own congregation by reiterating for them their own views and, maybe, conventions and prejudices; or he may take the other line, and secretly pat himself on the back for his courage and boldness in 'speaking out plainly' on matters on which he knows members of the congregation will disagree with him. Not that he ought not sometimes to do that; there are occasions for straight speaking, and only the moral coward who will not risk disagreement will flinch from the responsibility. The important question concerns the preacher's inner attitude to himself in doing this. Another obvious danger in topical preaching is the urge to popularise the message and arouse interest, to entertain rather than preach, so that one may enjoy success and a reputation. Popular and topical sermons may even be a disguise for theological uncertainty and a lack of real grasp on Christian truth. Interesting subject matter is no substitute for real conviction in the pulpit. The upshot of this cursory survey is that in such a vocation as that of the preacher, exceptional honesty is needed in the scrutiny of one's own motives. Just because the task is one of such high and solemn responsibility, more should be demanded of the preacher in the way of knowing himself than we are always ready to acknowledge. The psychotherapist must first submit to being analysed himself, for who dare probe into the motives of others unless he has first been prepared to search his own heart? Should any lower standards be expected of the preacher of the Christian gospel?

III. THE CONGREGATION

When we turn to the psychology of the congregation we face very different problems. The preacher addresses a crowd, and a crowd as such is impersonal. But that crowd is made up of individuals who will each react to the personality of the preacher and to his message in a particular and individual way. No two members of a congregation will receive exactly the same impression. What strikes one will be unnoticed by another; what impresses this person as a bold statement, progressive teaching, heretical ideas, dangerous views, will to that other one seem quite ordinary or platitudinous. What interests and captures the attention of some leaves others unmoved and cold; what interests the preacher may well leave the majority of the congregation unaffected. One hearer will respond with the head, another with the heart. The latter will welcome a passionate appeal that stirs and moves him, the former is likely to protect himself against the emotional appeal by adopting an intellectually aloof, superior, or even cynical attitude of mind. The orator or spell-binder, who succeeds in sweeping away the majority of his audience on a wave of feeling, may in any case be a danger. He reduces his audience to the level of the psychology of the crowd, which is sub-personal, sub-individual emotionality, in which thinking and critical functions are lulled to sleep. Unless we can arouse emotion we get no real response or decision, but if we arouse too much emotion at the expense of thought, we get a response from only half the personality and the kind of response that may well later on bring dangerous reactions of antagonism in a calmer and more reflective mood.

If it is possible for a preacher to exploit his audience and work off his own private problems on those he preaches to, it is also possible for his hearers to exploit the preacher and work off their private problems on him. This may happen in trivial ways: a family who come to church after some

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domestic tension at home, with minds in a state of irritation, will be wanting some target for their smothered resentments. The preacher is an inviting target, and so they 'couldn't hear a word he said; why doesn't the man speak out?', or else it was a 'poor sermon; he wasn't at his best tonight; I've heard him better', or else it may even be that 'he talked nonsense; he doesn't know the world he lives in; it would do him good to work in our factory for a few weeks'. That is the kind of thing which goes on in the minds of many who smile politely as the minister shakes hands with them as they go out after the service, but it is of little real moment. These temporarily disgruntled folk may still be at heart very friendly and loyal people who would rush to their minister's defence if any outsider attacked or criticised him.

A preacher's personality may be exploited in deeper and more dangerous and significant ways, by the projection on to him of the inner problems and conflicts of individuals among his hearers. Jesus gave a striking description of projection in the words: 'Judge not that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged' (Matt. vii, 1-2). It not seldom happens that someone in a church takes violent objection to something in the minister that he does not like, and will criticise him unfairly and even heatedly, and influence others to dislike him, when all the time the real truth is that some characteristic in the minister's personality, which is innocent enough in him, reminds the critic of something that he fears and dislikes in himself. If the critic would deal with himself, he would find that his minister raised no problem for him, and he would see him objectively and fairly. A preacher with an energetic and forceful delivery is criticised by a member of the congregation for lack of self-control in his public utterance. 'He gets me all worked up inside; I can't stand him.' But the criticism is quite beside the point. The hearer is afraid of losing control of his own emotions. He is tense and in an irritated state of mind through long-standing difficulties,

and projects his own condition on to the convenient figure of the preacher. Later, when his own troubles have been dealt with, he finds that he can listen to the same man with pleasure and profit.

A different aspect of this projection problem concerns conscience and guilt-feelings, and it reinforces what was said about denunciatory preaching. Many a preacher might be more wisely moderate and tone down his extreme and exacting idealism, and the uncompromising rigidity of the demands he makes in the name of Christ, if he understood the tortures he inflicted on many a hypersensitive conscience. So also would he deal with sins and temptations in a far more sympathetic way if he realised the morbid self-blame he was arousing in someone who stood more in need of pity than condemnation. The tough minds who really ought to take his words home to themselves are far more likely to apply them to their neighbours. It is the over-sensitive people, for whom his words are hardly meant, who will apply them to themselves and find their lives made more difficult than otherwise by the unhappy feelings of guilt and moral failure and religious unworthiness that are aroused.

The psychology of conscience is something that every minister should study exhaustively, since one aim of preaching is to educate a sound conscience in the listener. But the preacher does not start from scratch with his audience in this matter. Long before they sit under his ministry their consciences have undergone their first shaping in childhood. The function of judging, like that of observing, is natural and innate. The thinking side of our psychic life, by its natural constitution, has the double function of seeking facts and values. The fact-finder in our make-up grows into the scientist, the value-finder into the moralist. But just as our fact-finding intellect does not come to us at birth already supplied with facts, neither does our value-finding intellect come already provided with values or standards. These it acquires as a result of education, and the first moral

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educators are our parents. The results are in many cases most unfortunate and depressing. It is as if the critical and strict mother, or the cross and punishing father, or the nagging, depreciatory, nigger-driving authority of the adults around the child in its formative years took on a second life inside the child's own mind. It grows up with an internal image of the parent as a part of its own mind; the parent has become an 'internal object' who drives and criticises the child all through the rest of his life. One patient under analysis regularly dreams of a tall, dark woman following her, keeping an eye on her, everywhere she goes; it is the mental image of mother who has become the patient's relentless conscience, driving her all the time by secret self-criticism and self-depreciation to strain after perfection and yet always feel a failure. Another man, whose father all through his childhood urged and urged him to work, work, work, thereby creating in the boy a passive resistance to work, finds himself as an adult forcing himself to overwork most conscientiously and unreasonably, and then falling ill and feeling utterly stagnant and unable to work at all. He has constantly to fight against his repressed passive resistance to work, which is kept alive by the image of his slave-driving father who appears in his dreams 'leading the way while I followed him wherever he went'. The Freudian term for this kind of conscience, the Super-ego, is an apt one. It is as if such people had another ego inside them, superimposed on their own ego: a tyrant or internal dictator or policeman, who gives them neither peace nor rest. These are the people who will compulsively take home to themselves every critical or condemnatory word of the preacher and be made to feel miserable and guilty by it. Their morbid consciences are projected on to the preacher, and they suffer under him. He does, in fact, often appear in their dreams in place of the parent who is the original model of their consciences. Facts such as these should be well weighed before we 'let ourselves go in the

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pulpit' in condemnation of people's sins. Sufferers from what Dr. J. G. McKenzie calls 'the infantile prohibitive conscience' are entitled to help and relief at the hands of the preacher.

Enough has been said to show how complex are the emotional interactions of preacher and congregation; enough, we hope, to arouse a sense of responsibility for combining sympathy, tact, and wise moderation with conviction and searching utterance, in the preaching of the Christian gospel.

CHAPTER IV

The Problem of the Anxious Mind

1. *Social and Cultural Sources of Anxiety*

ANXIETY is the key-idea in the psychological approach to human problems. It occupies much the same central place in the theories of clinical psychology as the idea of sin in theology. Anxiety is the disturber of the psychic peace, the root cause of neurosis, the state of mind which, by upsetting the nervous system and endocrine glands, creates such a condition of organic tension that the physical symptoms that accompany neurosis arise. Anxiety again is the psychic factor which distorts character-development and causes all those maladjusted attitudes to self and to other people which make human co-operation so difficult. Anxiety is the cause of that active self-centredness and preoccupation with one's own aches and pains, or rights and wrongs, or prospects and misfortunes which can be so easily and hastily denounced as selfishness, without any further effort to understand it. One of the major questions for psychologists and theologians to settle is the relationship between anxiety and sin, since in practical life many acts and mental attitudes which receive condemnation as anti-social and immoral are psychic compulsions motivated by deep-seated fears.

The minister cannot ignore the problem of anxiety, for it is co-extensive with human life. All his work is in some sense a warfare against the anxieties which prey on the minds of his people. Jesus Himself recognised its importance: 'Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not

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the life more than meat, and the body than raiment? . . . If God so clothe the grass of the field . . . shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?' (Matt. vi, 24-34.) The consuming care that overspreads men's minds in the midst of the struggle for existence is recognised in this passage as a major obstacle to the spiritual life. Fear, and anxiety, which is the generalised form of fear, have a very close, if negative, relationship to two matters of vital religious importance—faith and love. 'Jesus said unto them: Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no faith?' (Mark iv, 40.) 'There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love' (1 John iv, 18). Christian preachers and thinkers have too often dwelt so exclusively on sin that they have failed to take proper account of the problem of anxiety, of which the mass of people are far more conscious.

We are often told that the modern generation has lost the sense of sin, which may be very largely true. It does not think in terms of sin. No sensitive religious mind will therefore conclude that sin is an out-of-date idea; it contains a profound truth. Yet it may be that the practical and relevant approach to the problem of sin for this age is by the study of the devastations, personal, social, and spiritual, which are the product of anxiety. The mind of our generation can at least understand what is meant by anxiety, which is for everyone an indisputable reality of everyday living.

The Dimensions of the Problem

It is necessary, first of all, to get an accurate measure of the size of the problem constituted by anxiety. It is not just a matter of a few particular people having a few particular worries. The pastor is certainly always being confronted with difficulties of that order. He cannot be in close touch with the life of his people without often having to listen to this mother who is worried about Jimmy's nasty cough, or

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that young wife who has an interfering mother-in-law, or this husband who is concerned about his job or his business, or that father who is upset because Tommy's school reports are poor or because his adolescent child seems to be plunging into premature courtship. These are the normal anxieties that are inseparable from the risks of living. They prod us and spur us on; they force us to use our minds, to think, to grapple with living issues. Without these practical difficulties that arise from day to day, life would be too easy and we should stagnate. Probably too much sympathy is expected and expended over troubles of this sort, when it really does us good to contend with them. A complaining attitude to the normal tensions of life would be a good reason for suspecting that deeper and hidden anxiety was at work. R. S. Woodworth, writing of personality tests, mentions several personality traits that have 'stood up well under intensive investigation and have some claim to be accepted'. Among them he lists: 'Trouble-finding, as against cheerful acceptance of the difficulties of life, also called emotional sensitivity. It has a good claim to be regarded as a genuine dimension along which individuals differ.'¹ The psycho-therapist would say that the emotionally over-sensitive mind, which regularly makes too much of the normal difficulties of life, was suffering from a neurosis. The healthy, balanced mind can deal with these worries in a constructive way and be all the stronger for the effort. Sometimes it is true 'it never rains but it pours', and the pastor will find some member of his church passing through a particularly rough patch, and in need of friendly sympathy. If the person concerned has a normal healthily balanced mind, all that is needed is to help him to see things in perspective, and remove a passing feeling of loneliness and isolation which grows out of struggling along with troubles that no one knows anything about, and trying to keep a brave face on life.

¹ R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology: A Study of Mental Life*, p. 152.

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The real problem of anxiety goes far deeper than this kind of day-to-day worry. It is an anxiety that is fundamental, insidious: the creeping paralysis, the mental tuberculosis that wastes away the strength and moral courage of numberless people in our civilisation. It inwardly consumes the energy and vitality, the freshness and resilience of all of us to some degree. There is a basic anxiety-problem to be understood. It is an anxiety-problem that seems to be an inescapable part of the essential structure of life in our age. Its results are to be seen both in the large and in the small, both at the social, political, economic, international level and at the level of private, personal, individual living. Since its atmosphere saturates the whole of life, the minister who ignores or does not understand it is not relating his work to the realities of the situation that confronts him. Its worst manifestations are war, dictatorship, and neurosis. War may be regarded as the volcanic temper outburst of human nature in the mass, goaded by insecurity and a sense of frustration. Dictatorship and totalitarianism may be seen as morbid expressions of the longing for security and the fear of responsibility amidst the uncertainties of a major transitional phase in the process of social and spiritual change. This aspect of the basic anxiety-problem of our time has been searchingly analysed by Erich Fromm. His thesis is succinctly stated in his Foreword, where, speaking of 'the totalitarian flight from freedom', he says:

'Modern man, freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not gained freedom in the positive sense of the realisation of his individual self; that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional, and sensuous potentialities. Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless. This isolation is unbearable, and the alternatives he is confronted with are either

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to escape from the burden of this freedom into new dependencies and submission, or to advance to the full realisation of positive freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man.¹

This diagnosis may not completely satisfy the religious mind, but it contains a great deal of penetrating and true analysis of the social and cultural structure of our present life.

Erich Fromm's diagnosis, made in America, is matched by the words of Professor John Macmurray in this country as far back as 1932:

'We are incapable of acting greatly because it involves a resolute choice and a drastic choice. We want instead to be saved from the necessity of making it. . . . The economic troubles are relatively unimportant. They are not the source of our dilemma, they are merely symptoms. The real trouble lies deeper. We shall never solve our economic troubles except in solving the dilemma in our spiritual life which produces them. . . . We have lost our faith, and when we lose faith we lose the power of action.'²

Hence the widespread fatalistic attitude to life one finds in many people, and meanwhile we grow up in an atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety.

The basic anxiety of our time appears also in serious disturbances in our private lives, as well as on the large stage of community life. The problem of neurosis has only come to be understood through the rise of medical psychotherapy. Though still the least-catered-for aspect of ill health, a persistent attack upon it is developing in the medical profession since the size of the problem was recognised. The official estimate of the British Medical Association is that at least 33½ per cent of all patients going to doctors are not

¹ E. Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*.

² J. Macmurray, *Freedom in the Modern World*, pp. 20-4.

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suffering from any primarily organic disease, but from functional nervous illness, i.e. an interference with normal healthy bodily functioning by emotional disturbance and personality problems. The contribution made by psychiatrists to the understanding of fundamental problems of human living is one of the great and major creative factors in the life of our time, for which profound gratitude must be felt; though it must be said that some individual doctors who practise psychiatry are not always adequately trained, and do not always understand the far-reaching implications of psychoneurosis. This, however, we believe to be a transitional problem of the pioneer period. Many experienced doctors put the figure for neurosis at 50 per cent. This indicates an extremely serious mass of personal unhappiness and maladjustment. A vicious circle is set up. The fundamental anxiety of our age results in neurosis, political regression, and war, and these in turn further increase anxiety. It is in this atmosphere that the minister has to do his work. With some reservations about the use of the word 'neurotic' in this connection, it may be said that we live in a neurotic civilisation in which life is too much determined by fear. The terrible, wasteful quest for political and economic security through the struggle for power is one of the uncontrolled ramifications of fear, and it creates the very problems we spend our strength trying to solve.

There is much unrecognised projection on to our external circumstances and on to our neighbours of our own deep-seated fears and hostilities. The result is an anxiety-ridden maladjustment to one another as well as to ourselves, and a devouring need for emotional and spiritual security along with not a little cynical weariness of life. This is the most probable cause for what is often spoken of as the decay of morals, which is apparent in the disregard of the ordinary decencies and loyalties and in the weakened sense of truth and honesty in public and private life. Fear and anxiety drive people into retreat from an open-eyed, courageous,

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and adventurous attitude to life, and destroy goodwill and normal unselfishness. They drive people to barricade themselves behind fixed, rigid ideas in politics and religion, and into the anxiously aggressive defence of ideologies both conservative and revolutionary. They lead many to withdraw into the defences of a small, self-concentrated, insulated life of the pursuit of private ambitions, hobbies, and pleasures, and a resenting of all claims and challenges that come from the larger life of the community. This is a question of great importance for the psychology of religion.

When a minister faces his congregation, it is certain that it will contain a number of individuals who are anxious and worried about this or that particular problem. But beyond that, the whole congregation will be composed of people who have been cradled in a fear-ridden society, and they will have a basic anxiety that forces them into a defensive attitude to life, usually without their realising this situation, because they are so accustomed to it. Perhaps only the few very spiritually mature souls succeed in living above the fears common to us all. This basic anxiety infects the whole of life, politics, business, sport, religion, and family life, and it makes an attitude of faith and adventure impossible to most people. This survey is necessary if we are to realise the dimensions of the problem of anxiety.

The Nature of Anxiety

It is usual to distinguish between fear and anxiety, and between normal and neurotic forms of both of them. Fear is a sharply defined and immediate, intense reaction to a specific object or situation. It is normal to fear a lion, but neurotic to fear a mouse. If one is on top of a bus that skids, it is normal to have a rush of fear that it may crash and over-balance. If, however, a person dare not venture on top of any omnibus for fear it may over-balance, that is a neurotic phobia. Similarly with anxiety: anxiety differs from fear in that it is not a short, sharp reaction to something specific,

but rather a long-drawn-out state of apprehensiveness. It is normal for a mother to be anxious when nursing a child through a long illness while it is yet uncertain whether the child will pull through; the anxiety is over something that may never happen, but it is justified. Neurotic anxiety is the same state of all-pervading apprehensiveness of danger or calamity, but it is recognised as neurotic because, though the person who feels it may try to justify it by attaching it to what seem to him real objective dangers, the observer sees that the anxiety has no real justification in the external situation. The neurotic will often see this himself, and say: 'I am afraid and do not know what I am afraid of', or, 'I worry all the time, and really I haven't anything to worry about'.

There is often a subtle intermixture of fears and anxieties that are both normal and neurotic. It would be a mistake to think that neurotic fears are what is often called 'imaginary'. It is true that they are not realistic fears, justified by the external facts, but that is only because at first sight we do not understand them. The external object or situation on which the neurotic fear fastens is in fact being used as a symbol of some internal problem that is giving rise to very real and justifiable fears. The phobia of the bus losing its balance has nothing to do with the fact that on very rare occasions an odd bus does over-balance, and any particular bus might do so. We would not regard that as a good reason for refusing to travel on top of a bus. The phobia relates to the fact that the person who has it is afraid of losing his own balance, of losing emotional self-control, of suffering a compulsive outburst of rage, of being carried away helplessly by the force of his pent-up feelings. This fear of inner loss of balance he projects on to the bus because it is easier to be conscious of a fear that a bus may over-balance than to be continuously aware that one may lose control of oneself. Neurotic fears and anxieties arise out of our inner emotional instabilities, conflicts, dis-

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contents, and rebellions. They relate to internal dangers.

Yet these have at one time been aroused by real external dangers; usually those that beset us in childhood as a result of being brought up by parents who were themselves emotionally upset by their environment and maybe neurotic as well. Normal fears and anxieties, mostly in childhood, but actually at any period of life, if they are suppressed and not frankly and openly faced, can be converted into neurotic ones, and, in addition to that, neurotic fears can be hidden from us by the fact that we have real and justifiable anxieties as well. It requires much care to disentangle and clarify this complex situation, but it is safe to say that every pastor and preacher will be constantly dealing with people who are caught in this anxiety-complex.

One more important distinction must be made: that between superficial and deep-seated neurotic anxiety. This corresponds to the difference between the situation neurosis and the character neurosis mentioned in the last chapter. In the situation neurosis an anxiety is not faced but pushed away into the mental background and kept from clear, conscious awareness. It then becomes a hidden disturbing factor, and is quite likely to give rise to some of the usual physical accompaniments of unrelieved anxiety. The original anxiety refers to some actually existing external problem. When the anxiety is repressed it becomes an internal danger. It would be more accurate to say that the original anxiety is about impulses that arise in connection with the external situation, because those impulses are unacceptable to the conscious waking self as in some sense inexpedient or even anti-social. When this whole problem is pushed out of consciousness, the anxiety arises that these forbidden impulses may slip out into expression in spite of conscious controls and vigilance. What is repressed and so forced to work obscurely in the unconscious mental background to our waking life, may suddenly take us by surprise and rush out compulsively in spite of ourselves. *It is this kind of fear*

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of what is within' that is of the essence of neurotic anxiety. Normal fear is of the outer world; neurotic fear is fear of ourselves, even when it is disguised as a symbolic fear of some external object or situation.

In the situation neurosis the things we fear in ourselves are very near the surface of consciousness and can be discovered with but little difficulty. There is no long history behind them, and they relate essentially to the present. In the character neurosis the dangerous tendencies and impulses that we fear within ourselves have existed from early childhood and have become entangled in vicious circles of emotional degeneration that undermine all sense of inner strength and security. The minister of religion or social worker may not be called on to treat neurosis in a specialist way, but if he does not possess an accurate understanding of what neurosis is, he will be quite unable to distinguish between the normal and neurotic fears and anxieties that upset his people, or form any reliable estimate of their depth and seriousness. The problem of neurosis will be considered separately in the next two chapters. Meanwhile, we return to the consideration of those fears and anxieties that are part and parcel of the lives of all of us in the social setting of this present-day world.

Communal and Cultural Sources of Anxiety

These we may divide into two groups and, for convenience, label them as overt and covert, or as politico-economic and psychological; in fact, communal and cultural. There are many very concrete and immediate causes for anxiety that are obvious and stare us in the face as part of the unstable contemporary world situation. There are others that are subtle and hidden, that arise out of the way our culture shapes and moulds our character and our conception of life.

(1) The concrete fears that the contemporary world situation arouses in us all rise to their full height in relation to

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the danger of an irreconcilable clash of interests between East and West in an atomic-bomb age. There is a widespread realisation that we are racing against time in our efforts to stabilise civilisation and produce a genuine world order. If we fail, and international fear, distrust, and rivalry drift on unhealed until we find ourselves entangled against our will in a ruthless march of events towards a third world war, with no further power to call a halt, then we understand that the last chapter in the present phase of civilisation will be written. Life as we know it can quite well go down into the abyss of international social disruption and a new 'Dark Age'. This is not inevitable, but it is a very real possibility. We do not go about thinking and brooding about it all day long, but it is the background of our living. It causes different degrees of anxiety according to whether we see the world's statesmen progressing or failing in their task of working out reliable means of international co-operation. At any moment the situation could give rise to acute anxiety if a major misunderstanding or breakdown threatened. The experience of the first fifty years of this century does not give us much encouragement to believe in the capacity of statesmen to prevent war once the fears and hatreds of nations, or perhaps rather of those statesmen themselves, have drifted to a certain degree of exacerbation.

On this broad background of more or less vague generalised anxiety many more definite and immediate worries arise. It is a commonplace, but none the less true for that, that our world has been in a transition period for at least the whole of this present century. The fall of European monarchies, the rise of the mass of the people to political power, and social revolutions, both progressive and regressive, are only the most obvious and largest-writ signs of a complete revolution in our entire conception of life, which is going on all the time silently in the minds of men everywhere. The mass of particular problems that are thrown up for solution taxes not only the ability, but also the adapta-

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bility and courage of all concerned; and the sheer pace of social change is often much too fast for many people to be able to adjust themselves to what is happening around them. They cannot let go the old and familiar ways of doing things; they cannot give up the old pleasures and comforts they have been used to for so long; they cannot bear to look forward into a prospect of still further fundamental alteration of the structure of life as they have known it, without a profound sense of irritation and insecurity. To have too set a mind in this modern world is to run the risk of being broken by it. Yet there are many thousands of good but unimaginative and emotionally conservative people who are in just that position, and the strain of life tells cruelly on them. As an elderly Lancashire business man put it: 'In my youth there were three eternal unshakable things: cotton, the Liberal Party, and the Church, and now all three are tottering'.

Then there are the worries that arise from having to keep the normal machinery of life working when conditions are as abnormal as they are in this post-war world. If we study the outlook of the average business man on his prospects for the next five or ten years, we rapidly find out to what a large extent his fears outweigh his hopes. If we study the outlook of any frank and honest politician, as he may express his inner feelings 'off the record' in private discussion, on such matters as the spiritual poisons circulating in the soul of Germany, the rest of Europe, and Russia, and ask him what he thinks is the remedy, we at once discover how helpless he feels in face of the problem.

In addition to these things there is a great deal of strain and mental weariness due to the emotional wear and tear of the last ten years of war and its aftermath, with the frustrations in large and small ways, the sacrifices, the unremitting efforts called for. This bears all the more hardly because there has been so much false expectation cultivated in our thinking during the earlier years of evolutionary optimism

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and the assumption that ease, plenty, and comfort for all were to be had for the asking, or at any rate by the quick device of getting our own favourite political party into power. It seems unbelievable now that in the 1930s we were discussing 'the right use of leisure' as the major problem of the near future. In this post-war world, with its inevitable reduction in the general amenities of life, and the Government's 'work or starve' slogan, we are not helped by the survival at the back of our minds of the high hopes of the 1930s. We tend to be peevish about shortages and disgruntled about life in general. The feeling of fatigue and bodily weariness is due far more to mental than physical causes, and a disappointed and disillusioned state of mind undermines our energy and freshness. All these things go into the anxiety-state of the mass of the population.

Up to a point, difficulties are a stimulus to greater effort, and an easy and over prosperous life leads to stagnation. But beyond a certain point difficulties lead to a depression of effort, especially when the prospects of arriving at a genuine solution of them seem to be uncertain. This is likely to be the average state of mind of very large numbers of people for some years to come yet. Even the courageous souls in whom faith and hope are kept alive, must be to some extent affected by the prevailing atmosphere around them. By thus bringing together various aspects of the disturbing and uncertain state of our present-day world, we can get some measure of the chronic background of anxiety against which modern life is being carried on. We push it away from us, we refuse to think too much about it, we get on with the immediate job that we have to do, but it is there all the time, sapping energy and increasing discontent, breeding new fears and with them new hates. Far more than we realise, we depend, for emotional support, on a fairly stable material basis and relatively undisturbed routine of life, and transition ages create anxiety.

(2) The overt social, political, and economic difficulties

and unrest are, however, not the only source of anxiety. They are, in fact, themselves the symptoms of a deeper unrest. It is because we are already, in a more fundamental way, anxious because of the cultural and spiritual atmosphere in which we have grown up, that in the mass we are so unable to move together towards the creative, if revolutionary, decisions that would solve the practical problems; but instead our fears drive us into unco-operative and selfish attitudes and actions, and so go on creating new and additional problems. The anxious mind grabs at an immediate short-term advantage, at present satisfactions; it cannot take the long view and postpone the fulfilment of its hopes and wishes in order to build up a stable situation. 'Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die' is the socially destructive attitude of the ultimately fear-ridden and hopeless mind. In practice today it leads people to fight for immediate gains when the general situation would counsel patience, or to resort to anti-social and unscrupulous practices, such as black-market dealing, in order to see to it they are all right and provided for, whatever happens to other people. The attitude of 'get as much as you can and give as little as you can' that is so frequently complained of today is, no doubt, enough to undermine the security of any social order, let alone one that is struggling for re-establishment in the aftermath of war. The prevalence of these attitudes, and parallel phenomena such as the decay of ordinary moral standards in honesty, truthfulness, and considerate good manners, has its roots in a basic attitude to life that is one of the bad cultural products of our age.

Psychologists are busy studying the ways in which our cultural setting shapes our personality and character. Professor Ralph Linton gives the following definition of culture in the sense in which the psychologist is interested in it: 'A culture is a configuration of learned behaviour and results of behaviour whose component elements are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society.'¹ Ever

¹ R. Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, 1947, p. 21.

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since Karl Marx it has come to be more and more recognised how much the general pattern of our economic life,*and the kind of behaviour it forces on us, shapes our ideas and character traits. Dr. Karen Horney, writing in America, says: 'Most of us are familiar, and exclusively familiar, with a behaviour pattern that implies wanting to get ahead in the world, to get ahead of others, to earn more money than the bare minimum for existence.'¹ In a closing chapter on 'Culture and Neurosis' she deals more in detail with this problem, and we permit ourselves an extended quotation:

'Modern culture is economically based on the principle of individual competition. The isolated individual has to fight with other individuals of the same group, has to surpass them and, frequently, to thrust them aside. The advantage of the one is frequently the disadvantage of the other. The psychic result of this situation is a diffuse hostile tension between individuals. . . . Competitiveness is one of the predominant factors in social relationships. It pervades the relationships between men and men, women and women, and whether the point of competition be popularity, competence, attractiveness, or any other social value, it greatly impairs the possibilities of reliable friendship. It also disturbs the relationship between men and women, not only in the choice of the partner, but in the entire struggle with him for superiority. It pervades school life. And, perhaps most important of all, it pervades the family situation, so that as a rule the child is inoculated with this germ from the very beginning. The rivalry between father and son, mother and daughter, one child and another, is not a general human phenomenon, but is the response to culturally conditioned stimuli.'²

Her final comment is: 'All these factors together—competitiveness and its potential hostilities between fellow

¹ Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of our Time*, pp. 13-4.

² Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of our Time*, pp. 284-5.

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beings, fears, diminished self-esteem, result psychologically in the individual feeling that he is isolated.'

Here is one of the deepest roots of the basic anxiety-state of all men in our modern world. In what R. H. Tawney called our 'acquisitive society' the tender emotions have been very largely taboo. They have been thought of as a source of weakness anywhere except in the narrowest sphere of our private lives. Even there the psychotherapist often finds men for whom the inhibition of tender emotional responsiveness is so strong that they cannot even function normally as a lover to a wife. Our world cultivates self-assertiveness, aggressiveness, shrewdness, and has little room for what it calls sentimentality, squeamishness, sensitiveness. The trouble is that it is led to misname genuine sympathy and generosity, and call them sentimentality and unpractical idealism. Friendliness is, as often as not, not felt with any real depth and sincerity; the capacity for really liking, and feeling for, other people is but shallow, and in its place a counterfeit sociable heartiness is made to serve. Beneath all this is much emotional starvation, loneliness, insecurity, and deep anxiety.

It is still possible to find elderly business men who were educated in the Victorian and Edwardian tradition of economic *laissez-faire*, for whom the Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' was dressed up as an ethic, and taught as a fine, if rigorous, philosophy of life that fostered self-reliance, self-discipline, thrift, and hard work. It was slipped in under the cloak of Christianity, and, when it is challenged, 'Nature' with a capital 'N' is appealed to. It is said that competition is the law of life in the animal world (a loose generalisation that is far from the truth), as if that established the fact that it is the divinely ordained law of human society as well. If the argument proves anything at all, it proves that competition is a jungle ethic, and that, in fact, has been the logical outcome of this teaching. The Nazi and Fascist simply dropped the spurious cloak of Christianity

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that the nineteenth century cast over these ideas, and openly worshipped race, blood, soil, brute instinct, power, and the right of the strong to enslave the weak. They were at least honest, and, in being honest, revealed the depth of spiritual nihilism that lay at the heart of the philosophy of modern European competitive capitalist ways of life. This is one of the fundamental causes of the inner loneliness, insecurity, and anxiety of modern man.

The final fruits of the basically aggressive, competitive pattern of life in our culture can be studied in *The Case of Rudolf Hess*, edited by Dr. J. R. Rees. Here the international team of psychiatrists who were charged with the examination and care of Hess have put together their findings about his personality. He is surveyed against the background of German culture and family life, with its stress on the power-motif, the domination of the strong father, the subordination of the weak if loving mother, the development in the son of an outer façade of toughness, hardness, ruthlessness, behind which lurks intimidation, insecurity, and longing for love held in check by fear of love as weakness, a sense of isolation, hidden dependency—and, growing out of all this, a paranoid suspiciousness of the outer world, where everyone appears as a potential enemy. This is the typical character product of our modern culture, and what is seen, in its most developed and uncompromising form in the Nazi, can be seen just as clearly in the more disguised, because less blatantly militaristic, form of the money-king. P. H. Newby, reviewing Charles Morgan's *The Judge's Story* in *The Listener* (September 25th 1947), writes: 'Severidge, the millionaire head of Combined Metallurgical Industries, is a destroyer. He has no better self to which he can be true; he wants the cherished possessions of others because of the sense of power their acquisition gives him; he wants to be loved without loving in return.' A civilisation that produces the Nazi and Severidge as its typical personality types has fear at the top of the list of its mass-

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produced commodities. It is an anxiety-ridden world in which the powerful are as insecure as the humble. It is not difficult to find wealthy men, anxiously absorbed in the defence of their thousands, who quite sincerely envy their own £5-a-week employees, who seem to them to be secure. Anxiety is part and parcel of the very structure of life in our present-day world.

The Answer to the Anxiety Problem

The title of this sub-section seems over-optimistic. There is no short and simple answer, at any rate not in practice. The basic anxieties of a neurotic individual can be dealt with by psychological investigation, but we cannot psychoanalyse a whole community or civilisation. There is being developed today what is called 'social psychiatry', an application of fundamental psychotherapeutic principles to social problems. This is certainly important. Modern psychology can and must be applied, not only to the healing of the sick mind, but to the education of the normal conscious mind and the guidance of our planned action for human welfare. Not all psychiatrists have faith in 'social psychiatry'. One doubter said to the writer: 'There are some problems that seem to get worse, the more you tinker with them, and, anyway, psychiatrists make bad politicians. Perhaps the only answer is God; these things will work themselves out in time.' This was said in a conversation about the best way of dealing with the spiritually poisoned mind of Germany. Yet it is hardly likely that we shall be content simply to sit back and leave things to God or chance. Nor would that be evidence of a sound religious faith. We have to learn to combine personal effort with an ultimate faith that inspires and guides our efforts. Psychology, whether its findings be applied in individual or social psychiatry, is a science, and science is only an instrument. Some faith must lie behind our use of it. Some faith is always implied in the use we make of science, even if we are not conscious of what that

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faith is. We have yet to see what new powers social psychiatry may put into our hands, and whether it will contribute effectively to the solution of the problems of emotional education in the mass, and the elimination of the anxiety that saturates a whole community. Psychotherapy enables individuals to live together in more peaceful, friendly, and co-operative ways. Will social psychiatry help us to enable nations to live together in the bonds of international brotherhood and co-operation? We do not know. The gradual permeation of the mind of our time by psychological understanding must inevitably be a slow process, and who can say what its fruits will be?

When we see a medical institution like the Tavistock Clinic in London transforming itself into the 'British Institute for Human Relations' we must be grateful for the courage, vision, and faith of doctors who recognise that psychological medicine has larger responsibilities than simply those of curing individuals suffering from neurosis. In time, if we are given enough time, the steady pouring into the community of a stream of doctors, child-guidance workers, psychiatric social workers, educationists, all adequately trained in psychology, who can help the next generation to grow up more healthily balanced in personality, with fewer undischarged resentments to be worked out on other people or on other nations, must have its cumulative effect. Ministers must be as adequately equipped to discharge their religious ministries with as much sound psychological insight. The churches can help in practical ways, in their club work amongst the young, in parents' associations, in co-operating with real knowledge in the work of Marriage Guidance Councils, and in the work of preparation for marriage and parenthood. The churches have unique opportunities here. These practical measures must be operated to the full. But there is something else.

We have said that we must combine personal effort with an ultimate faith that guides and inspires it. Here the Church

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has a major responsibility. The answer to the problems of fear and anxiety for a normally healthy mind is a strong faith, a philosophy of life that makes personal effort worth while by assuring us of its final grounds of success, and disclosing to us a pattern of meaning and purpose in living. There are faiths and faiths, and we must not despise the psychological and practical value of small faiths that are quite inadequate from the Christian point of view. Perhaps the smallest and meanest of all faiths is implied in the service of self and family. There are larger social and political faiths, of which Communism is the most challenging example. These may generate a really religious enthusiasm and motive power. Religion must include all necessary ingredients of personal and social purpose in an overall universal faith. Only such a faith can enable a man to take the longest views ahead, and give him the fullest and most adequate support and inspiration to fight a way through present difficulties and never give up hope. We must be strengthened to accept and bear objectively imposed anxiety of communal origin so that we may fight its causes effectively, and the faith that enables us to do that will also enable us to combat anxiety of cultural origin. It is, as the psychologist would say, ego-supporting.

Perhaps in the end the most effective part of the answer to the massive anxiety born of the communal and cultural insecurity of our time is not a psychological technique, but an interpretation of life that yields a really operative faith, a religion. We face the fact that the mass of people have not got it. The present confused religious situation, with its multiplicity of ecclesiastical and theological trends, shows that official religion is itself caught up in the disturbances of the age of transition. Yet Christianity has unrivalled spiritual treasures and resources, and the age calls loudly to the Christian preacher to meet its need. Unless people can be shown credibly that life has a meaning and is magnificently worth living in just such an age as this one, the

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massive anxiety of our time may breed spiritual despair, and eat the soul out of our civilisation. Psychotherapy reaffirms the importance of our conscious attitude to life. When the props of outer social security are shaky, inner strength is all the more needed against the temptation to selfish and unscrupulous living that a hard world creates. As Professor J. G. McKenzie writes:

‘The wider function of pastoral psychology is seen in the fact that the pastor, as preacher as well as priest, has for his primary function the task of giving to his people a religious meaning to life. . . . To remain mentally healthy the individual needs a philosophy of life. The theologian would probably put it that the individual must be reconciled to God. But that is just the same thing in religious terms; for to know what life means for me is to have a philosophy of life, and it is to have come to terms with God.’¹

It will not prove enough merely to reiterate ancient dogma. The thought-forms and technical theological terms of the past may not prove adequate weapons to attack the problems of interpreting life in this confused and changing time. The vital core of Christian truth must be thought out afresh in living relationship to this post-war world: the theologian’s task. William James, dealing with “what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean”, wrote:

‘If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a fight—as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears.’²

Thus he reminds us that we shall not rouse faith in others unless we have genuine faith ourselves.

¹ *Nervous Disorders and Character*, p. 30 f. ² *The Will to Believe*.

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2. Recognising Neurosis

IN the last chapter we dealt with the fears and anxieties which may be considered normal, even though at many points they come very near to, and even invade the territory of, neurosis; normal in that they arise out of the structure of communal and cultural life in which we all grow, so that these fears and anxieties are in some degree shared by everyone. In this chapter we turn to consider the fears and anxieties that are parts of the structure, not of society, but of the personality and character of individual men and women. They are specific to each individual because they are the product of each person's particular psychological organisation as it has been shaped in him by his experiences from the earliest moments of infancy. These are the fears and anxieties that are called neurotic and which express the disturbed functioning of a personality in a state of internal conflict of contradictory motives, impulses, and emotions.

It is worth noting that the term 'neurosis' is misleading. It is a survival from the times when all nervous symptoms of illness were regarded as due to some physical defect, infection, or lesion of the nervous system. The term 'neurosis' has therefore primarily an organic reference, and should indicate something wrong with the neurones of which the nervous system is constructed. Gradually the distinction between organic and functional neurosis came to be made, and with the recognition of functional nervous disorder, i.e. disorderly action of the nervous system which is not due to any structural defect, but rather to interference with its normal activity by emotional upset, the term 'neurosis'

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acquired a psychological reference that is not inherent in it. The disadvantage of this is that there are undoubtedly neuroses which do not reveal themselves in obvious physical symptoms, but rather in character distortion and behaviour problems.

Dr. Wilhelm Stekel therefore coined a new term. He speaks not of neurosis but of parathy. The term has not supplanted the older one, but is useful for making clear just what a neurosis is. Parathy is modelled on such terms as sympathy, apathy, and empathy, and indicated a condition of the feeling life of the mind. (Greek *pathos*, feeling.) The prefix *para* is in use in such a term as 'paranoia', which indicates 'false thinking'. (Greek *para* as meaning beside, outside, away from the normal.) Thus 'parathy' would mean 'false feeling', and sympathy means 'feeling with', and 'apathy' means 'lack of feeling'. A parathy or neurosis is then an area of false or distorted feeling inside the total personality. It does not involve the whole of the self; if it did there would be no possibility of a cure, for there would be nothing in the personality to appeal to or work with, against the neurosis. That would be a psychotic condition or insanity.¹ A neurosis is made up of a system of false or abnormal emotional attitudes and compulsive behaviour-patterns in reaction to the self, to other people, and to life in general. A neurotic is a person whose reactions are determined by anxiety, hostility, and all the subtle by-products of these basic attitudes, instead of natural and healthy spontaneous feeling which is appropriate to the occasion. The parts of the mind in which these maladjusted reactions originate are repressed and unconscious. A personality only becomes deeply neurotic when it has been emotionally upset from earliest childhood, so that the term 'neurotic' cannot be used as a term of blame or disapproval as if it meant mere 'cussedness' or unreasonableness, weakness, or worthlessness. The neurotic needs first of all to be

¹ As in schizophrenia, where the ego itself ultimately disintegrates.

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sympathetically understood, even if, in the course of treatment, he must be brought face to face with the fact that many of his attitudes and reactions are in fact very unreasonable, and unjustified by his present real situation in life.

Cultural anxiety affects everyone. Neurotic anxiety affects particular individuals, but there are far more of them than is realised. The size of the problem is indicated not only by the medical estimate that anxiety gives rise to more than one-third of all illness, but also by the fact that many people who are not nervously ill yet display neurotic tendencies in their general behaviour. Looked at in this way it is not at all easy to draw a hard and fast line between the neurotic and the normal, and C. G. Jung says that the most important thing about the neurotic is that he is so normal. He suffers simply from more exaggerated forms of the emotional conflicts that are common to us all. There is a real difference between normal and neurotic, but with every one of us the question is not 'Normal or neurotic?' but 'To what extent normal and to what extent neurotic?' If one were to take out of any large group of people all those who suffer from insomnia, indigestion, nervous fatigue, headaches, hypersensitivity, persistent worrying habits, and all who fairly regularly make use of Maclean's stomach powder, aspirins, laxatives or sedatives, a very big hole would be made in that group. If one counted the number of people attached to a church, or any other organisation, who had seen a doctor during the course of a year, and halved the number, that would give some indication of the prevalence of neurosis, but that would be the minimum estimate.

It may be said, then: 'What can *we* do about it? The treatment of neurosis is the province of the specialist in psychotherapy.' The answer is both 'Yes' and 'No'. 'Yes' in the sense already made plain in the first two chapters, namely, that it is not the social worker's or minister's first or real task to treat neurosis as such. 'No' in the sense

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that the social worker's job is to support these sufferers, and the minister cannot possibly ignore this problem, for he has to minister to them and also to work with them and through them in the life of his church, and he must at least understand them if he is to avoid elementary misjudgments and mistakes in his attitude to them and their troubles. He has also this further concern with neurosis, that he is most likely to be able to find neurotic tendencies in himself which complicate his own reactions to other people, and which will account for many of his own failures in his work. Short of the technical treatment of neurosis, a minister or social worker must be, in his own sphere, an expert in the understanding of human nature.

What is Neurosis?

Perhaps the simplest definition of neurosis is that it is 'a life based on fear'. Neurosis is the medical name for the ramifications and ravages of fear in the human personality. Thus the problem of neurosis opens up the whole pathos and deep tragic need of the human soul. The results of fear call, not for criticism and condemnation, but for investigation and understanding. What is the cause of the fear, what forms is it taking, what effects is it having on health, character, and behaviour? These are the questions that need answering. It is stupid to blame a person for being afraid. If his fear is justified then its cause needs to be removed; if the fear is not objectively justified then it needs to be discovered why he becomes afraid. As likely as not the habitually apprehensive attitude to life goes back to the fact that the patient has been more starved of parental love and understanding in childhood than the more fortunate people who have no neurosis.

Just because, sooner or later, the neurotic is told by a doctor that there is nothing the matter with him, and he is unable to give to his family, relatives, and friends any adequate account of the reason for his illness, he is pretty

sure to be told that it is 'only nerves', that it is all imagination and that he must pull himself together. It should be clearly recognised that that does grave injustice to the sufferer from neurosis. The emotionally healthy and anxiety-free people have little or no idea of the strain of an unremitting inward struggle that he has stood up to for years. He has been pulling himself together, on the whole successfully, for the greater part of his life, and has displayed a courage and determination in the face of his distracted inner life that is not realised. Since a neurosis is so largely a matter of the mind being torn asunder, as it were, by conflicting tendencies, by love versus hate, by anxious retreats versus determined compensations, it is in a sense literally true that the neurotic has had to keep pulling himself together all the way along the line. To maintain the integrity and efficiency of his personality, he has fought hard for a solution of his personality problems. He has tried all he knows to solve them. Nature's automatic defences against anxiety have been operated to the full. Fears, resentments, conflicts have been repressed into the unconscious mind; he has struggled to divert his conscious attention from himself by hard work, he has tried to forget himself in distracting pursuits, social life, recreations, hobbies. If he is religious he has no doubt prayed long and often for release from his difficulties, and again tried to take his mind off himself by 'good works'. But, in spite of it all, 'self' will keep intruding. He feels unhappy, strained, has moods when he is alternately sullen and miserable. He feels he becomes self-centred, self-seeking and inconsiderate, preoccupied with his own troubles, apt to bore others by talking about them. He will mentally chastise himself for being full of self-pity and self-concern. The fact is that 'self' is not an harmonious integrated team of co-operating forces working smoothly towards reasonable ends, but a perpetual unsolved problem. How can he forget himself, as he is often told to do, and 'take an interest in things, get out more and mix in company', and all the other

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good advice lavished on him by those who do not know what his trouble is like on the inside? All that is what he is longing to be able to do, but while the problem of his distracted and divided self remains unsolved he cannot do these things. What is the use of telling him to do them when his inability to do them is itself part of his trouble? Finally, he just grits his teeth and struggles on, wearing away the days as they come and go, trying to look and act normally while feeling hemmed in and frustrated, and presently panicky and despairing within.

One such sufferer writes: 'I must get in contact with you. Can you help me in any way? My husband will not listen when I tell him how ill I feel. He says I can conquer it. For some weeks I have had to fight the desire to take my life. This is a dreadful condition to be in, and unless someone understands these dreadful feelings it is just useless trying to explain. But just to sit down and express my feelings on paper gives me a little relief.' Such problems of the distracted and divided self exist in all degrees of severity, but when they are not understood and the sufferer can only wage a futile and exhausting battle against them, there is a gradual drift towards the open outbreak of neurosis in some specific clinical sense. The incipient neurotic has striven to use his powers constructively and freely, and seems to have got in his own way at every step; he has tried to get on with other people in friendly and co-operative ways, but his sensitiveness and moods get between him and them. He has done his best to 'live' and suffers increasing irritation and resentment at his inability to live in a happily adjusted and efficient way. He is in a dangerously unstable emotional state, and at last something precipitates a crisis. It may be an added responsibility such as the birth of a child or a promotion at work, it may be the death of some closely related person, it may be some disturbing change in the normal and supporting routine of life such as a change of job or house or a run of 'bad luck' in business, or else an

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accident or illness such as influenza; it may be anything that brings the inner tension to breaking point. Then, perhaps quite suddenly, the physical symptoms of nervous illness appear. It may be, however, that there is just a slow decline in freshness and interest, an increasing sense of weariness, a persistent feeling of being physically 'below par' and mentally 'fed up', and the subtle beginnings of some such symptom as poor sleep or headaches. A clinically definable neurosis has arrived.

It needs to be appreciated that this drift or else sudden fall into neurosis can only be prevented by the appropriate measures. It is possible for a time to resist by 'will-power', and that is not without value. Effort always strengthens the conscious mind, but the popular idea of will-power as the answer to 'nerves', which leads so many people to say: 'I feel I ought to be able to beat this by myself', is fallacious. The fight to master emotional difficulties can at best only lead to their repression. They are thrust out of consciousness, and by being buried in the unconscious they are actually preserved. Constant expenditure of effort internally is required to keep them repressed, with the result that the personality is always tense and strained, lacking in freedom of self-expression and spontaneity; and also is short of energy for external activities, which will betray itself in unnecessary narrowness of range of interests, and ultimately in a failure of interest and symptoms of fatigue. It is true that a resolute determination to keep oneself face to face with life in spite of emotional problems is necessary. Since all neurosis involves a retreat from real living, it is necessary to summon up conscious resolution to counteract this. But the neurosis will defeat the conscious resolution in the end, unless the much more vital factor of insight and understanding is added. *The real answer to neurosis is the determination not to beat it but to understand it; not to fight down fears, resentments, and so on, and leave it at that, but to probe their inner meaning and set going a re-*

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adjustment of personality that undermines their force. It is a waste of energy to spend a lifetime in fighting things that remain in existence in one's mind; the more radical method of getting rid of them altogether by achieving a revolutionary change in character, thus releasing energy for other constructive ends, is what is wanted.

The mind has its own laws, its own mechanisms, its own particular developmental history in each individual case, and as a result of that, its own structure. It is a popular fallacy that one can do what one likes with one's mind; that if one is depressed one can just will it away if one wants to; that if one is afraid, one can just say: 'It's silly to be afraid', and stop being afraid; that if one feels full of hate, one can say: 'It's wrong to feel like this', and simply go and feel different. This bland and superficial optimism about the management of the mind is quite unscientific and has no foundation in fact. Depressions, anxiety-states, irrational hates, and so on, can be got rid of only temporarily by the resolute conscious effort to banish them; and the effort is an unconstructive waste of time and energy, except in so far as it is necessary to enable one to carry on with one's immediate duties and practical activities. They can be got rid of in any true sense only by investigating them and understanding their structure, origins, and ramifications in character-make-up, so that in the end they are undermined.

The Signs of Neurosis

The signs by which neurosis, once it has broken out, may be recognised must be divided into physical and mental symptoms.

(1) *The physical symptoms* are, it must be emphasised, genuinely painful or distressing bodily conditions. There is no such thing as an imaginary pain. A pain is a real pain. If the heart palpitates and the doctor says there is nothing wrong with the heart organically, that does not mean that the whole thing is imagination as is ignorantly, though

often, said. It means only that the distressing state of the heart is caused by emotion and not by some organic defect. If a person falls unconscious or is sick as a result of a violent anxiety attack, the unconsciousness is genuine, and the vomiting can be seen for itself. People can be exceedingly ill as a result of mental conflict. One has seen people in middle life go as thin as a rake, show an ashen grey pallor, and be so exhausted as to be unable to walk, so that friends were convinced there was a cancer, yet a short time after admission to hospital and with no treatment except removal from an anxiety-creating life-situation, along with rest, relief from responsibility, nursing, care and attention, they have put on weight, regained normal colour and become able to walk in the hospital grounds. The physical state is not produced by imagination but by a serious and far-reaching dislocation of normal bodily functioning. Again, one has known patients suffering from exhaustion neurosis who were hardly able to stand the fatiguing effort of the first interview and whose working days were thought to be over. Yet a few months later they were back at work, and no treatment had been administered apart from the talking out and discussion of emotional problems.

Neurosis is a real illness and not just elaborate malingering. People can feel so ill in a state of chronic neurotic anxiety which flares up at some point into a really acute attack, that they feel they will die. There is so much popular misunderstanding about neurosis, and it is so easy with certain types of neurosis to conclude that it is all 'put on' that the above facts need to be stated. The state of the mind, conscious and unconscious, affects, often with astonishing rapidity, the sympathetic or involuntary nervous system and the interrelated team of endocrine glands, and through them the entire working of the body both in its general biochemical processes and in the special functioning of its separate parts, organs, and systems. It is well worth the while of anyone who, like a minister or social worker, deals

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with people as individuals, to get a working knowledge of the physiology of the body, the main organic systems such as those of digestion, excretion, respiration, circulation, and especially of the nervous system, voluntary and involuntary, and the glandular system. Any one of these can be upset by anxiety and mental conflict, and roughly in one or other of two ways. The process or function concerned may be increased, speeded up, over-stimulated, or else decreased, slowed down, or inhibited.

Only a few general indications are given here to serve as a guide, and to indicate the kind of information that ought to be sought. Thus sleep may be banished either partially or almost wholly in insomnia or else long, heavy, and unrefreshing sleep in a kind of drugged condition may be produced. In the first case the mind is, as it were, so hard at work doing overtime on its unsolved problems, that it cannot relax and drop into unconsciousness; it remains alert and wideawake with thoughts racing round and round inconclusively, or maybe sleep comes after a time, but it is restless, with frequent wakings all night. Sometimes disturbing dreaming rises to nightmare intensity and then the sleeper wakes with a start feeling frightened and cannot get to sleep again. The dream which was intended to provide a temporary fantasy solution to some conflict has failed to cope with the problem, or the mind dare not pursue its fantasy any further and the intense anxiety aroused has broken sleep. On the other hand, anxiety may be drugged by heavy and too prolonged sleep, so that all problems are blotted out. Alternative 'drugging methods' are overwork, a hectic round of social activity, or alcohol.

Eating and the digestive function is likewise upset in these two opposite ways. Appetite may fail and a person refuse to eat, as in anorexia nervosa or nervous loss of appetite; the best-known instance of this is when a young man in love 'goes off his food'. The digestive juices and processes may be inhibited so that undigested masses of food lie in the

stomach and presently are rejected by vomiting. The refusal of food often is found to go back to the small child's stubborn resistance against a mother who is disturbing it emotionally. On the other hand, a craving for food can be created so that the patient eats and eats and never feels satisfied; food is the symbol of love, mother love, and of mother herself, an identification that dates back to the time when to be fed and to be loved at mother's breast and to possess mother meant the same thing. An offshoot of digestive disturbance as a result of anxiety and overtension is the gastric and duodenal ulcer. The proper balance of digestive juices is upset, acidity eats away a portion of lining of the stomach or intestine, and the raw patch becomes a chronic ulcer. Medical attention will reduce the ulcer, but it is the worry and strain that really need to be eliminated.

The closely allied excretory function can be deranged either by inhibition or over-stimulation. In the first case, constipation is produced: a condition often found in stubborn and resistant people or in those who, in order to prevent the outburst of strong hostilities and resentments, are perpetually holding themselves in by rigid self-control, so that they lose spontaneity, become introverted, aloof, and both mentally and organically constipated. The opposite condition produces diarrhoea, which is fairly well known to be an anxiety-reaction. Many people experience a slight touch of diarrhoea before some worrying event. It is owing to the dislocation of the normal balance of endocrine secretions that people may either put on weight or lose weight rapidly when they are emotionally disturbed. The anabolic or tissue-building processes which store fat, and their opposite, the katabolic processes concerned with activity, the breaking-down of tissues and the release of energy, are governed by the action of the endocrine glands and the autonomic nervous system. These are, in their turn, immediately affected by our emotions. Thus, in hyperthyroidism, a person becomes nervously over-active, excitable and

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thin, while in hypothyroidism the patient is lethargic, dull, and shows an increase of subcutaneous fat.

The respiratory and circulatory systems are closely linked so that they are often stimulated or inhibited together. In the 'effort syndrome', which is the symptom picture made up of reactions that suggest the putting forth of effort (reactions which are also, in fact, produced in the neurotic condition as a response often to the slightest effort), palpitation of the heart and breathlessness are the most prominent signs. These are just the physical reactions that we should all produce if we were struggling up a steep hill, and people for whom life seems an unending uphill fight are liable to produce this reaction. Blood pressure, like other organic functions, may be affected by mental stress, though this is a symptom we cannot see. It is raised in the condition known as 'essential hypertension', but can be lowered in other conditions, and the responses of the heart and lungs slowed down.

One of the commonest and most easily observable anxiety signs is muscular tension. The unrelaxed body perches itself on the edge of a chair, often with legs twined round each other. In bed the body is unrelaxed in sleep so that the muscles, being tense and even rigid for a long time during the night, are stiff and aching by the morning. Many people wake up with a backache or a neckache caused in this way. The more obscure nervous and muscular tensions which can locate themselves in any part of the body account for many shifting aches and pains that are put down to rheumatism or dignified by the name of fibrositis. With a very unrelaxed body it is possible to take hold of a person's arm as he stands upright and raise it outstretched sideways till it is horizontal; then, when you let go of the arm, it remains raised; the muscles, unconsciously held tense, do not permit it to fall down as it would if they were limp.

Yet another group of neurotic pains are the various headaches which are usually put down to the weather or to

something that one has eaten. It is generally recognised that worry causes a headache, yet very few people, when they get a headache, ask: 'What am I anxious about?' They practically always look for some purely physical explanation. That is one of the signs of our unwillingness to know too much about ourselves. We prefer to externalise our troubles, to push them out of our personalities on to the body or the environment. Headaches of all kinds, from mild, dull pressures to a head-splitting migraine, result from emotional conflict. One frequently finds that violent and angry thoughts 'knocking' in the mind are accompanied by bumping, knocking, shooting, or stabbing pains in the head. The intimidated and crushed personality may have a sense of heavy pressure weighing down on the top of the head. It is surprising how often a symbolic meaning can be discerned in a type of physical symptom.

This leads us on to the symptom formations where the symbolic determination of the symptom is the major fact about it, as in cases of conversion hysteria.¹ This in turn raises the whole question of types of neurosis. What causes one person to develop one kind of physical symptom and another person quite a different kind? This may often be partly determined by accident. Any part that has been injured has already acquired a special interest for the mind, which directs its attention automatically to the 'weak spot' as it is assumed to be. There some kind of ache or pain will grow. In part the organic system affected will be determined by the nature of the conflicts that arouse anxiety. But also the matter is controlled largely by the constitutional personality type of the patient. The extravert hysteric more often

¹ Hysteria: not to be confused with the popular idea of being 'hysterical' or emotionally excitable. Hysteria is a neurosis marked by the conversion of anxiety into physical symptoms of almost every conceivable kind, along with a self-pitying attitude, direct and indirect attempts to extort sympathy, and a struggle to dominate or exercise power over others through weakness: also an underlying attitude of self-disparagement. The hysteric strives for loving support in a dependent relationship.

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develops thorax symptoms (disturbance of heart or lungs), or inhibitions of the obvious bodily parts—limbs, eyes, etc. The introvert obsessional¹ usually shows a far smaller development of physical symptoms, and these are likely to be mostly in the region of the abdomen. This is, however, only a rough approximation to the facts, though it is a useful one.

We must presently consider the main character types or tendencies that emerge in neurosis, but it is relevant here to consider the fact that while the obsessional is inclined to introversion, hides his troubles and therefore develops his symptoms in secret, the hysteric tends more to extraversion, has a demonstrative bent, and dramatises his troubles, publicises them to an audience in symptoms that are too obvious to be missed. It is here that the symbolism of symptoms reaches its highest level. The hysterical paralysis of an arm or leg tells the world that its owner feels helpless, impotent, and ought to be pitied and helped. Hysterical blindness reveals the fact that there is something that the patient does not want to see and so he inhibits the function of seeing. It will be something in himself, some offending impulse perhaps. It expresses concretely the idea that there are none so blind as those who do not want to see. A parallel symptom is torticollis or wryneck, where the head is forced round over one shoulder so that the patient cannot look straight ahead. It says that the patient does not feel able to look the world in the face, and his unconscious provides a way of escape from some difficulty by forcing him to look the other way. It is just what anyone might do on meeting a person in the street whom he does not want to see. In one interesting case of torticollis the head was forced to look

¹ Obsessional Neurosis: characterised by irrational compulsions (though with unimpaired intelligence) to repetitive acts, often taking the form of a ritual of cleansing; or of ordering, arranging, or organising one's actions or belongings; or the compulsive persistence of ideas, phrases, tunes which keep on 'running through one's head': also by marked guilt-feelings and a struggle for self-mastery. The obsessional strives to crush the bad, aggressive thing inside the mind.

upwards towards the sky rather than to right or left. Other characteristics went with this symptom, such as a history of a lowly origin with a strong desire to rise in the world against the barriers of an economic and social order that seemed to bar the way, dreams in which the patient was climbing upwards out of some suffocating situation, getting through the ceiling of a locked room, and finally a strong interest in the religious doctrine of immortality, thought of in terms of a higher world to which one might rise at death. The symptom symbolised both the desire to escape from present frustration, and also the strong trend of aspiration covering a gnawing sense of inferiority. A hysterical stammer may express the idea of a brake put upon the speech to prevent the outbreak of aggressive tendencies. These are only hints at the possible motivations of hysterical symptoms, and in truth make the matter look deceptively simple. It takes many hours of analysis to establish exactly the motivations underlying any actual symptom.

The obsessional neurotic also makes use of symbolism in symptom formation. He is usually oppressed by a strong sense of guilt over some forbidden compulsive desire, some bad thing inside him from which he wants to feel free and clean. So he will develop some washing ritual of a compulsive kind which may vary from washing his hands over and over again and yet never feeling they are clean, to a compulsion to keep on changing his clothes under the impression that they are soiled. But his rituals and compulsions are more secret and may only be known to himself or a few people close to him. The washing compulsion has clear connections with the religious ritual of baptism for the washing away of sin and is generally believed to spring from a very deep-seated, almost racially inherited tendency that is to be seen at work in most elaborate ways in the religious rituals of primitive tribes.

By the time neurosis has reached the stage of a definite obsession or hysteria, it has passed into the province of the

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specialist in psychotherapy. Many of the earlier physical symptoms mentioned can, however, be present along with simpler anxiety-states that a minister or social worker can well understand and deal with. One word of caution needs to be uttered. All of these physical symptoms can equally well be organically or psychically caused, and a doctor must pronounce in the first place whether or not an organic factor is present and important. One cannot jump hastily to the conclusion that, because a person has headaches or is sleeping badly or has indigestion, he is necessarily neurotic. But if the doctor cannot find any sufficient bodily cause, and the minister or social worker is in a position to know the sufferer pretty well in his private life as an individual, and so is able to infer with fair accuracy that this person is very likely to be suffering emotional stress, then it should be safe to make a cautious and tactful approach towards explaining how such and such a trouble is very commonly caused by anxieties.

The last physical symptom we may mention, since in lesser degrees it is probably the commonest of them all, is fatigue. This may reach the severity of sheer exhaustion, or it may simply be a feeling of lassitude, weariness, or lack of energy. Fatigue is particularly closely associated with our state of mind even in normal conditions. We feel tired when we are bored by a dull sermon or lecture, or when petty frustration will not allow us to get ahead with our plans. We wake up to new life as soon as our interest is really aroused. That is why one may be actually physically tired after heavy bodily exercise and feel fit to drop, but a sudden emergency discovers fresh and untapped stores of energy in us. The study of fatigue seems naturally to lead us on to the consideration therefore of the psychic symptoms of neurosis.

(2) *The mental symptoms* may also be thought of in terms of an increase or decrease of normal functioning. Anxiety may overstimulate the mind and cause an unnatural alert-

ness. One man suffering an anxiety-state felt that when he walked down the street he must see everything that happened, as if he had a weather eye open for possible dangers at every step. A disturbed mind may show itself as emotional excitability or over-sensitivity, as emotional over-reaction to trivial things so that molehills are turned into mountains, as aggressive argumentativeness and a need to try to force everyone into agreement. On the other hand anxiety may lead to loss of interest. Books or hobbies that have always been a great source of pleasure gradually lose their attractiveness. Loss of power of concentration is frequently complained of, so that a person may sit down to read but cannot keep his mind on the printed page; or if he is engaged in some practical activity, he cannot give his mind to what he is doing, but finds it wandering off in vague thoughts, day-dreaming, or forgetfulness.

Thus boredom is certainly not a sign of mental health. An active and non-anxious mind is not likely to be at a loss for interest. Boredom is a sign of some inhibition of mental activity of the naturally spontaneous kind. A continual sense of unsatisfied restlessness is a somewhat parallel phenomenon. Moodiness again is due to the uprising of some usually repressed condition of sullen resentment or dissatisfaction, and is evidence of a persisting undercurrent of disturbing emotion. A rather different aspect of decrease of mental function at the level of consciousness is apathy, or loss of feeling. This may be linked on one side to definite depression, and on the other to coldness and emotional unresponsiveness. Depression usually indicates the severe repression of some turbulent uprising of anger, resentment, aggression, and hate; but in fact the struggle to inhibit any strong impulse or emotion results in the draining away of energy available to the conscious mind, and also the repression of the one drive in question seems to involve an overall suppression of vital functioning in the personality, leading to the state of heavy, brooding, and also devitalised con-

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sciousness that we know as depression. This depression lifts when the mind can release itself in some kind of action, even if for the time being it is only vigorous physical activity of a kind that can symbolically give vent to the frustrated impulses. Emotional coldness, aloofness, inability to feel anything very deeply or even to feel at all, is primarily an automatic defence against the uprush of feelings that would be distressing, and impulses that one fears one may not be able to control.

The various forms of anxiety itself as a conscious state of mind are to be grouped with the mental symptoms. The worrying habit, the pessimistic outlook that is always apprehensive that the worst will happen, the feeling that things are more likely to go wrong than right, are common conditions that produce much misery and unhappiness. Inferiority feelings, a sense of inadequacy, or being unable to cope with life, a haunted and hunted feeling, a fear of imminent breakdown, or of going mad, which is really the fear of losing emotional control or balance, are more widespread than is superficially apparent. Anxiety frequently manifests itself directly during sleep in the form of falling dreams, or dreams of drowning, of swimming and only just being able to keep one's head above water, of tossing on a stormy sea in a little boat, or of being in danger from flood waters. The fear of loss of self-control may be revealed in dreams of gathering speed on a cycle or in a motor-car going downhill and the brakes fail to work so that one cannot pull up, or again of being in an express train that runs off the rails. These are only a few of the commonest dream themes that need little interpretation, though in any given case they may have a specific reference to some particular problem in the dreamer's life.

The fears and anxieties arising out of inner conflicts may be projected into the material environment, which is one way of avoiding the necessity of facing the trouble where it really exists, in ourselves. Then phobias arise. Terms like

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claustrophobia and agoraphobia have almost passed into everyday speech. Claustrophobia, the fear of small or shut-in spaces, may indicate a fear of and feeling of revolt against some frustration or smothering of the personality. Agoraphobia, the fear of open spaces, often indicates a need for close support, and a desire for enclosed security; out in the open the patient feels alone and unprotected and unsupported. Thus a person may be non-anxious walking along the pavement close to the wall, but becomes panicky on attempting to cross the road. But these are only the most obvious meanings of these fears, and other more intricate motivations exist. Fear of heights, or rather of falling from heights, may be classed along with falling dreams, as expressing a feeling of being unable to maintain oneself in some position, or else a fear of a moral fall, of letting oneself go in the expression of some impulse that is regarded as socially or morally taboo. Such people are often found to be able to swim, but they cannot let themselves go enough to dive. Fear of falling from heights may also reveal a wish to give up plus a fear of giving up a defensive detachment from life.

Among the most distressing nervous fears are the fear of failure, and the fear of making a fool of oneself, leading so often to a retreat from responsibility and opportunity, and an unnecessary narrowing of activity and interests. The motivation of these fears is far more complex than may appear to be the case at first sight. One may fear failure because one has too much self-love, and an impossibly high and exacting 'idealised image' of oneself that cannot really be lived up to.

Nothing has as yet been said about sex problems. They would require at the very least a whole chapter to themselves, and only the very briefest suggestions can here be given. Broadly, in sex, as in the other matters we have examined, anxiety either decreases or increases the natural strength of the function. Decrease will lead in extreme cases

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to frigidity in women and impotence in men, but it can exist in every degree from slight weakness or uncertainty of sexual interest or activity up to its complete suppression. Those who profess to be uninterested in the subject, who regard it as faintly distasteful, who find that they cannot imagine 'ordinary decent people' engaging in sexual activity, who think of intellectual concerns as 'higher' and of sex as crude by comparison, are in fact suffering from some degree of sexual inhibition; for these ideas are not really natural, but rather transparent rationalisations. The occasional couple who marry on an agreement not to have sexual relations, in the absence of any important reasons why they should not have children (though even then they could use contraceptives), are the victims of a neurotic attitude to sex, while the couple who prevent conception indefinitely and never feel in a position to risk having a child, are suffering from a neurotic attitude to the responsibility of parenthood. Not all sexual maladjustment in marriage is due to neurosis. Much dissatisfaction and failure is traceable to ignorance. Perhaps the majority of married people trust to the blind knowledge of nature's promptings for the conducting of their sex life. They do not realise that there is an art of love-making, that a man can make love clumsily, that he can fail to arouse his wife to full desire and co-operation because he does not know that this needs doing, that sexual intimacy can be restricted and stereotyped by the domination of narrow conventional ideas on the subject. Sound instruction can remedy difficulties of this kind. Neurotic inhibition or over-stimulation is a different matter.

Over-stimulation of sexual desire by anxiety-states is frequently explained by the supposition that the person concerned is biologically highly or over-sexed. That is a mistake. While there are natural differences in the strength of sex feeling, the compulsive seeking for sexual satisfaction found in the man who just cannot be without a woman,

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is usually neither a biologically over-strong sexual drive nor simple immorality, but the uncontrollable longing in a basically lonely, insecure, anxious mind, for the reassurance, comfort, and support of contact with the feminine body, always in that case a symbol for love which first came to us in the form of mother's breast. Such a compulsion will fade out under the analysis of the loveless character and of its origins in early childhood anxieties.

These then are the principal recognisable manifestations of neurosis. The consideration of the mental symptoms leads us into the region of problems of character and conduct, and so into the question of the real inner nature of neurosis in terms of character-structure and the maladjusted functioning of the total personality.

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3. Understanding the Maladjusted Personality

WE have surveyed the signs of neurosis, and examined the first broad outline of its nature. It was stated that neurosis or emotional illness is not marked off from normal human living in the way that psychosis or insanity is; and that neurosis as 'life based on fear' opens up the whole pathetic tragedy of human existence. Human history, culture, science, and religion show something of the magnificent potentialities in man. Individually and collectively we are capable of far more than has ever been achieved. Were it not for the fears that beset us and the angry, destructive impulses and inhibitions on the capacity to love that flow from them, little or nothing would stand between us and our dreams. Man frustrates himself because he does not yet understand himself. We must think of neurosis from this point on not as a purely medical problem of illness, but as the major problem of the frustration of human living by discord within the personality itself as something in which we all share. This is what brings the matter so close to the concern of the minister and social worker. If our exposition of the inner meaning of neurosis is given more in terms of the sociological point of view and the character-analysis of Karen Horney, than of the biological approach and Freudian psychopathology of childhood, that is not because Freud can be ignored, but firstly because the psychopathology of infancy concerns the specialist in psychotherapy, and secondly because, in spite of his tremendous and revolu-

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tionary insights into human nature, his instinct theory ties man down to purely hedonistic types of motivation, the quest for instinctual 'organ pleasures', which is a sub-personal level of psychic life. That prevented Freud from arriving at a proper theory of man as personal, and rendered his psychology incapable of explaining satisfactorily the higher levels of rational, artistic, ethical, and religious functioning. Karen Horney's concepts are more usable at the level of social work, and hers is a psychology primarily of personal relationships and not of the pleasure-motive.

1. Neurosis as a Strategy of Living

While we grasp firmly the fact that a neurosis is a real illness which one cannot just 'snap out of' at will, and which requires appropriate treatment, it is also the patient's 'reaction to life', his way of dealing with life for the time being, because no other way seems open to him. This may be more true of all illness than has hitherto been recognised, but it is especially important to the understanding of neurosis to recognise that it does not just happen to a man; it is something he does, it has a meaning and a purpose. We can distinguish between neurotic character and neurotic behaviour. The former leads to the latter, and neurotic behaviour includes the production of symptoms of illness. *Viewed as a strategic reaction to life, neurosis has two characteristics: retreat and regression.*

Retreat, or the flight from real life into illness, is more apparent in some forms of neurosis than in others. In some types of hysteria it may become practically a conscious technique of playing on other people's feelings in order to get sympathy and support, but the neurotic does not recognise what he is doing as clearly as the observer does. To the patient it all feels so convincing and legitimate that it is usually difficult to get him to understand that his illness has a positive value for him, that he uses it to get certain things he needs even though the price he must pay in suffering may

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be appallingly high. But in all forms of neurosis the 'secondary gain from illness' is present. The patient at least finds it easier to face anxiety over a physical pain or an obsessional compulsion than over the disunited condition of his own personality; and for a time he may also derive comfort and sympathy from others to help him on. His personality problem is one that he does not know how to solve and feels helpless and hopeless about, and it is this desperate situation that dictates the flight into illness. That is gradually given up when he can make use of a psychological investigation to open up a more constructive way.

This 'retreat' aspect of neurosis naturally involves serious dangers. It may condition a whole character-formation and develop into a technique of 'power through weakness'. The neurotic mother who rules the household by means of her headaches, or has a heart attack when people will not give in to her, is not uncommon. This can be carried to appalling extremes, so that illness may even be used as a weapon. It is possible to express hostility in disguised forms against those we live with, by keeping up an incessant running commentary of complaints about aches and pains till they are driven frantic, or even by falling helplessly ill on them so that their freedom is curtailed and they are burdened with the care of an invalid. Tears, and the pathetic reaction, to make other people 'come round' or 'give in' may be equally destructive. Such ways of handling life are so plainly abnormal, and are so obviously self-destroying and indicative of weakness and not strength, that the mind can, if it will, give them up once it thoroughly understands what it has been doing. It is the acceptance of insight that is the painful thing. It is a proof that fear has eaten deeply into a personality when it is driven into such totally negative reactions to life.

Regression goes along with retreat, and is one aspect of it. It is a retreat from the present back to the past, a falling back on the attitudes and habits of childhood, or of some

earlier stage of life. It is a regular feature of the dreams of neurosis that they are tied to the past. The dreamer is back in the pre-married state, or back in some earlier job or dwelling-house, or busy with people known years ago and maybe now dead, or even back at school as a small child. The dependent behaviour patterns of childhood may be revived, so that a grown-up person becomes afraid to be left alone, a girl in the late teens has to have mother to sleep with her. There may even be a revival of infantile bed-wetting. When the smoking habit becomes a real compulsion there is little doubt that it is a regression to the breast or to some later breast-substitute such as dummy or thumb, but it is highly ambivalent: it both sucks and destroys the symbolic breast. The complete hysterical paralysis of both arms and legs represents an extreme regression to the physical helplessness of infancy. One such patient had to be fed by her mother and would try to bite mother's fingers in the process, an expression of aggression in an infantile manner. It is often noticeable with some types of neurosis that the patient seems immature, childish, not really grown up in a general sense. Such a woman may still speak of 'Mummy' and 'Daddy' like a little girl.

The double strategy of retreat and regression often revealed in illness is stated in an uncompromising way by Dr. G. Groddeck in *The Unknown Self*. His term for the unknown self, which includes even if it transcends what is normally referred to as the unconscious, is the 'It'. He writes: 'The result of sickness is suffering, and bound up with that is the desire for help. If a man thinks his sufferings, whatever their nature, are getting worse and worse, he finally gets to a state in which he is dependent on the help of others in certain definite vital activities, a state he and every man has once before experienced: he becomes a baby . . . The sick man tries to get help, a particular kind of help which he has already known by experience, i.e. the help of his mother or of her representative. Always and under

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all conditions, sickness is a yearning for the mother, for the kind protective mother, a return to childhood' (pp. 66-7). So much for regression; on the question of retreat Dr. Groddeck says: 'Whoever finds life too hard, sometimes external life, still oftener his private mental life, can easily drop all his difficulties, at least for a time, if he gets ill. The man who breaks his leg cannot go to business. . . . The man who cannot see which way to take in his mental struggle gets a high fever which deprives him of all power of making a decision, and this perhaps so clouds his consciousness that all remembrance of the inner conflict disappears most opportunely. Occasions in life when to gain time is to gain everything are not so very rare. By the time one has recovered everything may have changed; by the time one has recovered somebody else may have made the decisions' (p. 71.)

2. Why the Neurotic Cannot Keep Face to Face with Life

What shall we say of this regressive-retreatist attitude to life? No doubt all of us have a breaking-point somewhere, at which our strength for dealing with life begins to fail. But that does not answer the question. The neurotic reaction is not due to the inherent and absolute limit of strength having been reached. The patient possesses powers that are adequate to dealing with life, but cannot use them. His psychic credits are, as it were, frozen, and he cannot draw on his resources. He is like a man who has money in the bank but is unable to draw it and so has to fall back on borrowing and becoming dependent on other people. The normal attitude to life is one of average (not overweening) self-confidence, courage to express oneself and thereby gain experience, and preparedness to take risks and not be downcast by failure. The normal mind is like a cork that may be pushed under the water but always comes up again and cannot be kept down. The neurotic falls back from this positive attitude into a negative one, not through moral cowardice, but because he suffers from a real inadequacy

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to life. He has powers, but they are in large part more potential than actual. His character is immature, undeveloped. There has been an arrested development, a fixation, at some early phase in life, and though he can develop beyond that point he has not yet in fact done so. *Regression is the revelation of this underlying immaturity, retreat is its consequence.* The undeveloped self finds adult situations, responsibilities, and relationships too big a strain, and is driven back on an attempt to reconstruct life in terms of infantile dependency and the need for support.

The idea of maturity, of which psychology today makes so much, is clearly of great importance to ministers, concerned as they are with teaching and preaching. Much Christian teaching would be nearer to the real problems of human living, and far more helpful in practice, if it were concerned less with what we might call the theologically formalistic themes of the law of God and sin as disobedience to that law, and more concerned with man's need to develop mature selfhood, and the miseries and failures that spring from our actual immaturities. The preaching of theological formulations divorced from psychological insight becomes unrealistic and does not truly contact the mind of the hearer. This is a problem we must face when we come to deal with religious education.

The neurotic cannot, then, stand up to life because courage and determination are undermined from within, and because, though he has the powers and resources, potentially, for dealing quite adequately with life, his arrested and immaturely developed personality is inadequate in practice. How does this come about? Neurosis might be traced either to constitutional or developmental factors, or a mixture of both. The problems of temperament and character will be mentioned later. No doubt constitutional factors cannot be ignored. Dr. Eysenck and his collaborators in a recent book, *Dimensions of Personality*, claim to have isolated a constitutional factor which they call 'general neuroticism'. What

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its organic basis might be is not clear; perhaps the degree of lability or sensitiveness of the autonomic nervous system leading to emotional over-reaction all through life from childhood on. Yet it would certainly be possible to find people with 'highly strung' nervous constitutions who are not neurotic, and who have developed stable and mature character. No conclusions could be drawn from the statistics about 'general neuroticism' in Dr. Eysenck's cases, as to whether it is a genuinely hereditary factor or not, unless all the cases were psycho-analysed as well as statistically investigated. So little is known about constitutional factors that no reliable conclusions can be based as yet on what little is known.

It is, however, positively known that *neurosis does spring from the fact of a child's normal emotional development being seriously disturbed by bad human relationships with the adults who are responsible for it.* There are few cases of neurosis in which there is not the story of an unhappy childhood. The one fact that is most relevant, from the point of view of the special interests of the minister and social worker, is that neurosis is built up on 'separation-anxiety', fear of loss of mother or of mother's love, emotional rejection by mother, or actual loss of mother. The foundation of a baby's security is a good relationship with mother. A Christian psychologist might say that mother-love is the first revelation of God. If that foundation is shaky, everything built up on it is unstable. But the word 'love' has so many misleading associations that it needs to be carefully defined for our purpose. Lack of love cannot be hidden from a child since it betrays itself by the absence of a subtle something from all dealing with the child, and which the child senses and reacts to with lack of confidence. Lack of love cannot be made up for by extra emphasis put on material care, or by giving presents or money, or by spoiling. Still less can it be made up for by impressing the child with its duty to be grateful for all that

parents do for it. Emotional blackmail either in the appeal, 'If you love Mummy you won't do that', or else 'If you do that Mummy won't love you', is destructive of good relationships between parent and child. A pretence of good relationships by insisting on outward signs of respect for parents, or on conventional signs of affection such as kissing 'good-bye' or 'good night', is not the same thing as a really good spontaneous relationship.

One might well define parental love as the capacity to make friends with one's children, and it is essential that the children should genuinely have been wanted, which is by no means always the case. Many a baby is emotionally rejected by parents before it is born. The one rule is that of 'the happy middle course' of not too much and not too little of anything. Not too much and not too little demonstrative affection, discipline, visible support and encouragement, correction, freedom. With that will go a genuine desire to see the child grow up self-reliant, capable of thinking and acting for itself, not over-dependent on parental backing though sure that it is there if needed. True love will gradually and wisely help the child to wean itself from the dependent status of childhood, and grow up into adulthood; thus true love is not possessive or repressive. It is a genuine interest in the child for its own sake, showing as affection, spontaneous good feeling, expressed in practical ways rather than in emotionally overheated fussing and fondling. It is 'being on the child's side' with wise discrimination. Now the fact is that an appallingly large number of children get nothing like parenthood of this quality. They are criticised, scolded, nattered, exploited, humiliated, punished for trivial things, made to feel guilty or ashamed over matters that have no real moral significance but perhaps consist only of interfering with the parents' convenience. The self-confidence of many an adult was undermined or prevented from developing long before the age of ten, and the seeds of fear, insecurity, inferiority, anger and smouldering resent-

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ment sown in the mind. Out of such experiences in childhood the neurotic character is formed, and it consists of emotions and impulses organised round the twin but antagonistic poles of love and hate. The child's need of, and natural affection for and dependence on, parents, clashes with its anger and resentment at parental frustration. The hate usually has to be stifled through fear of losing parental love altogether, and so hate flourishes unchecked in the unconscious beneath outward respect and compliance with parental wishes. Normal self-assertion becomes bad aggression, normal affection becomes weak compliance. On neither side is the emotional life healthy, but is self-contradictory.

Conflict becomes the key word to the internal situation, the conflict between anxious love and hate in a mind divided against itself and so increasingly crippled in its will and capacity to live. This conflict between love and hate draws into itself gradually most or all of the psychic functions: sex, capacity for work and concentrated attention, the use of intelligence, capacity for friendship and personal relationships. This condition is technically identified under the name *ambivalence*, the existence of a double will or sets of reactions based on opposite feelings at one and the same time for one and the same person. Ambivalent reactions, starting with the child's experience of parents, will spread later in life till as an adult he cannot react in a simple and uncomplicated way to anyone or anything. This state of desperate internal discord and self-frustration is what drives the whole personality at last into a neurotic retreat. The internal 'maladjustment to self' is paralleled by external 'maladjustment to other people', for it began in a disturbed personal relationship to mother, or to both parents, and steadily infects all the human relationships of the child as it grows up into adult life. Relations with brothers, sisters, friends, schoolmates, and later on workmates, employers, colleagues in voluntary organisations, husband or wife, and ultimately children, all become involved so that the wheel

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comes full circle and conditions are created in which the next generation is infected with neurosis.

The more intimate and detailed analysis of neurosis that is necessary to the psychotherapist who has to help disentangle its complexities, can be made from two different but really complementary points of view. Freud represents what we might call the internal or psycho-biological point of view, which seeks to answer the question: 'What has become of the basic constitutionally fashioned driving forces of the mind inside the neurotic development?' Karen Horney represents the more external or sociological point of view, which answers the question: 'What is the structure of the neurotic character considered as a system of conflicting and contradictory attitudes and reactions to other people?' The psychotherapist cannot afford to neglect either approach. For the special purposes of the minister, and of social workers in general, Karen Horney's approach is more immediately enlightening and useful. She writes in her latest book: 'Neuroses are generated by disturbances in human relationships. . . . Compulsive drives are specifically neurotic; they are born of feelings of isolation, helplessness, fear, and hostility, and represent ways of coping with the world despite these feelings; they aim primarily not at satisfaction but at safety; their compulsive character is due to the anxiety lurking behind them. Two of these drives, neurotic cravings for affection and for power, stand out in clear relief.'¹

Thus the neurotic retreats from life and regresses into infantile behaviour patterns and dependencies because he has a personality problem that he does not know how to solve, and as it drags on unsolved it so undermines his struggle to live that it drives him into a desperate situation of psychic and social deadlock, from which he can find no way of escape except illness, until he is helped to understand himself in an entirely new way. Between the original emotional conflict and the final retreat into illness there are

¹ Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts*, pp. 12 f.

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usually two intermediate attempts at a solution, first by a conscience-reaction to crush the conflict under 'guilt' feelings, second by 'detachment' or withdrawal from situations that arouse emotion.

We have briefly outlined the developmental theory of the cause of neurosis, but a hint of the part played by constitutional factors can be given. Before the modern development of 'type psychology', William James divided people into the Tough and the Tender. We may still accept that as having a real, if rough, accuracy. It helps us to understand something of the difficulty of achieving a balanced emotional growth. If constitutional temperament tends too markedly in one or other direction, there is risk of failure to develop the weaker side as character grows. Our nature exhibits a polarity that is fundamental, and the opposite poles are not always well balanced hereditarily, even allowing for the extreme difficulty of deciding what is due to heredity and what to environment. The tough people have dynamic energy and driving force, know what they want and go straight for it, and hit back vigorously at obstruction. The tender natures have a capacity to put themselves in other people's shoes, to feel with and for others; they are sympathetic, dislike rows and hurting people's feelings, and their sensitiveness gets in the way of their self-assertion. These two tendencies are, no doubt, first manifested in the sucking and biting impulses of the Freudian early and late oral phases.

Thus of two brothers, both of whom are capable and forceful, one has greater feeling for other people. The more sympathetic brother is more liable to be imposed on and exploited by the family. The father may want one son to go into his business. The tougher son does not like it and simply refuses; father probably knows by experience that it is no use arguing and trying to persuade him. He has always been 'intractable, a difficult child'. So he is left to go his own way. The other son is equally averse from devoting

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himself to father's business. He, too, has private ambitions, perhaps for a professional career, but cannot so easily bring himself to disappoint father by refusing to comply with his wishes. If father does not see that his son can only fulfil himself along his own proper line, which is not the business in question, or if he has a stronger wish than he would admit to control his children's lives, he may appear to leave the son free, yet bring subtle pressure to bear on him of the kind that the sensitive person finds especially hard to resist. He lets it be seen how disappointed he is that none of the family will join him, he shows a martyr spirit that makes the son feel uncomfortable. The son may yield and then for years smother resentment and frustration, till he becomes nervously tense, inhibited, depressed, and develops a neurosis. One patient said: 'My brother is not wholly regardless of others' feelings, but has never regarded them as much as I have. He got what he wanted and didn't care what our parents said, so they let him get away with it. Up to thirteen I was respected at school, could be forceful if necessary, and a leader, but then I lost it. I've always had two opposites inside me. I didn't like hurting others' feelings, and I considered theirs more than they considered mine.'

Of two sisters, one refuses to stay at home and help, or has always been so independent that she is not even expected to do so. The other, who equally could and wants to pursue a training for a job, is expected to stay at home. Maybe this is less common today than years ago, but there are still many middle-aged women whose chances of marriage or a career were ruined by their being made to feel that their first duty was to look after parents, as if that necessarily meant sacrificing entirely their own lives. Sometimes parents are quite blatantly possessive in such matters, but it never fails to create hidden conflicts in the children.

Dr. Eysenck and his team of psychiatrists and psychologists claim not only to have isolated a constitutional factor

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of 'general neuroticism', but to have confirmed the existence of a second constitutional factor, the familiar extraversion-introversion characteristics of Jung. In some form all investigators accept this, and it is related to the question we have been discussing. The tough person is usually an assertive extravert not much troubled by 'feelings inside his mind'; his interest is in the external ambitions he pursues, the things he has set his heart on doing, and he is single-minded in pursuit of his aims, inclined to ride roughshod over other people's susceptibilities in forging ahead to his goal. The constitutional make-up of the opposite type is not so uniform. He may be an emotional extravert with a strong natural attachment to people, easily becoming compliant to their wishes; he is more likely to become anxious through loss of other people's support than through being dominated by them. The thoughtful introvert is the person who so plainly sees both sides of every question that he gets involved in difficult conflicts of motive as between other people's expectations of him and his own wishes. The theoretical problems behind this brief reference to constitutional factors await the development of an adequate constitutional psychology. Those who wish to delve into the matter should read Kretschmer and Sheldon.

3. The Neurotic's Fundamental, but Unconscious, Attitude to Life

We have seen that neurosis is a strategy of retreat from life which is forced on a personality reduced to desperation by what seems to be the insoluble problem of an inner contradiction, a conflict of motives, attitudes, wishes, in which the mind feels driven in opposite directions, torn apart, by the forces of love and hate. Sometimes this has a constitutional basis, but even then the actual conflict is created by early life history and disturbing personal relationships, usually with parents in childhood. This leads to the formation of the neurotic character-structure, the implica-

tions of which are of vast importance for the understanding of moral and religious problems.

We may say that our first impressions of what the world is like, and of what kind of treatment we shall receive from other people, are formed on the basis of our experience of mother and father. If we grow up in a home where the atmosphere is one of friendliness, understanding tolerance, and a genuine desire in parents to encourage and not frustrate or merely make use of the children, we feel confident and at ease, because there is a fundamental safety about life. It is true that later on it will be found that the world at large is not as good as the home, and that there is a great deal of injustice, exploitation, fear, and hate in the relationships of individuals, organisations, classes, and nations: but by the time we make that discovery the foundations of our own emotional security and self-confidence have already been firmly laid. We know from those most important experiences in the earliest and most impressionable years of life that good relationships really exist, that good will in human beings towards one another is a genuine fact. We are able to make discriminating judgments about people, allowing for bad motives when we find reason to do so, but not expecting them everywhere. Because we shall not approach people with suspicion and fear in the first place, we are in fact likely to draw the best out of many of them, and find the world to be a much more friendly and helpful place than hostile people find it.

If, however, a child grows up in a home where parental attitudes are difficult and disturbing, where he cannot count on being understood or on getting a fair hearing and just treatment, where he is constantly subjected to undermining criticism, humiliating disparagement, punishment for every trivial fault, and general lack of consideration for his feelings and interests, then his whole outlook on life becomes warped. Underneath all other and later mental attitudes is a primary feeling of being alone, isolated, weak, and unhelped

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in face of a hostile world. This is what has come to be called 'basic anxiety', and it is a complex state of mind which calls for analysis. In itself it is a permanent anxiety-foundation, underlying the entire functioning of the mind, so that nothing wholly escapes its influence. It may be repressed and almost entirely unconscious and so unrealised, yet it still colours and secretly controls all reactions to life. It is an increasing, insidious, all-pervading feeling of being lonely and helpless in face of a world that is one's enemy. It concerns relationship to people, primarily, though it is often displaced on to events, situations, places, or future prospects. The basically anxious person feels insecure in everything, but often does not recognise his attitudes as those of fear. He will, in a variety of ways, feel small, insignificant, deserted, endangered in a world of people who seek only to dominate, humiliate, or exploit. It means emotional isolation, weakened self-confidence, conflict between the desire to rely on other people and distrust of them. All this sets up a 'basic hostility' which is part of the complex state of mind indicated as basic anxiety. When the world is our enemy we are inevitably on the defensive against it all the time. Many a man, who wonders why he does not get on well with people, does not recognise the latent attitudes of fear, suspicion, and hostility in which he meets them.

The intermixture of hostility and anxiety is illustrated in the case of a business man suffering from physical anxiety attacks, palpitation, hot sensations, and trembling. He dreams that someone is telling him he cannot do anything and he is trying to say that he can. He says:

'I never get full satisfaction out of my work. In doing a transaction I feel it's too big to cope with, or too good to last, and I feel choky. I feel thwarted as if I were only working for others and not for myself. I seem to have the opinion that everyone has something in their make-up

that's wrong, they are only out for their own ends. I get an inferior feeling that people don't actually want to have anything to do with me. I haven't got genial feeling for others. People attract me physically but repel me mentally. I can't get inside people. I feel outside people and events. If I'm talking to people I suddenly feel "Have I talked long enough, do they want me, had I better go!" If only I could lose this anxiety. I haven't got to the roots yet of my inability to face things. I find I can turn on anxiety feelings by talking of being alone or isolated. A friend told me the other day of his family financial expectations and I suddenly felt alone in the world while others have family supports and props, and feelings of jealousy and helplessness surge up.'

That is a perfect description of basic anxiety and basic hostility from one who suffers from it, but who never realised what it meant till it came to be investigated. Dr. Karen Horney's descriptions of this problem, scattered through all four of her books, should be carefully studied.

It would require a treatise in itself to do justice to all the components that go to make up this complex fundamental condition of the personality. The whole of clinical psychotherapy is an exposition of it. We may select the following: (1) *Insecurity*, leading to general apprehensiveness and the worry habit; (2) *Isolation*, giving rise to longings and compulsive cravings for personal contacts, along with a fear of making them; (3) *Helplessness*, showing as fear of responsibility or risk, feelings of inadequacy or inability to cope with people or situations, panic in face of quite simple problems, general lack of confidence; but helplessness may also be felt towards oneself in face of the internal dangers of an unstable mind, fears of disintegration, loss of will power and inability to direct one's life, fears of loss of self-control, and of the explosive force of impulses; (4) *Hostility*, revealed in critical, depreciatory, irritable attitudes to people,

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sullen, resentful, black moods, depressions; and finally (5) *Passivity*, due in part to reluctance to expose the small, weak, helpless self to the dangers of life in an unfriendly world, and still more to the need to suppress the hostile and resentful feelings that rise up against people and circumstances, so that in fighting these down the whole personality is subdued and repressed and becomes unable to release itself in vigorous and confident activity.

4. The Neurotic Character and the Human Environment

The neurotic character, then, with its foundations laid in childhood, in the conflict between love and hate with all its ramifications, creating basic anxiety and basic hostility, subsequently conditions all later development. We do not so much grow out of our childhood self as grow over the top of its persisting character-traits. It is quite possible to build up a façade or 'social self' of what seem to be more mature and adult attitudes to life, a conscious self that seems to be realistic and reasonable. It may deceive both ourselves and other people, but other people are very likely to begin to see through it as they get to know us better, while we go on naïvely taking ourselves at our face valuation. This kind of dualism in the structure of character has often been noted. William James called it the 'social self' and the 'real me'. C. G. Jung called it the 'persona' and the 'shadow'. The persona is the actor's mask, the self we show to the audience and in which we act for the benefit of other people. The shadow is made up of the less attractive traits that we push into the mental background. The Freudian 'Ego-ideal' and Dr. Karen Horney's 'Idealised Image of the self' are in part unconscious assumptions we make about our own moral and spiritual elevation, but they also in part correspond, in so far as they are conscious, with the visible self by means of which we resist and compensate for the early neurotic character. This self on the surface is not a mere deception and pretence. It is, in fact,

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the most mature part of us, the self we want to be and try to be, but the neurotic self in the background will keep breaking through so that we are unable to maintain a consistently realistic and reasonable and co-operative attitude. The social self is the expression of our thinking, influenced by cultural tradition; the neurotic character expresses our actual state of feeling.

Though the neurotic character is, in bulk, hidden, repressed, and the whole of it is never allowed to break through and entirely dominate our conscious reactions, i.e. it is unconscious, many of its manifestations are visible. The neurotic, however, does not recognise them for what they are, and usually fights against being made to see them in a true light. Psychoanalysis consists in making a neurotic person aware of the existence, total structure and ramifications of the neurotic character which falsifies all his attitudes to himself and to other people. So long as this is not accomplished he gets ever more deeply entangled in unsatisfactory relationships and so often blames other people for this state of affairs. It has often been observed that a neurotic person sooner or later brings into being an environment that answers to his neurosis; in so far as he fears, distrusts, dominates, or is overdependent on, other folk, he is liable to set them against himself, and so finds himself actually confronted with the very things he was at first afraid he would find.

Karen Horney has summarised three chief distorted attitudes to other people that neurosis generates. Pointing out that normally we move towards people in friendliness, or against them in opposition, or away from them into privacy as occasion demands, she says that when neurotic anxiety gets into these reactions one or all of them become both exaggerated and compulsive, producing the compliant, aggressive, and detached reactions or characters. We shall examine this more fully later. Meanwhile we might parallel this with a similar threefold summary of neurotic attitudes

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to the self. Normally we are able to respect ourselves for our proper qualities and actual achievements, to feel some measure of disappointment when things go wrong for us, and to see and correct our faults and failings. When anxiety invades these reactions they are turned into Narcissism (self-love, self-aggrandisement), Hypochondriacal self-pity, and the Super-Ego of Freudian psychology (self-criticism, self-attack, guilty self-recrimination, and self-punishment).

5. How to Treat the Neurotic Person

The answer to this all-important question is simple in theory but extraordinarily difficult in practice. The neurotic has to be met with a judicious mixture of sympathy and challenge. If one loses patience and meets the maladjusted person with crossness and criticism, he will react with a sense of injustice deepening into despair, and the feeling that no one understands him; as it has always been with him, so it is now, the world is a cold, heartless, unsympathetic place, and he feels ever more alone in it. On the other hand, mere sympathy and nothing else encourages the neurotic in attitudes of dependence on others and self-pity, and does not help him to a resolve to face and understand his own problems. In fact, some neurotics sense their exorbitant need of, and demand for, sympathy, realise the danger of this, and react vigorously in the opposite direction, refusing indignantly any kindly interest shown in them. This reaction is not, of course, simple. The demand for sympathy is still there, though repressed, and partly the conscious repudiation of sympathy is determined by inability to believe in its genuineness.

The neurotic is entitled to sympathetic understanding and cannot be helped by anyone who is hostile to him, since that repeats the original treatment that upset him in childhood. On the other hand, he equally cannot be helped unless he can be brought to adopt an objective and critical attitude towards himself. He must see that instead of rationalising,

justifying, and defending his feelings, and projecting the problems or the blame on to circumstances or other people, he must recognise that his own attitudes and reactions are unjustified, inappropriate, and often anti-social, being subjectively determined by his anxieties and hostilities which are rooted in the past. He must be tactfully challenged to face himself. It is easier for the psychoanalyst to do this than for the minister. The neurotic comes to the analyst as a patient. He is ill and cannot get rid of his symptoms unless he goes through with treatment. Often the symptoms are the analyst's greatest ally. They flare up again whenever the patient resists treatment and force him to carry on or else remain uncured. Even so there is plenty of desperate resistance against accepting insight into himself. When the Greeks said: 'Know thyself', they did not realise that that is the last thing we are anxious to know.

The minister's or social worker's task is harder still. He will find neurotic people, who, because of their character and difficult reactions to life, are getting into trouble and ill health of a vague sort, but they will resent fiercely the implication that they themselves are at the root of their difficulties. Infinite tact and sympathy is required to help them see how matters really stand. Yet if a dangerous drift into breakdown is to be prevented, there will be times when the minister or social worker has to address himself to this delicate task. If he really feels for the people he seeks to help, if he knows or can get to know enough about their past history and difficulties in life to be able to illuminate them as to the connection of all that with their present troubles, he may succeed in bringing them to the point of seeking expert psychotherapeutic help; or, if the case falls short of that degree of severity, drawing them to talk out their troubles with himself. Often, however, it cannot safely be attempted at all until some situation arises that gives a favourable opportunity. The important thing for those who work with and for people is to be able to recognise when a

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neurosis is too severe for first-aid treatment, so that the minister or social worker becomes like the general practitioner who sends the patient on to the specialist.

The minister is particularly concerned to know how religion can be brought to bear on the troubles of the maladjusted personality. Here again the matter is simple to state in theory, but difficulties arise in practice. What neurotics need above all else is the secure sense of belonging, of loving acceptance at the hands of other people, and life. The Christian gospel that 'God is love' is just what they need, but the difficulty is that they cannot believe it. Doubts and fears go too deep into the very structure of all their feeling and thinking. Thus a woman with an unloved childhood, who had been forced into the position of the family stooge, had to say: 'I would not say I am an atheist. I cannot dispense with the idea of God. The trouble is that God is an idea. I cannot feel that He is real.' If God is love, those who have never known genuine love must find it difficult to know God. That surely is the minister's first clue. He must mediate to them the reality of Christian love. His must be to them a personality in which they become aware of the reality of good will, infinite patience, selfless disinterestedness. He must bring to them a ministry of personal understanding and friendship which is proof against disturbing episodes, and on which they can rely. No more exacting demand could be made on the quality of the minister's own character, but the same demand is made on the social worker and the psychotherapist.

In the second place, the message he preaches must be presented so as to arouse hope and not deepen despair. It must be positive rather than negative, illuminating rather than denunciatory. Since neurosis is a life based on fear, distrust, and self-defence, religion as the answer must be seen as a life based on love, trust, and self-giving, a life that becomes possible to everyone in proportion as right relationships are achieved to other people and to God. 'Thou shalt

love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself.' The fundamental anxiety of the human spirit is 'Separation Anxiety', not merely the child's fear of loss of mother, but the adult's 'lost oneness' and sense of being isolated, cut off from the reality of his own true self, of his neighbour, of God. Not for nothing has the word 'at-one-ment' been a key word in Christian theology. Where fear rules we are strangers in life and in the universe. In the end there are only two answers: Bertrand Russell's philosophical despair in pigmy man melodramatically defying the soulless universe, which is absurd; or the Christian gospel, which proclaims that 'God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son', Who said 'How oft would I have gathered you, as a hen gathereth her brood under her wings'.

PART 2. THEORETICAL

The Nature and Functioning of Human Personality

1. THING, ORGANISM, PERSON

THE foregoing treatment of the neurotic malfunctioning of human personality under the influence of fear, insecurity, and anxiety, is based on a definite theory of its structure. Before we proceed to questions of moral education, and of conscience and authority, we should perhaps pause to consider this theory. When we ask: 'How can we guide and educate the child so that it shall escape disintegrating conflicts and grow up stable and mature?' we realise our need of accurate understanding of the dynamics of personality development. Such knowledge is what psychology seeks to supply, but this newest science is itself as yet in its early stages and very much in a transition period. With Freud on the clinical side and McDougall on the academic side, psychology moved out of the first, philosophic and *mechanistic, phase*. The 'mental atomism' of the Associationist Psychology was mechanistic. It conceived the mind, not as a system of forces, but as a collection of units. Sensations and perceptions, images and ideas, were strung together like beads on a string, or fitted together into a pattern like the bits of a mosaic picture. There was no dynamic self in action, to possess the ideas, and the psychology of emotion was for all practical purposes non-existent.

Under the influence of the theory of evolution, psychology moved into the *biological phase*, and the study of emotion and impulse took precedence over the study of cognition. Now at last there was a real individual, inter-acting energetically with an environment. Psychology ceased to be abstract

and became very concrete and practical. Motivation was entirely a matter of instinctual drives which clashed with the environment, and when those drives were frustrated anxiety and conflict were set up within the psyche. Man was an organism. 'Instinct Theory' is the mark of this biological, organismic psychology. McDougall's list of fourteen instincts did not establish itself, and Freud's theory of instincts passed through three different stages, but psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general operated, and still operate, with the theory that man is motivated by instincts, of which two stand out, variously called sex and aggression, or love and hate, or the life instinct and death instinct. A third instinct of self-preservation, sometimes called the hunger instinct, and again the fear instinct hovers about the main two.¹ It is variously thought of as the need to maintain bodily existence, either through the satisfaction of the appetites, or the warding off of danger when fear stirs. Fear, the affect associated with this instinct, invades the working of the other two, and neurosis arises. This simple scheme of a trinity of basic biological drives that are hereditary, innate in our constitutional make-up, and endowed with their own energy, by virtue of which they press relentlessly for satisfaction and will take no ultimate denial, proved a sufficient basis for the creation of a really effective psychotherapy. Many cures have been wrought, and much suffering relieved, by analysis carried out on these theoretical assumptions.

But 'Instinct Theory' has already begun to prove unsatisfactory. The earlier Freudian view that a character-trait is only the transformation of an instinct in such a way as to make it socially acceptable or tolerable, is under fire even within the Freudian ranks. The environment influences us

¹ 'Psychoanalysts favour simple rather than complicated groupings of instinct. They are content with a working division into sexual impulses (or love impulses) . . . and aggressive impulses. Even the self-preservative impulses are regarded as a specialised form of love-impulse . . . most psychic disorders can be traced back to disturbances in the equilibrium of love and hate.' Edward Glover, *Psychoanalysis*, p. 18.

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in far more subtle ways than direct frustration of natural impulses. The view has arisen that character cannot be accounted for solely in terms of instinct-vicissitude, but that the child's relationships with parents and its identifications with parental attitudes which are thereby set up inside itself as parts of its own character, must be taken into account. Human object-relationships, leading to the 'internalisation' of the parents as parts of the child's own psyche, i.e. as 'internal good or bad objects', is now to the fore in psychoanalytical investigation through the influence of the work of Melanie Klein. Another type of psychology represented by Karen Horney and Erich Fromm has frankly rejected instinct, and holds that the character and personality of the individual is shaped solely by his cultural, including family, environment. What Freud calls instincts, Karen Horney calls 'compulsive character-trends' culturally conditioned. The difficulty with Karen Horney's views is that, while they provide a fascinating and detailed analysis of adult character problems, these are not related in a clear way to the psychodynamics of infancy, nor to any fundamental theory of personality-structure of a kind that could relate character to the biological aspect of human nature. Dr. J. Cohen finds occasion 'to cast doubt on the value of instinct theory altogether as an explanatory principle in human conduct'.¹ Psychotherapy, however, is moving into a sociological phase where the problems of 'human relationships' are overshadowing the idea of 'instincts', and so at last the really important question is being brought to the front, that of man as a *'Person'*.²

A person is more than an organism, and while psychology is tied to the idea of organism, a completely satisfactory analysis and understanding of man will not be reached.

¹ J. Cohen, *Human Nature, War, and Society*, p. 36.

² The writer became acquainted with the work of Dr. W. R. D. Fairbairn of Edinburgh too late for it to influence the composition of this book, a matter for great regret. His important revision of the

That does not mean that the idea of organism is to be denied. A human being still has his organic aspect, just as he still has his physical and chemical aspects; but in the evolutionary process the lower undergoes a real transformation, even transmutation, at the higher stage. Psychology has to find out how to build on biology without being tied down to biological concepts, so that it can go on to do justice to the fact that man is more than an organism; he is a person, and the organic has become something different at the human level from what it was at the animal level. The need to go beyond biological psychology to a psychology of the personal life has been forced on the writer by practical clinical necessity, by finding that many problems of patients cannot be satisfactorily solved on the basis of instinct theory, so that the suspicion has deepened steadily that 'instinct' is a misconception as applied to human living.

Yet the organismal theory provides us with the principle which enables us to move on to the personal theory. A *mechanical whole* is merely a group of units put side by side, each remaining in the whole just what it was outside it. The nature of the parts determines the nature of the whole. The whole can be broken down into its parts again without their suffering any change, and they can be reassembled into another whole without undergoing any further change. In an *organic whole* the opposite is true; here it is the nature of the whole that determines the parts. An organism is an entity that has its own peculiar and individual pattern, its own specific structural wholeness which cannot be altered without the organism ceasing to be what it is. That innate

Freudian libido theory does in fact turn it into a psychology of the personal life. Several important quotations have been included as footnotes to this chapter.

'It would appear as if the point had now been reached at which, in the interests of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be transformed into a theory of development based essentially upon object-relationships' (*A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psychoneuroses, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. XXII, Parts 3 and 4, 1941).

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structural pattern which strictly speaking is the organism, determines its development and takes charge of the parts that make up the whole. The behaviour of the part is due to the pattern of the whole. The part taken out of the whole becomes at once an entirely different thing from what it was inside the whole. In the case of an organism it is only possible to understand the nature and functioning of a part by reference to, and in the context of, the nature and functioning of the whole; whereas in a mechanism a part can be taken out and studied in isolation from the whole. This all-important aspect of the meaning of an organism is today having a far-reaching effect on medicine. In the earlier mechanistic medicine, a diseased organ was considered in and for itself, the person whose organ it was did not matter. It was not thought that that had any bearing on the fact that something had gone wrong with the organ. Now that medicine is seriously treating man as an organism, it is seen that a diseased organ is simply a clue to the larger fact of a malfunctioning total organism. If a heart palpitates, or a duodenum develops an ulcer, the reason for that cannot be found simply by studying the heart or the duodenum; it can only be found by studying the reactions to environment and to life of the whole organism of the human being.

From this standpoint we are in a position to make the next move from the organism to the person. *A person is a structural whole of a higher order than an organism, and cannot be understood solely in terms of biological concepts such as instinct, organ pleasure, or relaxation of tension.* Whatever aggression and sex stand for as instincts at the animal level, they undergo a profound change of nature and significance at the personal level. It is not possible adequately to understand the manifestations of aggressive or sexual impulses or the meaning of fear in human life solely by means of the 'instinct' idea. Just because a human being is at least not less than an organism, the nature and behaviour of its parts, whether psychic impulse or bodily act, are

determined by the nature of the whole; and *since the personal whole is more than the simply organic whole, what superficially appears to be the same thing in both, must in fact be different.* If we analyse aggressive or sexual manifestations in a human being as expressions of frustrated, fixated, infantile instinctual drives, we are trying to understand a person at the sub-personal organic level only, and we must fail therefore really to understand the problem.

2. The Meaning of a 'Person'

We cannot give an account of the structure of human personality until we know what is meant by a 'Person', and that is our real difficulty. It seems that we do not yet really know; the problem is only now beginning to emerge clearly. Prof. J. Macmurray writes:

'Modern psychology fails, in the theoretical field, because the type of thinking which could express the nature of personality, the type of analysis which the psychological enquiry demands, is not available. It is the business of philosophy to supply it. On the other hand the researches of psychologists, particularly in the field of medical psychology where theory is necessarily controlled by personal fact, force upon us, in a way that nothing else can, the empirical problems for which an adequate instrument of analysis is demanded. They also reveal and crystallise into definite form the difficulties of applying either the mathematical or the organic conception for the elucidation of the known facts. It is in the combination of a rich knowledge of the personal field in immediate experience with the study of modern psychology that the hope of discovering the unity-pattern of personal thought most probably lies.'¹

Since Prof. Macmurray has made this problem of the meaning of the personal life his especial concern, we may summarise his views as a starting point. He says that philo-

¹ J. Macmurray, *Interpreting the Universe*, pp. 159 f.

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sophy has already worked out the types of thought necessary to deal with material 'things' and with 'organisms'. Mathematical thinking deals with material units, with things as identical objects that can be added, subtracted, put together, and rearranged. Biological thinking deals with organisms, in which the parts are not identical units merely put together, but are complementary functions which cannot be understood apart from one another, or apart from the pattern of the whole which determines them to be what they are. As against the 'thing' and the 'organism', the logical representation of the 'self' is the central problem of modern philosophy. Descartes treated the Self as a substance by means of mathematical thought. Post-Kantian philosophy has treated the Self as an organism by means of biological types of thinking.

'We stand today at the point where the failure of this effort has become evident, partly through the realist's criticism of idealist philosophy and partly through the development of scientific psychology. But, so far, all that has come to light is the necessity of a new unity-pattern which will be capable of overcoming the limitations of the earlier forms of symbolism. No one has yet produced the pattern of thought we need. All that we can do, therefore, is to discover, through reflection upon our empirical experience of the personal, the main characteristics which differentiate it from the material and the organic . . . Until we have discovered how to symbolise our experience of persons as persons, our thinking is bound to misrepresent the nature . . . of personality. The question which faces us is simply "What is the essential nature of personality as we know it in immediate experience?"' ¹

We may note that it is as urgent to discover how to think truly about human nature as personal in the social as in the individual psychological field, for totalitarianism is the

¹ Op. cit., pp. 123 f.

application to the state of a biological conception of society in which the individual becomes merely a part entirely subordinated to the pattern of the whole, and no longer a person. Biological thinking, necessary in its proper place when organisms are being studied, is disastrous when applied in the psychological and sociological field to the life of human beings as persons. It may be that the extreme length and tediousness of much psychoanalytical treatment is due to the theory which treats the patient as an organism, whose problems are due to biological, instinctual drives, instead of as a person. It may be that the cure of neurosis owes as much to the intuitive insight of individual analysts, as to the hitherto defective theory. Some scientific psychotherapists who still cling to the older Freudian orthodoxy have not yet realised that their own work has revealed the inadequacy of the 'organismal' theory of human nature. It is because this realisation is dawning that 'human relations' are being forced to the forefront of psychotherapeutic investigation. So we are forced to ask: 'What is a person?'

Psychodynamic theory must be rebuilt on the assumption that the human being is an organism of a special type, an organism which is potentially a person, and whose development consists in, and is motivated by, the striving to actualise that potentiality, to become a personality. A human being is not motivated by a quest for instinctual pleasures, but by a need to achieve what Jung calls 'the prospective goal of personality'. This is recognised in the distinction that is drawn between 'primary' (biological) needs and 'psychological' needs, but this hardly makes the problem clear. Jung has specially emphasised what this means in psychological terms from the subjective point of view; it is the process of integration or individuation. Objectively it means a life of relationship to personal objects. This is what dominates the psychic life of a human being: to whatever extent such subjective integration and object-relationship

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has not yet been achieved, there is a compulsion to seek it, woven into all other reactions.

A disintegrated psyche is compulsively egocentric, pre-occupied with its subjective problems, unable to pass interest beyond itself objectively into personal relationships; in its dealings with other people it cannot treat them as persons, value them for their own sake, and sustain a mutual relationship with them; it is forced to make use of them in the struggle to solve its endopsychic conflicts. *The real psychic drama of human life is the struggle to become an integrated personality, a mature individual, so that the personal life of relationship to other persons can be lived; while only in seeking to sustain personal relationships can the individual be fulfilled and become himself a person.* The quests for personal significance and personal relationship as, together, aspects of the total process of living the personal life, are the over-riding motives in human behaviour. They gather all interests under their wings. In so far as internal psychic conflict frustrates the achievement of personal significance and relationship, the struggle for integration increasingly dominates everything, the functioning of the bodily appetites, dreams and fantasies, and the human relationships in which the individual is involved. The integration problem is worked out all the time, blindly, through these other matters.

The quest for so-called instinctual satisfactions or organ-pleasures, where it seems prominent, as, for instance, in eating or excretory or sexual compulsions, is deceptive. Bodily pleasures play an important secondary role in the life of a human being, but are subordinated to personality needs.¹ The attempt to understand appetitive compulsions

¹ W. R. D. Fairbairn: 'Libidinal pleasure is fundamentally just a signpost to the object. According to the conception of erotogenic zones the object is regarded as a signpost to libidinal pleasure; and the cart is thus placed before the horse. Such a reversal of the real position must be attributed to the fact that, in the earlier stages of psychoanalytical thought, the paramount importance of the object-relationship had not yet been sufficiently realised' (op. cit.).

only on the basis of libidinal pleasure-wishes makes a genuine interpretation of these behaviour phenomena impossible, and holds up the cure of neurosis. That is why the need to substitute personal for biological thinking in psychology is becoming imperative.

What then are the characteristics of the person, and the personal life? Macmurray singles out three: rationality or objectivity, self-consciousness, and mutuality. The meaning of these three characteristics must be stated clearly, for our analysis of the functioning of personality must be made in the light of them.

We begin with *Self-consciousness*. Prof. Macmurray says: 'A person is a self-conscious being. If he were not self-conscious he would not be a person. In other words, personality not merely implies but is constituted by self-consciousness.' He warns us not to forget 'that the self is a self. It is the subject of experience, not the object or part of the object'.¹ Thus there are types of consciousness that are not personal, but are, in fact, sub-personal. The animal is conscious, we presume; it has sense organs, which bring it knowledge of the external world so that it can adapt to it. The baby is conscious and so can respond to its environment. Adults have a kind of consciousness that is active in sleep when they dream. But all these are subjective types of consciousness. To rise to the level of personality self-consciousness must arise within consciousness. We must not only know objects, but know that we know them. We must be aware, not only of our world, but also of the fact of our being related to our world. Not merely the objects of our knowledge, but the relationships between us and them must enter into our awareness. We become aware of ourselves, i.e. self-conscious, in the experience of becoming aware of a relationship between us and the object of our knowledge. *Thus self-consciousness implies the other two*

¹ Op. cit., pp. 136 f.

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characteristics, objectivity and mutuality. Macmurray puts it thus:

‘If self-consciousness is merely the inner aspect of our consciousness of other persons, it follows that personality is constituted by, and does not merely imply, personal relationships between persons. Personality is mutual in its very being. The self is one term in a relation between two selves. . . . The self only exists in the communion of selves. . . . My own existence *as a person* is constituted by my knowledge of other persons, by my objective consciousness of them as persons.’¹

So important is this that it needs further elaboration. We cannot realise our nature as personal except in relationship with other persons. We only function as persons, are only actively personal, in the mutuality of a personal relationship, for which Macmurray prefers the term ‘friendship’. In dealing with a thing or an organism, say a tool or an animal, our personality, our capacity for being personal, has no chance to manifest or express itself. A human being, though his nature is essentially personal, is not always living at the personal level. His capacity for being personal may be merely latent for the moment, or even potential and quite undeveloped. *A human being is an organism with a potentiality for being a person, but that potentiality for personality is his real and essential nature, which he does not always realise.* Mostly we live more at the organismal level than at the personal level, but even when we behave more as an organism than as a person there is always either a blind or else a conscious striving for the personal life. Thus, in concentrating on the process of integration or individuation, and the ‘prospective goal of personality’, Jung has put his finger on the really determining motive in the psychic life of a human being. It is the inescapable and ineradicable urge to become, and fulfil oneself as, a person. Unfortun-

¹ Op. cit., p. 137.

ately, however, Jung's treatment of this is too subjective: he does not show how integration is necessarily bound up with good object-relationships.

The first characteristic of a person, self-consciousness, involves, then, the other two, and we deal next with *Rationality or Objectivity*. In *Reason and Emotion* Macmurray writes: 'Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves . . . in terms of the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively. Reason is our capacity for objectivity', for behaving 'in terms of our knowledge of the nature of the world outside'.¹ To fear a lion is to behave objectively and reasonably; our fear is justified by the nature of what we fear. To fear a mouse is to behave subjectively and irrationally; the fear is not justified by the nature of what we fear. We are then projecting our subjective fantasy on to the object and are not in a realistic relation to it. Objective or rational thought and feeling is the opposite of neurotic thought and feeling, for it is determined by the real nature of the objects of our experience and not by our subjective states of mind. It is apparent how important this is when we realise how much human behaviour is determined by subjective fears, anxieties, jealousies, and resentments, that cause us to misrepresent and misinterpret and misunderstand one another. Human relationships, whether between two people such as husband and wife, or between the members of a family, or between classes, nations, races, are upset by our behaving subjectively instead of objectively. Our neurotic or anxiety-determined ego-centricity is the proof of how far we fail to achieve truly personal levels of experience.

In considering the *Mutuality* of personality the whole argument is gathered together. In a personal relationship each values the other for what the other is, not for what he can get out of him. It is only by entering into a personal relationship that we can know another human being as a

¹ J. Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion*, pp. 19 f.

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person, and know ourselves as persons, and for this 'friendship' is the best term. The saying of Jesus: 'No longer do I call you servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends',¹ is the full expression of personal relationship and shows it to be the essence of religious experience. We may *use* another human being and then we sustain only a material relationship with him; we treat him as a tool, a thing. We may *co-operate* with another human being in some organised effort even though we have no friendship with him; then we become complementary functions in the organisation, and sustain only an organic relation. In both of these types of relationship we are less than personal ourselves and are unable to realise our proper nature to the full. We become personalities ourselves in the full sense only when we grow capable of entering into fully personal human relationships with other people, and we cannot do that when our own nature is divided and distracted by inner conflicts; for in that case we are all the time working off our private problems on other people, and using them as foils to our own anxiety-ridden minds. Thus it may be said that *the true aim of psychotherapy is to liberate us to become persons*. Psychotherapy, therefore, is not likely to be fully successful unless it is based on a theory of human nature as personal and not merely organismal. When we fail to achieve genuinely personal relationships, if we do not retreat from human contacts, we may substitute appetitive gratifications instead, and then the appetitive compulsion symbolises our reaching out after personal relationship, as is conspicuously the case in sexual compulsions. It is the individual who is inwardly isolated from other people, who has no genuine flow of sympathetic, friendly feeling towards others, who cannot really love, who is driven in desperation to clutch at physical contact to make up for inability to achieve emotional rapport. If, on the other hand, such an individual has inhibited

¹ John, xv, 15.

all emotional response and physical impulse with it, he may fall back on purely intellectual intercourse which is impersonal and concerned with ideas rather than with people. One can argue and discuss with people with whom one has nothing really in common, but if one has little capacity for having 'something in common' with other folk, then intellectual interests may give an illusory sense of still maintaining human contacts. Depersonalised physical and depersonalised intellectual intercourse should rank equally as betrayals of truly human living, as substitutes for genuine personal relationship.

A person is a being who is self-conscious, objective or rational, and who realises his essential nature as personal in mutual relationship with other persons. This may be finally expressed in two further quotations from Macmurray:

'The basic fact about human beings, in virtue of which they are human, is that they know one another and live in that knowledge. . . . If we wish to discover the new elements which have to be represented in the description of personality, and so in the unity-pattern of psychological thought, we have to reflect upon the nature of personal relationships in their completely personal character . . . The main characteristic which reflection reveals is the mutuality of the conscious relationship.'¹

Further, after showing that social relationships in general are functional or organic rather than personal, he says:

'There is a second way in which we can enter into relationships with one another. We may associate purely for the purpose of expressing our whole selves to one another in mutuality and fellowship. It is difficult to find a word to express this kind of relationship which will

¹ J. Macmurray, *Interpreting the Universe*, pp. 135 f.

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convey its full meaning, not because there are no words, but because they have all been specialised and degraded by misuse. Friendship, fellowship, communion, love, are all in one way or another liable to convey a false or partial meaning. But what is common to them all is the idea of a relationship between us which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it is natural for human beings to share their experience, to understand one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together; in expressing and revealing themselves to one another . . . Two people are friends because they love one another. That is all you can say about it . . . This is the characteristic of personal relationships. They have no ulterior motive. They are not based on particular interests. They do not serve partial or limited ends. Their value lies entirely in themselves and for the same reason transcends all other values. And that is because they are relations of persons as persons. They are the means of living the personal life. . . . The impulse to do this is simply the impulse to be ourselves completely . . . The whole significance of human life is to be found here. What other significance can our existence have than to be ourselves fully and completely.¹

Not till psychotherapy has grasped the fact that all human striving is motivated by this aim, the aim, not of gaining instinctual pleasures, but of achieving personality and living the personal life of fully human relationships, will it be really adequate as therapy.

This view is supported surely by our experience of our own aims and purposes. If I ask myself: 'What is the meaning of my life, what am I living for, what is it I really desire and find satisfaction in?' there is no truer answer than to say: 'I am seeking to be a real person in free and mutually satisfying relationship with other real persons.' If I am told

¹ *Reason and Emotion*, pp. 98 ff.

that I am seeking, though I do not know it, the satisfaction of instinctual drives which ultimately means 'organ pleasures', I can only answer that that does not seem in any way adequately to convey my feeling. I can recognise and enjoy organ pleasure, but to regard it as the goal of my striving seems quite insignificant, and, moreover, it does not bear at all on the things that do give life a genuine significance. To be told again that these higher 'psychological needs' are only transformations of 'primary biological needs' is quite unenlightening. I am not enabled to understand the significance of personal needs by contemplating primary appetitive needs. This reductive type of explanation ignores the fact that, in the much more significant whole of the personal life, organic functions have undergone such a change of meaning that, instead of their supplying the key to the understanding of this new-patterned whole, it is only in the light of the meaning of the personal life that one can understand how the organic functions operate within it. The only thing that can satisfy a person is to feel that one means something worthwhile in oneself and to other people; these two aspects are inseparable. Our psychology must begin with the human being striving to become actually what he is potentially, a significant person related in meaningful ways to other persons.

3. Psychological Analysis of Personality

The analysis of the functioning of human personality must begin with the dynamic psycho-somatic individual striving by the necessity of his nature towards 'the prospective goal of personality', realised in personal relationships. Traditionally the psychic life has three aspects, conation, affection, and cognition, but these three do not stand on the same footing. Conation or energetic striving, effort, equally characterises both feeling and thinking, in a way that feeling and thinking do not characterise each other. 'Conation' is the basic dynamism of life that must manifest itself or

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express itself in both feeling and thinking, it is the 'will to live', the spontaneous reaching out to establish object-relationships. It does this in a series of bi-polar functions of which the first is the bi-polarity of body and mind, the somatic and psychic functions. This does not necessarily imply philosophical dualism; it is a purely phenomenological dualism which we are bound to observe in our experience. Without committing ourselves as to the ultimate nature of body and mind, it is clear that while to the infant body and mind are one, and the psyche is a body-psyche, as we develop intellectually the psyche can and does treat the body as something different from and outside itself, so that the conversion hysteric can displace conflict from the mind to the body; anxiety can disappear from the conscious mind and reappear disguised as, for example, a paralysed arm. The mind can distract its attention from emotional conflict by generating physical symptoms and worrying over them. In the personal life, when the individual cannot achieve a true sense of psychic relationship, he will feel a compulsion to make do with physical relationship as the next best thing. A sexual compulsion symbolises the psychic longing for a personal relationship. To talk of a sex instinct in human beings is probably misleading because the word 'sex' is so identified in popular thinking with genital activity. True, that is not necessary, for sex includes the entire range of differences between men and women along with their complementary relationship, and the wider Freudian use of the word is justified. Yet both popularly, and in older Freudian theory itself, attention is concentrated on physical satisfactions which misses the whole point of sex in human life. Freud showed that many things symbolise sex, but in the personal life sex itself is the great symbol of personal relationship; and in dreams sex, genital union, marriage, etc., are symbols of integration of personality. Sexual intercourse may be either the physical expression of a really existing personal relationship, or a substitute for the lack

of one. Space prevents our dealing with the way in which problems of personality and character can also be symbolised in and through other bodily functions. It must suffice to say that three groups of bodily functions can be distinguished, the senses, appetites, and motor mechanisms. The special senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, to which must be added the sixth, organic or body sense, which gives us the feeling either of bodily well-being or of discomfort in general, and special internal sensations such as headache, nausea, cramp, beating arteries, twitching nerves, kinsæsthetic sensations, etc. The appetites include hunger, thirst, breathing, sex, excretion, exercise or movement, rest and sleep. Motor mechanisms include muscular movements of all kinds, and especially speech, a mechanism of special importance for personality. Conflicts originating in the emotional, or generally in the psychic life, can be played out through all these bodily functions either by over-stimulating or inhibiting them; in that case usually some one of the senses or appetites or a particular motor mechanism may be singled out and disturbed in the ways outlined in chapter five. On the other hand the psychic conflicts may leave the body out of account so far as any special symbolic disturbance of its functions is concerned, though some of the general, if vague, bodily accompaniments of an anxiety-state will be present.

A complete study of the problem would have to include the correlation of physique and temperament, but this would take us too far afield. Jung, who specially stresses the importance of studying the personality in its bi-polarity, speaks of the 'physiologically conditioned psyche' as opposed to the factors of a 'higher psychic order . . . rational, ethical, aesthetic, religious determinants . . . which cannot be scientifically proved to have any physiological basis. This sphere of highly complex dominants forms the other pole of the psyche. Experience shows that it contains an energy which in certain cases is many times greater than

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that of the physiologically conditioned psyche'.¹ That serves to remind us that the immediate psychic correlate of bodily functioning, sensory experience, is the lowest or most elementary form of psychic life, shared by man with the animal. With the bodily functions go organic needs whose satisfaction is necessary primarily for physical survival. With the psychic functions go personality needs whose satisfaction is necessary for meaningful living.

Turning to the psychic functions we are at once confronted with the fundamental bi-polarity of our mental life, feeling, and thinking, the traditional affection and cognition. From the biological and evolutionary point of view we can see that these are linked with bodily function, feeling with the sensory experience of the appetites, and thinking with the sensory data supplied by the sense organs. This, however, does not in the least enable us to understand what feeling and thinking mean in the personal psychic life of a human being and we must proceed to a psychological analysis. Feeling is primarily an extravert response to objects or situations in the environment as the basic emotions of fear, anger, and tenderness clearly show. Thinking, on the other hand, is an introvert manifestation; when we come up against a difficulty and have not got an automatic or spontaneous response available, we retire into ourselves and think out what we shall do. There is a knowledge that is bound up with or implicit in immediate sensory and emotional experience of our outer world. Thinking is different; it is a detached reflection upon immediate experience, and we do in a sense withdraw from life into thought. There is something cautious, defensive, about thinking. It is not a free and open response to life, and to see that is important for the understanding of one of the main ways in which we try to deal with conflicts in our personality, viz. by retreating from immediate emotional experience in contact with our world into abstract intellectual life. This

¹ C. Jung, *Essays on Contemporary Events*, p. 37.

difference between emotional extraversion and intellectual introversion is held by constitutional psychologists to be deeply rooted in our biological make-up, so that it plays a part in producing 'types' where a given individual tends rather markedly in one or other direction.

Feeling and thinking are themselves bi-polar in turn and here we come upon distinctions of extreme importance. What the two poles of the emotional life are in practice is clear enough, but it is not easy to settle on the correct terms to describe them. Perhaps the simplest would be 'self-assertion' and 'affection'. This distinction is recognised in the Freudian aggression and sex though these terms are quite unsatisfactory to indicate the simple fundamental forms of these two reactions to life; as also are those other familiar terms, hate and love. Sex too obviously implies instinct theory and is more a biological than a psychological term. Love is much too complex and developed a state of mind to be identical with the simple basic feeling response we have in mind. The term 'affection' is quite satisfactory, as also would the terms 'tenderness', 'sympathy', or 'altruistic feeling' be. In many ways 'altruistic feeling' is the best term as it reveals clearly the basic situation in which this emotional response arises. The Freudian term *libido* stands for the combination of self-assertion and affection in the absence of fear: positive self-expression in loving desire for the object.¹ A human being is always a self over against a world of others with whom he desires, if possible, to live in a good relationship. As a person that relationship is the essential meaning of his existence. Thus the two elementary forms of feeling would be a feeling for oneself and a feeling for others. In the absence of fear both of these are good feelings, and 'affection' or 'altruistic feeling' is one pole of our emotional life.

By analogy the other should be 'ego-feeling' of an accept-

¹ W. R. D. Fairbairn, op. cit.: 'The ultimate goal of the libido is the object.'

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able kind. It is here that we feel the lack of a suitable term. It would almost seem that the Christian tradition, with its extreme emphasis on love and unselfishness (an emphasis needed to combat the pugnacity of a competitive world) has prevented our realising that we can have a good positive feeling for ourselves. That is not so in principle, for Jesus said 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour *as thyself*', which implies a healthy form of 'self-love'. Yet most of the terms we have, such as 'egotism', 'pride', or the Freudian 'narcissism', imply condemnation. McDougall, searching for the feeling aspect of 'assertion', lists 'elation, feeling of superiority, of masterfulness, of pride, of domination', all of them likewise having a flavour of disapproved attitudes about them. Finally he fixes on 'positive self-feeling' which, if somewhat colourless, expresses what is wanted. The fact that he had to invent this term shows that the exact word we want is not to hand.¹ Aggression and hate certainly will not do, for they both involve the presence of fear, and do not indicate the simple normal affect. So we fall back on 'the feeling of self-assertion' or, for short, 'assertion', and may then say that 'assertion' and 'affection' are the bi-polar modes of the feeling-life. It is useful to keep in mind the alternative terms, 'ego-feeling' and 'altruism'; or self-love in a good sense, self-respect, and love of others.

It also serves an important purpose to think of them as the symbolically masculine and feminine attitudes, since we do in a broad sense associate the male with self-assertion and the female with affection, and in dreams these two opposite aspects of the emotional life are regularly represented by male and female figures. We may then think of the feeling-life of both men and women as bi-sexual in the psychological sense, and we would say that it is normal for a man to be somewhat more pronouncedly assertive than affectionate, and a woman somewhat more affectionate than assertive.

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, p. 324.

That gives deep significance to the association of male and female in marriage; each serves to stimulate the other on the less prominent side of character-development. It also helps us to understand why there is some abnormality about an effeminate man and a masculine woman, and to remind us that, for balanced character, both the assertive and the affectionate sides must be adequately developed in both men and women. We should remember, however, that Jung speaks of emotion in general as feminine and of thinking as masculine, which is also legitimate so long as once again, we remember that both men and women must be bi-sexually developed in respect of this polarity also, even though there is some difference in the normal male and female pattern.

Turning to the thinking side of the psychic life, we again find bi-polar modes of manifestation. Freud, in analysing the super-ego or conscience, speaks of 'the self-observation which is necessary as a preliminary to the judicial aspect of conscience', and adds that the super-ego is 'also the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself, towards which it strives, and whose demands for ever-increasing perfection it is always striving to fulfil'.¹ Clearly the judicial aspect and the ego-ideal are basically one, for there can be no judgment without standards of judgment, and where standards exist judgment is bound to follow. We have then the Observer and the Judge (or critic or evaluator) as the bi-polar modes of our thinking life. The observer looks for facts, the judge for values. These are clearly distinguishable functions of thought by which we register facts or acquire information, and define values. Freud held correctly that the actual content of the ego-ideal, the values we begin life with, are taken over from our parents, though it is part of our true development to criticise and rethink traditional values and outgrow the petrified parental super-ego. Freud was, however, wrong in

¹ *New Introductory Lectures*, pp. 82 and 98.

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holding that conscience is entirely externally created and imposed. In the second chapter of *The Future of an Illusion* he writes: 'External compulsion is gradually internalised; a special function, man's super-ego, takes it under its jurisdiction. It is only by this means that man becomes a moral and social being.' The truth would appear to be rather that while the first standards with which the judging function operates are necessarily taken over from the environment, the judging function itself is innate, a basic psychic function, which is bound to operate and develop.

Our analysis has distinguished four psychic functions, two belonging to the emotional and two to the intellectual life. Jung also distinguished four functions—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition—but it would appear that sensation should be subsumed under thinking as providing the elementary material of experience with which thinking must operate, while intuition seems to be 'unconscious emotional valuation or perception'. *The four functions are more adequately arrived at by an examination of the bipolarity of the feeling and thinking life. They are the extravert feeling functions of assertion and affection, and the introvert thinking functions of observing and judging or evaluating. For the sake of vividness we might personify them thus: assertion as the Worker, affection as the Lover, observation as the Scientist, judgment as the Moralist, Artist, and Practical Critic working with utilitarian values.* But we must remember that these four functions are normally all found working together in harmony in every actual piece of behaviour. We assert ourselves energetically in some given piece of work because of our affection for those whom it concerns, and in doing so we have to observe accurately so as to acquire the information we need, and we must use our powers of judgment both for practical adaptation of means to ends and for the determination of the legitimacy of the ends themselves. *It is the development of the thinking functions that creates the possibility of self-consciousness,*

rationality, and mutual relationship, thus raising the organic psyche to the level of the person.

This, then, is the normal working of human personality: an integrated and harmonious co-operative functioning of the four aspects of the psyche dynamically working out its purposes through the instrumentality of the body with its senses, appetites, and motor mechanisms in the quest for integration and personal relationship. It remains to show how disharmony, conflict, and disintegration is introduced into the psychic life. This was considered historically as originating in the fears and insecurities of childhood, in chapter six. Here we are concerned to trace the development of conflict functionally. The integrated and harmonious operation of the psyche described above depends primarily on the one all-important condition that the individual feels secure. He then feels friendly disposed towards his environment and can assert himself normally without any loss of friendly feeling. His assertive and affectionate responses, as such, are in no way mutually contradictory, and thinking and feeling operate together in harmony. As soon, however, as the individual is faced with insecurity, danger, or threats of any kind, fear arises, and a profound change comes over all the psychic functions when they have to operate on a background of fear, anxiety, and insecurity. If the danger is a real, external, temporary danger facing an adult and well-integrated personality, the affectionate response is laid aside for the time being to be taken up again when the danger is removed. An aggressive attitude of attack, which is in itself healthy, is adopted until safety has returned. The thinking functions work in the service of the whole.

The problem becomes quite different when the personality has been seriously disturbed early in life, and grows up anxiety-ridden. It is then on the defensive all the time, feeling the whole world about it to be hostile and unfriendly. No function can operate in a healthy way, and internal psychic conflict and disintegration of the personality proceed

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by clearly definable stages. The first conflict appears in the bi-polar emotional life. Normal self-assertion grows into a permanent, compulsive, aggressive attitude and deepens into hate, because the person concerned can only over-assert himself in what he feels to be a dangerous situation. He grows irritable, resentful, sees threats where there are none, is jealous, hostile, suspicious, over-sensitive, bad-tempered. He is driven to seek security by a perpetual power-drive in which he tries to batter down opposition and frighten off criticism, whether it is really there or not. He becomes rivalrous and competitive. This usually leads him into further difficulties, and always isolates him from sympathetic contact with other people, thus deepening his sense of insecurity. If he turns to seek safety by the opposite path of friendly behaviour, winning people over to his side, and forestalling possible hostile acts against himself, he must develop his capacity for affection into a weak compliance, giving in and giving way to others, never challenging their opinion, agreeing with and flattering and setting out to please those around him. Thus, gradually, he undermines his personality, comes to feel inferior, and unable to stand up for himself or cope with things. Thus the two sides of his emotional life have become distorted from normal self-assertion and affection into incompatible and mutually contradictory aggression and compliance, and the tension of the conflict, as the sufferer is perpetually tossed to and fro between equally unacceptable reactions to people, generates an ever-increasing and incapacitating anxiety-state. Karen Horney has defined the primary disintegration in the neurotic character as the conflict between compliance and aggression. Alexander and French prefer to describe it as the opposition between help-seeking dependency and competitive rivalry. Whatever descriptions are used, this is the basic problem of every neurosis, even though its ways of manifesting itself are multitudinous. The result is a serious underdevelopment of *normal healthy* emotional

capacities, and often an apparently complete sinking of one of the two necessary sides of the emotional organisation. Neither side can be normal, but whichever side is most suppressed is inevitably compulsively sought after, though in blind and uncomprehending ways. This is the striving for wholeness and integration which is so often worked out through neurotic sexual compulsions. We may illustrate this in the commonest of all sexual problems, masturbation. The young man who, in an insecure home, has grown up hard and aggressive and over-masculinised, and believes that it is soft and sentimental, and at any rate that it does not pay, to be sympathetic and considerate, will masturbate to the accompaniment of heterosexual fantasies. He may imagine himself having intercourse with voluptuous and very feminine women. The meaning of this is that both by his physical sexual stimulation and his imagination he is being driven compulsively, by the laws of his nature which demand wholeness, to try to arouse by masturbation the feminine and affectionate side of his character which he has almost lost. On the other hand, the over-compliant and under-assertive, under-masculine youth may masturbate to the accompaniment of exhibitionistic fantasies, imagining not sexual intercourse, but women watching him as he stands naked with erect penis. He is being driven to attempt to stimulate in himself by masturbation a masculine feeling to arouse that side of his nature which is not developed. This is, of course, only one aspect of masturbation and not its whole explanation or meaning. In the same way the quest for integration and wholeness of personality can be seen working itself out, blindly and unsuccessfully, in all the various neurotic compulsions and symptoms.

Ultimately the anxiety of this basic conflict becomes so great that the mind is driven to drastic measures of self-defence. The first is usually a retreat from the emotional to the judging side of the thinking function. Conscience rises up with its criticism; aggression is bad, compliance is

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cowardly; both must be ruthlessly repressed. Morbid-guilt feelings are aroused in an attempt to crush down the whole of the disturbing emotional life. Aggression is utilised as self-attack. Compliance is utilised in the form of submission to conscience. That in fact only makes matters worse, for guilt feelings do not help in the least to solve the problem of the original conflict, which can only be solved by the elimination of the fundamental fears that started up the whole process. A second conflict is added to the first; not only are aggression and compliance at war, but conscience is unconstructively at war with both. At that stage a third development is likely to arise. The individual turns away altogether from emotion, and takes refuge in the observer function. He becomes detached, a spectator of life rather than an actor. He keeps out of the way, as far as he can, of personal contacts so that people shall not arouse his feelings. He lives an increasingly narrow and uninteresting life, avoiding all situations which would stir up the conflicts which always lie in wait in his mind. Yet even that is no final solution, for it is not in human nature to rest content with detachment and isolation. The 'will to live' is strong, and he continually feels pulled back again towards life, so now a third basic conflict has arisen, between the desire to keep away and the urge to get back into living contact with other people. He is likely to ring the changes on aggressive, compliant, guilty, and detached reactions in a vicious circle, getting ever more deeply involved in crippling anxieties which arise out of his disorganised psychic state. Karen Horney singled out three major neurotic character-trends: aggression, compliance, and detachment; but guilty feeling is the fourth, and they correspond to the four normal psychic functions disturbed by fears.

At this stage the last development will probably occur, a desperate retreat from the unendurably contradictory and anxious psychic life, in its totality, into the body; and then physical nervous breakdown occurs. The sufferer gives

himself serious and often acutely painful physical symptoms as a distraction from the still more painful mental conflicts. It may now be seen why the sufferer from neurosis has a just claim on our sympathy and patient understanding. He cannot solve his problems himself, though he spends all his strength trying to do so. He must have expert help of the kind that analyses the complex manifestations of his character-contradictions, and helps him by insight to break the vicious circle that has led him ever deeper into the mire. The aim of psychotherapy is to eliminate conflicts in the character-structure, and to set going the process of integration, but this is also the aim of religious teaching and an important part of the goal of religious experience and of the meaning of salvation and inward peace. We are thus brought to consider the relationship of moral and religious education and the process of psychological integration.

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THE elimination of conflict, the achievement of integration, and of that inward peace which, as an indirect result, makes one 'spiritually shock-proof' in a disturbing world, has always been an important religious and Christian concern. It is what St. Paul desired when, caught in the conflict between the 'law of the mind' and the 'law of the members' he exclaimed: 'O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' (Rom. vii, 24.) Psychologically the fundamental needs of a person are for integration and personal relationship. The conclusions arrived at in the last chapter, however, force on us a radical reconsideration of traditional teaching as to the nature of the conflict that has to be overcome. We have seen that, whereas the anxious mind is frequently driven into a conflict between the feeling and thinking functions, the fundamental problem is the reconciliation of the basic emotional opposites of self-assertion and affection, of egoistic and altruistic attitudes and behaviour. It is only when at this point psychic conflict arises that the body, becoming involved, seems to be a source of trouble. The well-integrated mind has no difficulty with bodily appetites and the root conflict is therefore wrongly conceived if it is thought of as a battle between flesh and spirit, body and mind, animal biological instincts and ethical and religious ideals. This dualistic concept of an inevitable warfare between the passions and lusts of the flesh on the one hand, and the spiritual life on the other, is however, the traditional way of seeing the problem.

1. *The Conscious and Unconscious*

Before this matter is investigated something must be said

about the conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind and their relationship. Although the social worker and the minister of religion are primarily more concerned with the support and education of the conscious mind than with the investigation of the unconscious, they cannot afford to be ignorant of the disturbance of conscious mental life by unconscious processes, since it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line between neurotic and normal people. Neurosis is the exaggeration of normal emotional problems, and neurotic tendencies are to be found in slight or more marked degree in most of us. Yet there is a real distinction between neurotic and normal. The larger the element of neurosis the more the person comes within the purview of the psychotherapist. The larger the element of normality the more the person is free to benefit by the ministries of social help, religious education, and spiritual direction. As Professor McKenzie says: 'Pastoral psychology has for its field the understanding of the development of character in normal people, and especially it studies the relation of religious beliefs to the development of character and its stability, and to the achievements of personality.'¹ The education of the conscious mind has a tremendous bearing on the functioning of the unconscious.

It is not necessary to go at length into theories of the unconscious, such as Freud's repressed personal unconscious, and Jung's hereditary, racial, impersonal unconscious. We may take the matter in a simple practical light. However it is explained, it is a fact that our conscious thinking and behaviour are influenced and often compulsively determined by motives, feelings, and impulses of which we have no awareness consciously at the time. We have once been aware of them, and it is possible to become aware of them again, but at the moment of action these influential mental contents are not in consciousness and

¹ J. G. McKenzie, *Nervous Disorders and Character*, p. 25.

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cannot easily be got there. The conscious mind is not the whole self. A great deal of our most important thinking and feeling is done unconsciously, and the conscious mind registers conclusions unconsciously arrived at. Intuition is a valuable instance of this. Most of the processes concerned with development of character and growth of personality go on unconsciously. Conscious insight works like leaven and produces unconscious changes which presently manifest themselves in a changed conscious attitude. In psycho-analysis one can trace through a long series of dreams changes that are going on all the time, but of which the patient is not aware consciously.

But we must not fall into the error of thinking that only the unconscious mind matters. Insight achieved consciously is of major importance in initiating those changes. From a biological point of view it may be true to say that the conscious mind is a mere surface of the psyche developed for purposes of adaptation to the outer material environment—a psychic organ having survival value. *At the personal level the conscious mind is of primary importance. It is the organ of self-consciousness, objectivity, and relationship. It is the conscious mind that makes us persons and not just organisms.* When Jung repeatedly stresses the need to widen the area of consciousness, he is calling us to become more personal and less simply organic and blindly impulsive. Yet even then the constitution of the total psyche is complex, for often in dreams people reveal greater wisdom and understanding of themselves than they consciously possess. We must distinguish two aspects of the unconscious: the infantile unconscious and an unconscious part of the ego. *We cannot work with any smaller idea than that of the 'total self' which has both conscious and unconscious aspects,* while we emphasise the need to bring all our mental operations into consciousness so far as we are able to do so.

In the practical sense in which we are first of all concerned with it, the unconscious comes into being in the

course of our development as a collection of unwanted mental contents ejected from consciousness; perhaps we ought rather to say 'suppressed and ignored character-traits'. We have the fatal habit of shutting our eyes to our emotional problems instead of keeping ourselves steadily face to face with them, and of evading recognition of our own attitudes, desires, and motives when we do not like or approve of them, or believe that others would not do so. Yet they are still part of our total self. The process of repression begins in early infancy, because the ego is as yet too weak to deal constructively with its problems. This policy brings into being from earliest years, and feeds throughout life, a hidden 'backstage self' which is insecure, restless, discontented, turbulent. Energy has to be expended and wasted in keeping it hidden or repressed or finding disguised outlets for it, and the result is an unhealthy dualism in the personality. Jung has described this by the terms 'persona' and 'shadow', the persona being the actor's mask of the social self presented to the world, and the shadow being the socially unacceptable self, the darker self behind the scenes. Persona and shadow are in violent conflict. Thus if the conscious persona is 'good', compliant, over-generous, self-effacing, quiet, tame, the unconscious shadow will be 'bad', aggressive, hostile, resentful, demanding. If the persona has a strong sense of duty and a stern conscience, the shadow will be anti-social, rebellious, destructive.

This dualism of opposites in the total self is of far-reaching importance. It takes us ultimately into the deep waters of religious experience and of mystical and philosophical speculation as to the final goal of human life. We quote Dr. H. V. Dicks:

'The human mind has always perceived in itself a duality. . . . Clearly the union of the opposites has been set as the highest goal of human achievement . . . a task to be fulfilled by the individual within himself—a process

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of psychological growth and unification—the resolution of conflict to give it its modern name. The discovery of oneself, the finding of the centre from which we cannot err, of “the still small voice”, of the “Golden Flower”, of the “Keystone of the Arch”, of the “Philosopher’s Stone”, of the “elixir of life”, the “thousand-petalled lotus”, etc. etc., by whatever name this precious self-realisation and acceptance has been called—this is nothing less than the aim of psychotherapy, within the limits of the patient’s powers . . . How shall we explain this sense of duality and conflict, its origin whether in individuals or in the race as a whole? In modern psychology these contrasts appear chiefly in such terms as the following: active and passive, sadism and masochism, superiority and inferiority, extraversion and introversion, and love and hate, and perhaps one should add thinking and feeling.”¹

One can see in this list of opposites various versions, neurotic and otherwise, of the two fundamental bi-polarities of our psychic life, thinking and feeling, self-assertion and affection.

2. The Traditional View of the Nature of Conflict

We must now consider the account of the conflict of opposites that has been traditionally accepted. It is interesting to discover the traditional view presented in scientific form by Freud. His first view was that conflict existed between the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious was the home of the instincts or biological drives seeking only pleasure, and they came into conflict with the conscious mind which was rational and had to observe the demands of the social environment and live by the reality principle. The conflict was set up by the fact that a human nature that only sought selfish satisfactions of a pleasurable order clashed with the moral or social restrictions imposed on the individual from without and which had their basis in expediency.

¹ *Clinical Studies in Psychopathology*, p. 109.

Repression of natural instincts was necessary to culture, civilisation, human survival.

Freud later discovered that important parts of the conscious self and the super-ego or conscience became unconscious and operated unrecognised to produce and maintain repressions and inhibitions. He abandoned the simple division of the psyche into conscious and unconscious, and adopted the idea of the Id, Ego and Super-ego. The Id was the impersonal, inherited, unorganised, biological basis of psychic life out of which the instinctual drives emerged. The Ego and Super-ego which were partly conscious and partly unconscious were organised parts of the psyche charged with adjusting Id-impulses to the social outer world. Thus we still have the basic conflict in man described as that between the selfish 'Natural Man' with roots in the organic life of the body and ethical ideals or restrictions imposed by society. One can recognise in this a modern scientific edition of the traditional teaching perhaps best represented by St. Paul's doctrine of the law of the mind and the members and the widespread ancient idea of the eternal antagonism between the flesh and the spirit. Unless care is taken to understand this problem, it may appear that Christianity and post-Freudian psychotherapy are in opposition, which is not the case. *The lack of an adequate psychology has confused the issue as between ethical choice and psychological integration.* Christianity calls for a Kierkegaardian 'Either—Or'; a clear choice between the bad and the good, a pronouncement against aggressiveness, selfishness, lovelessness, anti-social attitudes, and in favour of 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself'. If that seems incompatible with the psychotherapist's call for integration, a Hegelian 'Synthesis of Opposites', that is only because a false analysis of human nature obscures the real issue. The psychotherapist, just as much as the Christian, calls for the rejection of aggressive, loveless, and anti-social attitudes which are recurring themes in the neurotic character from

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which release is sought. The neurotic personality is in a morally unhealthy state, egocentric, full of undischarged hate, and with a lost capacity for affection. Psychotherapy contrasts it uncompromisingly with the healthy personality which is morally sound because self-assertion and affection are integrated in a wholesome blend of strong sympathy and firm friendliness for which 'love' is the true word.

It is a false analysis of human nature that identifies good and bad with parts or functions of the personality in themselves natural; it would make psychological integration a false aim and an ethically impossible goal. It is just that kind of incorrect analysis that is involved in traditional teaching and in the earlier Freudian psychology. The opposites that are in conflict in man were conceived as the flesh and the spirit, or instincts operating only by the pleasure principle and reason working by the reality principle. The solution was always thought of as the suppression of one of the opposites by the other. Conscience must discipline the flesh, reason must subdue the instincts by demanding their sublimation and the inhibition of their primary aims, the spirit must triumph over the body and its lusts. The body was the enemy of the soul. Such ideas have a long history. They have roots in Greek dualism with its opposition between appearance and reality, the realm of the senses and the realm of reason, the body which is the prison-house of the soul and the soul which is the Platonic world of Ideas. Oriental asceticism with its identification of matter with evil has made a large contribution to such theories. Both Greek and Oriental thought contributed to the creation within the Christian Church of a negative attitude to the body and its pleasures and an identification of the highest Christian life with the severest discipline and mortification of the flesh.

St. Paul brought such teaching to clear expression in Romans, chapters vii and viii, revealing the intensity of his own personal conflicts. His is a clear case of the obsessional type of personality, which is in itself the normal personality-

pattern, and conflict-pattern, of forceful, dynamic natures. He exhibits two of its clearest marks: the aggression of the fanatical persecutor later sublimated into burning zeal and heroic labours and endurance of suffering, and a negative attitude to sex which hedges it about with stringent safeguards and a barely permissive tolerance of it even inside marriage.¹ He had to endure a stormy emotional life, and it may not be mere speculation to suggest that his 'thorn in the flesh' which he besought the Lord thrice to remove, without avail, was a physical symptom of his intense conflict-states. 'What I hate, that I do. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. (Exactly what many a sufferer from neurosis feels, doomed to conflict with an internal bad object, faced with a psychic compulsion that he cannot master.) For I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing . . . For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.'² 'For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and and peace; because the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be; and they that are in the flesh cannot please God.'³ He is describing a real ethical conflict in false psychological terms. The combatants are not the members and the mind, the flesh and the spirit, but the psychosomatic or body-mind whole of the one person disturbed by an unconscious area of the psychic life in the grip of insecurity, fear and hate, which is counter-attacked by repression from the ego and super-ego. The conflict is between the immature infantile unconscious and the more realistic socially, morally and spiritually mature ego.

We have to recognise the fact that hitherto the theologian has never had at his disposal a sound scientific psychology which is only now, at long last, beginning to emerge. Chris-

¹ 1 Corinthians, vii, 1, 7-9, 28, 32-3.

² Romans, vii, 15-23.

³ Romans, viii, 6-8 (Revised Version).

tian thinkers of all past ages have had to work in ignorance of the exact psychological nature of the conflict in human nature, and with no reliable understanding of the unconscious aspects of our mental life, the repressed motivations and character-traits which set up conflict and which, until they are resolved, have all the appearance of compulsive and inevitable parts of man's constitutional make-up. St. Paul speaks of the 'law of the mind or spirit' as if it were doomed to unending warfare against the 'law of the flesh', which, he says, is not and cannot be subject to the law of God. This would imply that the moral and spiritual life is a psychic defence mechanism that makes use of moral and spiritual values in its struggle to repress turbulent instinctual drives. This only shows how instinct theory commits us to a dangerously false dualistic account of human nature. St. Paul's psychological observation of himself, working with the only terms then available, is astonishingly accurate and a perfectly true description of the state of mind in which many dynamic personalities find themselves. But we can no more expect him to anticipate modern psychology than we expect Genesis to anticipate modern astronomy and physics. The arresting thing in St. Paul is not the inadequate psychology in which his conflicts were described, but the fact that he worked through to the true goal of love, the evidence for which is the mellower tone and the spiritual peace of his later epistles and the tremendous thirteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians: 'If I speak with the tongues of men and angels, but have not love, I am become sounding brass, or a clanging cymbal . . . For we know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child: now that I am become a man, I have put away childish things . . . Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love.'¹ No finer account of psychological and spiritual maturing has been given.

¹ Verses 1, 9-11, 13 (Revised Version).

It is, however, unfortunate that the traditional psychological dualism has entered so deeply into the moral and religious teaching of Europe. It led to an identification of sex and sin which is not yet extinct by any means. It has been used in the upbringing of children to prohibit natural self-assertiveness on the child's part, leading to serious inhibitions. The harm that such a point of view has done still needs frank acknowledgement. Romans vii has been misused because it was not seen that it rested on a pre-scientific and misleading psychology. It is not a description of the normal and proper constitution of human nature, but rather of St. Paul's personal emotional conflicts described from the ethical and religious point of view. In calling those conflicts by the term 'neurosis' we are doing what must be done, viz. lifting the term 'neurosis' right out of its narrow medical connotation and showing that *neurosis in its medical and psychological aspects is the symptom-picture of the central drama of human life, the struggle of fear, hate, and love for mastery in the soul*. To take Romans vii literally would mean that psychologically there is a dualism in human nature that is ultimate and cannot be overcome. Integration or wholeness of personality would be impossible, and the utmost that could be hoped for would be that the 'higher' in man should permanently subdue the 'lower' by the grace of God. The evil flesh in man would remain as a permanent underground movement within the personality, causing an unremitting, if latent, civil war in the mind and perpetual tension. That is not integration and peace, but repression. Since Romans was written many years after St. Paul's conversion, it would seem that that conversion was the suppression or control, and in large measure the sublimation, but not the solution, of his aggression-problem, and that it took him many years subsequently to work through to the real solution that gave true peace of mind.

We shall presently see reason to believe that psychological integration and religious peace are different aspects of the

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same thing. The intuitive insights and most mature religious experience of Christians involve the rejection of the idea that there is any ultimate irreconcilable dualism in man, and that repression or else conscious control of the lower by the higher are the only possible solutions of conflict. Such phrases as 'the peace that passeth understanding' and 'entire sanctification' seem to indicate a belief in the possibility of that wholeness and overcoming of dualism and conflict which the psychologist refers to as the integration of personality.

Before we pursue further this important question, we note again that modern psychology, through the teaching of Freud, has perpetuated the traditional theory of man's dualistic nature and is only now beginning to find its way to a truer view. Freud occupied much the same position as St. Paul with his view that the instincts are inherently selfish and anti-social and that there can be no civilisation without repression. He states this uncompromisingly in *The Future of an Illusion*, and his theories have been used as a support for the theological doctrine of Original Sin. Instinct theory, however, as we have seen, is being drastically challenged today. Karen Horney holds that the Freudian Ego and Super-ego are neurotic defences against the Freudian Id and that what Freud says of them is not true of the healthy mind. Even so, Freud developed through two stages of his thinking. In the earlier we may draw a close parallel between his conflict of the conscious and unconscious and St. Paul's laws of the spirit and the flesh. Whereas St. Paul called for the complete suppression of the flesh by the spirit, Freud took the opposite point of view and worked for the release of the instinctual unconscious so far as that was socially possible. Gradually, however, this preoccupation with the repressed and undervaluation of the conscious gave way to a recognition of the importance of the Ego and its character-structure. Integration psychology has taken the place of mere release of repressed instincts.

The real problem all through has been the false antithesis of flesh and spirit, instinct and reason, a type of analysis of human nature that we saw in the previous chapter must be discarded if we are to arrive at a correct understanding of man as a person. The conflict is not between flesh and spirit, but between polar opposites in the psychic personal life itself, a conflict which may then be played out over bodily appetites which otherwise would be no source of trouble. Not that these polar opposites are in themselves mutually incompatible; if they were, no integration would be possible. It is fear and insecurity which arouse conflict by centring our attention on ourselves and rendering us unable to sustain unselfish relationships with others. Fear and love are the only really incompatible opposites, and they bring us face to face with a clear ethical choice between the selfish and hostile attitudes founded on fear and the altruistic, generous, sympathetic attitudes that are the expression of love. That ethical choice is necessary to the process of integration. We must want to lay aside aggression and the urge to dominate in favour of a strength and firmness of normal self-assertion that has no hostility in it; and we must want to feel affection for and interest in other people for their sakes, and not use the techniques of affection to gain sympathy, appreciation, and support for ourselves. Then the fears that turn our strength into hostility and our affection into selfish weakness may begin to be eliminated. Normal self-assertion and genuine good feeling for others will then reveal no essential contradiction between themselves, and integration will proceed. In the words of Dr. Dicks already quoted: 'The union of the opposites has been set as the highest goal of human achievement . . . a task to be fulfilled by the individual within himself, a process of psychological growth and unification. . . . This is nothing less than the aim of psychotherapy within the limits of the patient's powers'. But at this point psychotherapy has gone beyond the medical concern of curing symptoms and illness

and throws light on the quest and struggle of the spirit of man all down the ages.

3. The Harm Done by False Theory

Discarding the traditional view of the dualism in human nature has an important bearing on our achievement of integration and wholeness of personality and also on moral and religious education, for wrong teaching can create unnecessary conflicts which confuse the inner life and frustrate its proper growth. An artificial and unreal, yet very damaging, antagonism can be set up between the bodily appetites and the spiritual life if a child is brought up to believe that something in him called the 'natural man' or 'fleshly passions or lusts' must be for ever resisted and denied. The negative attitude of St. Paul towards 'the flesh' is a note that seems absent from the mind of Christ. In the parable of the Prodigal Son, the incident of the woman taken in adultery, and of the woman who washed His feet with her tears, the story of the turning of water into wine, and in the saying: 'I have piped and ye have not danced', one feels in Jesus a spirit more tolerantly human and divine, more sympathetic to and understanding of the life of the body than one finds in the earlier writings of the converted fanatical persecutor, or than has existed in some types of so-called Christian teaching. One does not cite these as 'proofs', but as expressions of that subtle thing called 'atmosphere' which is of such fundamental importance.

Whatever the explanation, the fact is that Christianity has too often in the past stood for a life-denying negativism. That is nothing like so true today, but there are types of 'Christian' teaching of which even now it still holds good. The psychotherapist is regularly confronted with the emotional devastation caused by such teaching. Many people have been driven into a crushing sense of guilt over impulses that were simply natural and healthy. We have grown out of much that the nonconformist conscience condemned in pri-

vate life, though it is still possible to find Christians who believe that smoking, cards, the cinema and theatre, a glass of beer, etc., are 'Sin'. More serious is the sense of guilt and shame that is felt, even when people are not conscious of it, about sex. Traditional Christian teaching never achieved much more than a negative, and permissive, attitude to sex. A vague sense of there being something nasty, dirty, wrong, forbidden, in sex, along with the feeling that one should be ashamed to admit to enjoying pleasure in sexual functioning, is still more widespread than is recognised. The very self-consciousness and blatancy about sex of the 'emancipated' shows that they, too, are fighting the same feelings deep down within themselves.

Thus a young woman in the thirties dreams that she went for a walk with a friend and they met Christ. The friend said to Him: 'My friend thinks that you wouldn't approve of Shakespeare'. Christ answered: 'I like Shakespeare very much', and the dreamer was surprised. Her comment was that she had been brought up to believe that a true Christian should not read secular books and she did not feel that Shakespeare was very 'improving' reading. The friend, who was an invention of the dream, was a growingly emancipated part of herself. A man in the thirties had this dream: 'The dog I loved as a boy was ill. I attended to a wound on its leg, sympathising with it. It began to talk to me and told me it had been cruelly beaten by an elderly woman only because it had wanted to sniff at her dog, a bitch. I said: "Well, you know what these good Christian people are"'. The dreamer's comments were: 'That elderly woman was one of mother's circle, one of the people who were busy with good works and missionary meetings. She represents a lot of negatively good people I have no time for, a lot of grown-up people in my boyhood who went to church. I was never allowed to play tennis on Sunday at home because the church set would have been shocked. Mother was always saying: "Mrs. So-and-So says you're such a nice boy, you

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don't frivol away your time with girls''. Both dreamers grew up wanting to be married, emotionally unable to marry, and burdened with guilty feelings about sex.

A minister of religion in the same emotional condition, himself the son of a minister, dreamt that he saw a number of girls and boys going off in pairs, laughing and talking, arm in arm, and a voice said: 'That's all right for the young people of the parish, but not for the son of the manse'. A woman in the forties brought a dream about baths and washings, i.e. cleansing symbols indicating guilt feelings, and it set her reflecting about 'Christian conscience and duty; mother and I went to church; we had family prayers up to the first world war; I took it all in; then I went to a Church Boarding School and religion came into everything; at nineteen I began to feel a revulsion against religion and rebelled against going to church; father wouldn't have made me go, but all mother's friends said "What a pity"; I got more and more bored'. As a final example one may cite a woman of fifty who has bursting feelings as of something pounding up into her head. Over every trifling mistake she had to keep saying to herself: 'You shouldn't have done it'. Another compulsion is the repetition of the phrase 'For ever and ever', which suggests to her the end, death, the Judgment Day, facing a great white throne, everyone knowing all your wrongs, standing alone to be judged, 'feeling as I did as a child when mother said: "I'll tell your father"', and he would lecture us till you could drop through the floor, an awful feeling'.

None of this, of course, represents true Christian teaching, but rather the misuse of religion by parents who did not recognise their own aggressive desire to dominate their children. But we cannot say that that sort of thing no longer exists today. We know so little of the inner atmosphere of the home life even of people we know quite well in a social way, and the 'keeping up of appearances' still hides much loveless fear and repressive authority in the treatment of children.

A young man of twenty says: 'I was sure it was very wrong to have wet dreams. I'm always scared of my parents finding out'; and a young woman of the same age forces herself to say: 'I must confess I'm a sexual pervert, I masturbate', and is astonished when told that masturbation is not a sexual perversion. These attitudes are by no means confined to people from church circles, but ministers have the chance to spread saner views among their flock, while social workers of all kinds can influence many whom the Church does not touch. Far more enlightened attitudes already hold sway among the leaders of church life, though one reflects sadly that it was not the Church that led the way, and among the rank and file of church members many more lag behind than we like to know. Any tendency to treat Christianity as an authoritarian discipline can easily play on and revive the deep feeling still latent in us that sex and sin are one and the same thing, and that natural impulses are 'the lusts of the flesh'.

4. Genuine Moral Conflict

Both psychotherapy and religion have great need of sound and sensible education of the conscious mind, which needs truly constructive standards and values if steady advance towards a conflict-free and integrated personality is to be made. We must now turn our attention to the real moral conflicts that arise out of the struggles of human nature with life. All too many tendencies and impulses that can only be called evil are to be found in every disturbed mind, and the unconscious is frequently found to harbour even violently anti-social wishes. The Freudian repressed unconscious or the Jungian shadow may be so strong and menacing that the ego or main self becomes afraid of it. Moral conflict is a terribly real experience that can give rise to acute anxiety attacks. Many people register the existence in themselves of impulses that could not be allowed overt expression in human relationships, but find an outlet in dreams of murder

or rape, or of a sinister person or a burglar breaking in. Over against these dreams are others in which the dreamer is arrested by the police, or condemned in court, or punished by imprisonment. One actual dream went as follows: 'A mob of rioters came down the street pillaging and burning. I was afraid, but presently police marched up and were going to crush the rioters'.

A man in the thirties dreams: 'I want to beat a chap up. Also I am dancing with a girl. I think of my "pillar of respectability" because I probably want to rape her though I am behaving very respectably'. His comment was: 'I desire to do things I wouldn't approve of myself doing. I have to adopt a hypocritical standpoint and put a veto on my impulses. To clamp down on sadistic and homosexual trends I have to clamp down on much else, and I am not myself. I'd like to be myself and can't, because part of me is anti-social. I feel nonplussed, in a conflict, two halves of me going different ways. The dream reflects my complete and utter selfishness, and I loathe it'. The poignancy of moral conflict here revealed is even greater than superficially appears. His 'pillar of respectability' was a narrow and negative conscience that clamped down on all naturalness and spontaneity and made him feel that sexual impulse was in itself evil, and therefore that any interest he felt in a girl must be bad. Not that he consciously believed that, but he unconsciously felt it, his mind having been moulded that way in childhood. This rigid and tyrannous conscience which was no true moral conscience, but a strait-jacket inside which he could not grow, goaded his nature to revolt. Yet he could not do without it, for, as shown in Chapter VII, the guilt-inducing super-ego is a defence against the infantile greedy and aggressive impulses. He was at war with himself, generated fierce aggressive feelings, and so found a fresh cause for self-hatred. The chap he wanted to beat up and destroy was the symbol of his own aggression turned against itself.

Another man who grew up in a home perpetually upset

by a drunken wife-beating father says: 'I'm afraid to let myself go. I'm afraid what may come out if I do. It might be an arrogant blusterer who only cares for number One; that's what father was'. He was infected in boyhood with the example of that father, identified with father so that father becomes part of himself, and he is compelled grossly to inhibit his whole personality to prevent that father-part of him erupting in anti-social conduct. A somewhat different example is that of a man who passed through a time of extreme unbefriended loneliness in adolescence, during which time he had to make his way and earn a living without a soul to help him. In various jobs he found himself among immoral and financially unscrupulous men, was disgusted at what he saw, yet such was his insecurity that he felt that in such a world his only chance was to discard his moral scruples. He did not do so, ultimately got clear into sound employment, and worked his way to economic security. Later in life, finding himself faced once more with unscrupulous men in business, he began to get anxiety attacks with palpitation and breathlessness. Under analysis his dreams revealed him trying to shake off a low immoral beggar who was tempting him to sexual licence, and fighting to defeat a super-spiv or clever crook. A sense of insecurity in his personal relationships in business had re-aroused the old tempting feeling that one can only fight such a world with its own weapons. His anxiety attacks were due to the fear that the sympathetic, affectionate, and morally sound character might be destroyed, and during that period he was seized with the fear that his daughter might die. The daughter, an affectionate little girl, constantly appeared in his dreams as the symbol of his own affections, and his phobia about her expressed his fear lest the ruthless struggle of the business world should kill the good in him. His fear of the little girl dying disappeared as he regained a sense of emotional stability and moral security.

5. The Process of Integration

This example brings us back to the true explanation of moral conflict. We have seen that human nature is innately possessed of two complementary functions of self-assertion and affection, of egoistic and altruistic feeling and impulse. These two are not at all necessarily incompatible, but in an insecure world of human relationships they are easily and very early developed into conflicting tendencies. Self-assertion becomes aggressive and hostile, and, because of anxiety, affection is smothered by a self-seeking utilisation of friendly attitudes in order to gain security. Love, sympathy, tenderness are feared as weakness, as sentimental handicaps, because life is seen as a battlefield, and in a fight for security one has to be ruthlessly strong. So the 'person' whose nature it is to fulfil himself in human relationships finds himself isolated by his very defensive hostilities; and he whose nature it is to develop a mature capacity to love finds himself unable to feel for other people, but only for himself. Because of insecurity and anxiety his love becomes a greedy demand for satisfaction like that of the baby at the breast. His moral judgment rises up to condemn his loveless aggression or his equally loveless but weak compliance which is dictated by a hungry and dependent need for support. He will find no peace until he can win his way back to a normal and non-aggressive self-assertion that is integrated with uninhibited tender affectionate feeling in the harmony and wholeness of love, which is man's true nature.

As Ian Suttie pointed out, we begin life in a symbiotic relationship—a relationship of union of our life with the life of another, viz. mother. Every phase of our development is conditioned by our early human relationships, to parents in particular. We cannot grow mature except in good personal relationships with other human beings. When they are denied to us in our formative years our healthy natural impulses are miseducated into unhealthy and anti-social passions and weaknesses, and we are driven into a long

struggle for integration, maturity, and peace. The theologian does not always appreciate the psychological implications of this problem. Thus Professor John Baillie writes: 'In my earliest memories I (found) the presence in myself of a tendency to rebel against the constraint which was exercised over me. . . . My word for this was Naughtiness. I have no hesitation in saying that its essence lay in the tendency to find the centre of life in myself, to behave as though I were the centre of my world. Its essence was self-will'.¹ This ignores two all-important psychological facts. First, the natural tendency to self-assertion is balanced by the equally natural tendency to feel affection for others, and is not in itself bad, but fully capable of integration with affection. Second, the child *must* learn to assert himself, and his parents must learn to tolerate his assertiveness against themselves without giving him a feeling of guilt, or he may grow up to be an inhibited 'Yes-man' or else a rebel. 'Naughtiness' was no doubt not little John Baillie's word, but his parents'. There are adults who are either nervously ill or ineffective as personalities because they never dared to be healthily naughty as children. The child is weak because it is physically and mentally undeveloped, and it must not remain weak. Its first need is to develop, along with a secure knowledge of being loved, valued, and accepted, a feeling of strength in itself; an awareness of becoming a positive 'somebody in its own right'. If it cannot do this it will grow up with crushed initiative. It can only realise its potential strength by asserting itself against its environment, and only the parents can help it to do that with a feeling of safety. If the child feels that other people are always intolerant of its self-assertion, and make it feel guilty about it, it will either become an over-assertive rebel or fall into a tame, under-assertive, and compliant personality, and come to feel inferior. There is a neurotic version of the

¹ *Invitation to Pilgrimage*, p. 39.

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Christian character which is highly dangerous to the personality; it takes the form of compulsive unselfishness, an attitude of 'None of self and all of Thee' to both God and man, It always hides a tremendous repressed frustration-rage, the control of which drives the sufferer into all the more frantic efforts at self-denial and self-sacrifice and self-effacement. One cannot serve God or man by the crushing of one's own personality.

Naturally, while the child is still young and unsure of itself, its attempts at self-assertion will often be overdone; it will be over-assertive. That is involved in the process of developing and discovering its strength, and needs patient, wise, and tolerant handling by the parent. In time, if the child meets with understanding affection in the parents who help and encourage it to realise and use its own powers, it will grow confident, and self-assertion will not develop into aggression and stubborn self-will, but will become creative self-expression combined with love and consideration for others. If, however, it is brought up on the idea that 'self-will is naughty and even sinful' the result may be very different. A young woman brought up in just such a 'Christian home' broke down into fatigue, chronic headaches, and inability to decide anything for herself. She was oppressed by a severe sense of guilt over any attempt to strike out for herself. In a dream she got terribly annoyed with mother and shouted: 'I'm sick of doing as I'm told. I'll damn well please myself'. Had she been allowed to please herself more in real life her natural need for self-assertion would not have been forced back on her in that dream in the ugly form of aggressive revolt. When the child is too strictly brought up it is often only able to escape compulsive unselfishness and neurotic compliance by swinging to the other extreme of the 'Nazi neurosis', compulsive aggression, despising of love as weakness, and an urge to dominate in order to gain reassurance about one's strength.

Professor Baillie writes:

‘There are those who attempt to show that the two conflicting entities, instead of being God and man, are only two different parts of a man’s own self. The duality is there, but it is a duality within human nature. . . . It became quite clear to me that the tension in question was never merely between two parts of my existing nature, but between my actual and my ideal nature. Of the two parts of my nature that are here said to be in conflict one does not exist; it only ought to exist. The tension is never merely between two desires, but essentially between the desired and the desirable, that is between what I actually do desire and what I know I ought to desire but for the most part do not . . . The real tension is not between a higher and a lower self, but between my clear knowledge that I am called upon to prefer the one self and my strong actual tendency to give preference to the other . . . The conflict that I experience cannot possibly be regarded as merely interior to myself, but can only be caused in me by a constraint coming to me from beyond myself.’¹

We must agree with Professor Baillie that the conflict is not between a higher and lower self in any constitutional sense, but for the rest this passage seriously confuses the psychological issues. The psychologist is not as such competent to speak about the ultimate metaphysical or theological source of moral obligation. The theist will regard it as ‘coming to me from beyond myself’, but that is in no way incompatible with the recognition, psychologically, that moral obligation is rooted in the constitution of human nature. It is not psychologically correct to describe the ideal self as ‘one that does not exist; it only ought to exist’, and as ‘what I know I ought to desire but for the most part do not’. That ideal self does not exist in any sense in the amoral psychopath who seems to be constitutionally incapable of feeling for other people at all,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 42 f.

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and so cannot develop an ideal or a conscience. Normal human nature includes a need and demand for affectionate and unselfish relationships with other people, and also an innate function of self-observation and self-assessment that recognises and condemns hard, unloving, and anti-social attitudes. That is the psychological basis of conscience, though it must be educated so far as its actual standards of judgment are concerned. *Conflict arises over selfish, aggressive, ego-centric, and defensive desires, because I not only know I ought to be different, but I really want to be different. Conflict is 'interior to myself'. It is not a conflict between a bad self-willed nature and a non-existent ideal self.* That lands us back in early Freudian theories where the source of moral obligation was wholly outside human nature and coming to it from beyond itself, from society. From the purely scientific point of view it is immaterial whether one says that the source of moral obligation beyond the individual is society or God; the point is that moral obligation has its roots inside human nature. If it had not we could never become truly moral at all. The real conflict is between my nature, which is personal and demands good relationships with other persons in which I can find both personal significance and unselfish, loving mutuality, and my neurotic, anxiety-moulded, defensive infantile character-traits, which combine aggression, greedy need, and weakness and stifle my capacity to love.

Perhaps only the analyst, who has the opportunity of penetrating into the hidden dynamics of the unconscious mind, has the chance to appreciate how hard human nature compels us to fight against our neurotic and non-moral tendencies. Freud rightly said that in the unconscious mind we are both more immoral and also more moral than we know. A man who, when away from his wife, suffered much from distressingly strong attractions to other women, dreams of being pursued by an immoral tempter who is luring him. He fights this tempter furiously and throws him off and wakes with his heart palpitating. A deeply religious man

struggling with a strong repressed hostile ambition dreams of an aggressive man who continually intrudes into and interrupts religious services, and he throws him out. To teach that human nature is all bad self-will, rebelliousness, and unredeemed sinfulness is simply not true to observable facts. *Men and women must not be got into a state of moral conflict with what they believe to be a bad nature, but rather taught that their immoral tendencies are not an expression of their true nature at all.*

There is need for a sound psychology as the foundation of Christian teaching. It must begin with the fact that the true path of human development is an equal fostering of normal self-assertion and affection, so that these twin aspects of our emotional life fuse in the whole of a healthily integrated character. This will only take place in and through good personal relationships, primarily those between the parent and child. In the security of an understanding parental love the child learns to assert itself with confidence and develop its powers without resentment or hostility, and does not feel that affection is a weakness that betrays it into being exploited by other people. Integration and human relationship are intimately interwoven at every stage. In the next chapter we shall see how desperately hard human nature fights against the crushing out of the capacity to love, though it often fights in blind and unhelpful ways that do not produce any solution to the problem which arouses so much anxiety. For the moment we stress the fact that *personal relationship is the true instrument of moral education.*

Before we deal with the question of education let us gather up the various strands in the argument: we have considered the conscious and unconscious, the reconciliation of psychological opposites, the necessity for ethical choice, and the process of integration. There is no higher spiritual self permanently at war with a lower fleshly one. There is a total self that lives through both bodily and psychic functions, and it alternates between security and insecurity, health and

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neurosis, love and hate, integration and disintegration. Love is the fusion of normal strength and assertiveness with tender affectionateness and is characteristic of a healthy, integrated personality; it is the proper state of human nature. Hate is the fusion of aggression and weak compliance in an insecure and disintegrated self who feels every man, and often God as well, to be his enemy. The total self is always tending one way or the other, and it is in good or bad personal relationships that the personality grows morally and spiritually healthy or diseased. A fundamental and exclusive ethical choice is needed between love and hate, and it is in the end literally the choice between psychic and spiritual life and death. The ethical choice in favour of love can, however, only be actualised in and through the processes of development that are described from the psychological point of view as integration or individuation, the process of becoming a true, whole, and harmonious self. That is what creates the state of mind called 'peace', and there is an important link between the psychological idea of integration and the religious conception of peace, even though the latter is a larger concept.

Two comments in a valuable criticism contributed by Principal Cunliffe Jones will serve to focus attention on the central issues. First, he writes: 'The transition from neurotic compulsion to mental health does not seem to me the same as that from ethical dissatisfaction to religious peace'. If neurosis and mental health are interpreted in narrowly medical senses that will be true. But as soon as we realise that in the larger sense neurosis is simply the drama of human life, the struggle of fear, hate, and love for mastery in the soul of man, we must see that what the psychologist describes as the integration process is the gradual harmonisation of the personality in the course of its transition from hate to love; looked at psychiatrically that is identical with the transition from disease to health, and from conflict to integration. Looked at religiously it is surely the same thing

as that redemption from sin, from pride, hate, lovelessness, and selfishness, which is called 'salvation'. That is not to reduce religion to psychology—an irrelevant objection, since everything that happens within the human personality, including its religious experience, must have its psychological aspect and be capable of description from a psychological point of view. That description will not exhaust the whole meaning of any experience, but must help us to understand its implication. If anything, this would mean drawing psychology out of a narrow scientific exclusiveness into the consideration of the whole meaning of human life. The correlation of the two concepts of integration and religious peace has been made by Carl Jung, who, of all psychiatrists, probably has the profoundest intuitive insight into these questions.

Jung's handling of the matter may be prefaced by a consideration of Principal Cunliffe Jones's second comment. 'There are dualisms of different orders. Some dualisms ought to be resolved by the integration of the contending parties; other dualisms ought to be resolved by one party casting out the other. I am willing to admit that some dualisms that ought to have been resolved by integration have been treated as being of the type of necessary opposition.' With this we entirely agree. The dualism of love and hate can admit of no compromise. The traditional dualism of spirit and flesh is a misconception and no true dualism at all. The dualism, or polar opposition, of the self-assertive and affectionate aspects of our psychic life calls for integration, and it must not be confused with the ethical opposites of hate and love which are rooted, not in the constitution of human nature, but in the situation in which human nature lives its life, whether it be one of insecurity or security, of the presence or absence of fear, and so of neurosis or health. *Nor must it be supposed that this is a purely humanistic and non-religious point of view, for to the psychologist fear, anxiety, and insecurity arise, or do not arise, in the sphere of our personal*

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relationships, and a religious experience is the supreme personal relationship in which alone full security is found, a personal relationship with the ultimate reality, God. All lesser personal relationships cannot be other than reflections of that ultimate one.

There remains the dualism of the conscious and the unconscious mind to consider. This should be replaced by the dualism of the ego and the infantile repressed unconscious. Consciousness is an arena into which components from the ego and the infantile unconscious can enter, and where they confront each other. Consciousness is largely, but by no means entirely, dominated by the ego or main self; ego and infantile factors struggle together in consciousness for mastery, the ego seeking always to keep the infantile factors repressed and unconscious. Is this a matter for ethical choice or integration? The answer, strictly speaking, is both. What is repressed is always what seems to be ethically, socially, or personally unacceptable. One man will repress his aggressiveness because it is bad and dangerous; another will repress instead his compliant submissiveness because he despises it as weak and senses the exorbitant dependent demands on other people that it disguises. Whichever of these two is repressed the other is likely to dominate the ego in consciousness, and ethically discriminating judgments have to be made, in fact, as much about conscious as about unconscious attitudes. On the other hand, repression always does more than is required. In getting rid of an unwanted character-trait it also inhibits the development of a necessary, natural, and healthy function. The baby is thrown out with the bath water. The repression of aggression involves the inhibition of normal self-assertion and leaves the personality weak. The repression of compliance involves the inhibition of affection and leaves the personality hard. The unconscious has to be brought back into consciousness again; the repressed infantile factors and the main ego must be brought face to face once more; repressed character-

traits must be re-accepted, and the whole aim of analytical treatment is to break up repressions so that integration can take place. That does not mean allowing a crude outlet for every repressed impulse. To accept the unconscious is (1) to be prepared to face it, to know it, to let it return to conscious awareness whether we like its contents or not, for not till then can it be dealt with; (2) to learn not to misinterpret it and fear it as pure evil, but to recognise it rather as the aggravated state of natural energies or needs, and (3) having exposed the fears that are responsible for the aggravation, and normalised the emotional reactions, to set going that fusion of 'nature' with our 'social, moral, and spiritual values', in and through which man can really live.

Any attempt to exclude ethical valuation of neurotic character-traits from analytical investigation of a neurosis must defeat the real purpose of treatment. The patient's own mind will not acquiesce in the exclusion of, or if it does it will run the risk of losing, the moral sense; when we come to deal with the problems of conscience we shall see that ethical judgment must be carefully distinguished from a morbid sense of guilt which is negative, depresses vitality, and hinders the recovery of mental and moral health. Guilt is a defence that aims at repression. Ethical valuation is a true conscience that initiates changes of mind. Nothing but a destruction of the moral sense could bring a person to believe, for example, that the character-trait of aggressiveness is other than evil, because it is destructive of good relationships and isolates the self from other selves.

What happens when analysis sets a person on the road to mental health? The earliest theory was that abreaction, or the working out of pent-up emotion relieved the mind of internal pressure and set it free to function naturally again. That is no longer accepted as an adequate explanation, and certainly any view must include the fact that insight into our hidden motives and character-structure, the bringing into awareness of our obscure fears, puts us in a position to

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re-orientate ourselves and liberate ourselves with respect to other people. Yet the abreaction theory was a crude version of the truth. The mind is drawn out of itself. It has been retreating into itself, withdrawing from personal relationships, shutting itself up behind defensive barriers. When emotion can be let out, that is a sign that a change of front is taking place, the mind is turning outwards again towards its world. Orientation outwards, away from oneself towards the reality that is beyond ourselves, is as necessary to religious experience as it is to social re-adaption. The patient is drawn out of himself first of all into a relation to his analyst, and from that starting point goes on to relate himself positively once again to his environment. Many successful analyses have shown that personality can be transformed in this process. Repressed and unconscious mental life is both altered and integrated at the same time, and becomes, not a collection of frighteningly strong, dangerous impulses, but a source of creative energy that can be used in constructive ways.

In the relationship of the conscious and unconscious both ethical choice and psychological integration are involved. The break-up of repressions on strong anti-social drives has its dangers. Such drives could take charge of the conscious self if they have been repressed by nothing but a fear of consequences out of which no genuine moral values have been developed. It has to be remembered that a resentful, revengeful, deeply embittered mind can repress its social feelings and its ethical sense, and become cynical, nihilistic, and destructive in attitude. This possibility also can be a source of gravely disturbing conflict. It is not infrequent to find a genuine fear of the disintegration of the moral and social consciousness under the pressure of the emergence of long-repressed violent tendencies. In the realities of moral conflict it is not always the bad self that is repressed. There is need of an adequate, convinced, yet reasonable conscience and moral understanding if acceptance of the unconscious

is to proceed constructively. One of the questions that must be faced by educationalist, psychologist, and theologian alike, is that when a child grows up in a bad home, where he is presented with nothing but examples of harsh exploitation, selfishness, and lack of all true consideration for other people, the moral sense may fail of adequate development, or be stifled at its birth. A hard world can inhibit affection so early that social and moral development can be prevented. Our Western aggressive, competitive culture has just that kind of effect to some extent on all of us. What Ian Suttie called the 'taboo on tenderness' in our culture can also be seen as an inhibition of the moral sense; one of its widespread results is the idea that in business and politics morality has no place. 'Business is business' and politics is always 'power-politics'. The resulting personality-type is naturally only superficially strong, but actually hard and brittle and very liable to break down under stress, because the repression of a whole half of the emotional life is involved.

It is at this point that a consideration of Jung's theory of the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious is forced on us. He has shown that there is an important sense in which the unconscious is complementary to consciousness. Whatever is excluded, by repression, from our conscious self gathers strength in the unconscious and forces itself back on us again. If all normal self-assertion is inhibited it will grow increasingly violent and aggressive in the unconscious till it threatens to break out in spite of all controls, and phobias arise. The unfortunate sufferer becomes terrified of committing some act of violence, of striking people, of going berserk; he gets an anxiety attack if he sees a knife lying on the table, or he cannot go on top of a bus for fear it will overbalance, which conceals a fear of loss of control and balance in himself, or if he reads of a crime in the Press he is seized with the thought that he has done it. The unconscious is blindly struggling to restore balance to a onesided unassertive personality. Again, if

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affection is repressed under hostile and aggressive attitudes the deep natural need for loving personal relationships will gather strength in the unconscious and force on the person a compulsive hunger for sexual relationships that becomes almost impossible to resist. When it is felt that there is little capacity for love within, the need to acquire this attractive quality of personality may be projected on to the body or on to dress. The hard and over-assertive woman may dye her hair blonde, or spend an enormous amount of time on make-up or on her clothes, so as to possess in her appearance that attractiveness she senses is lacking in her character.

This compensatory retaliation from the unconscious for the repressions that drive necessary psychic factors out of our conscious self so often fails to solve the problem because it is blind and not consciously understood. Only by bringing the real problem into consciousness can the personality be set securely on the path to integration and mature development. A fine description of the integrated personality is given by Dr. H. V. Dicks in a privately circulated report of a U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference on 'Education for International Understanding'. He writes:

'The socially mature personality is one who has been allowed to develop his natural tendencies harmoniously in an atmosphere of security. His inner control over his emotions is effortless; he has them at his full disposal for the tasks of real life. He has a clear and spontaneous capacity to assert his own values without fear and anxious consideration, and he is therefore not troubled by inner tensions resulting from secret needs for power and vengeance. This frees his aggressivity from the venom of hostility, self-contradiction, and feelings of guilt, and imparts a quality of peaceful strength and purposefulness to the character, as strength is balanced by an equally mature capacity for love and tenderness in his relation with other human beings.'

As one ponders these words, one feels how far most of us are from the goal of an integrated personality. There is no cheap and easy way to it. The way lies through much psychic suffering, the resolute and honest facing of ourselves, and calls for the moral courage to refuse to evade one's own problems by projecting them and blaming other people. It is a way of the cross, but it leads to the resurrection of the personality from the grave of fear to the fulfilment of love.

Is it any matter for surprise, then, that Jung correlates psychic integration with religious peace? We ourselves do not identify these two concepts either in scope or meaning. We would rather say that *psychic integration is the subjective aspect, from the point of view of mental functioning and character-structure, of religious experience*. Religion is more than integration for exactly the same reason that marriage is more than integration. Religion and marriage are objective personal relationships, and the New Testament uses marriage as a symbol of the religious relationship, as where the Church is described as the bride of Christ. Jung's theory of integration or individuation is of profound significance for the psychology of religion, but it does raise two difficulties. Jung either does not see, or does not deal with, the question of personal relationship as the medium in which ultimately integration is achieved. This is of fundamental importance as we realise when we consider all that is involved in Macmurray's treatment of 'mutuality' as of the essence of personality. One gets the impression that Jung regards integration as an esoteric and wholly internal process, in achieving which we end up inside our own psyche. A condition of psychic self-sufficiency would surely be a state of spiritual isolation which contradicts the very nature of the personal life. He also seems to treat integration as a process largely confined to the second half of life, whereas we see integration as the dominating need from the very earliest moment that conflict arises, and as the inner meaning of psychological growth through every phase of our life-course.

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Integration within ourselves and personal relationship with other people proceed *pari passu*, as we shall see in the next chapter, and result in the capacity to love, a strong unselfishness in which one's own personality is not evacuated, but fulfilled. It is the fusion of self-assertion and affection, making possible the satisfaction of the two basic needs of personality—personal significance and personal relationship. One cannot love without someone to love, and marital harmony and religious peace and communion are the two supreme instances of this fulfilment. They are more than integration, yet cannot be fully achieved without integration, which is simply the description of the inner condition of the personality of a person who is capable of true marriage and of a religious experience of God.

Yet this does not invalidate Jung's description and analysis of the integration process, which is something that present-day psychotherapy has not yet properly assimilated. Its bearing on religion must be given in Jung's own words: 'Religion is the fruit and the culmination of the completeness of life, that is, of a life which contains both sides'. That is Jung's comment on a dream of a highly intellectual patient who had broken down with a neurosis. He continues:

'A careful comparison with other dreams of the same series shows unmistakably what the "other side" is. The patient always tried to avoid his emotional needs. As a matter of fact he was afraid that they might get him into trouble, into marriage, and into other responsibilities such as love, devotion, loyalty, confidence, emotional dependence, and general submission to the soul's needs. All this had nothing to do with science or an academic career; and, moreover, the word "soul" was nothing but an intellectual obscenity, not to be touched with a barge pole. . . . The voice (in the dream) on the other hand . . . is unconventional to a shocking degree: it takes religion seriously, puts it upon the very apex of life, of a life con-

taining "either side", and thus upsets the most cherished intellectual and rationalistic prejudices."¹

He is careful to point out that:

'We do not establish a metaphysical truth through such formulations. It is merely a statement that the mind functions in such a way . . . there is no question of belief, but of experience. Religious experience is absolute. It is indisputable. You can only say that you have never had such an experience, and your opponent will say: "Sorry, I have". And there your discussion will come to an end. No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a source of life, meaning, and beauty, and that has given a new splendour to the world and to mankind. He has *pistis*² and peace. . . . Nobody can know what the ultimate things are. We must, therefore, take them as we experience them. And if such experience helps to make your life healthier, more beautiful, more complete, and more satisfactory to yourself and to those you love, you may safely say: "This was the grace of God".'³

We should miss the truth of this if we dismissed it, for example, as an instance of the inadequate philosophy of pragmatism. It is a psychological description of a state of mind that is an aspect of religious experience. The psychologist is not called on to deal with the philosophical implications. What Jung is saying is that religious experience, experience of what he would call 'the God within', is the experience, reached through great struggle and suffering, of psychic wholeness and integration, the uniting of both sides of the psychic life. It is an experience of great power and impressiveness which means everything to those who

¹ C. Jung, *Religion and Psychology*, pp. 50 f.

² 'Pistis', Greek for 'faith'.

³ Op. cit., pp. 112 ff.

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have it. It is fullness of life, it is what man has blindly sought in all religions, and in love, literature, art, and even science; it is the 'peace that passeth all understanding'. It does itself raise all the ultimate philosophical and theological questions which go beyond psychology as a description of subjective experience. We cannot evade the fact that the achievement of psychic wholeness, true selfhood, and inner peace, is a part of what man does mean by religious experience of God. The rest takes us beyond the inwardness of an integrated experience into the field of personal relationship and of life objectively lived.

It is a remarkable fact that dream symbolisation of the integration process, even with patients who have had no religious connection for years, regularly makes use of religious symbols, the church, the altar, communion, and marriage at the altar. We give one outstanding example of this, the dream of a man approaching forty. 'I had an invitation to a Roman Catholic Church Service. Walking into the church I knew I had to bow at one stage and followed people in so that I could see when to bow. A priest asked me for my ticket and my name. I said "B". He said "Alfred B?". I said "Yes", and was surprised that he knew it. He led me to my seat. I realised that I was being shown to one of the most prominent seats. It dawned on me suddenly that the whole service was for my benefit. At some point in it I would be asked if I was prepared to marry a girl, and at my place was a letter from the girl to me beginning "My Dear Lover". The service was a magnificent service with colour, pomp, and ceremony. I had to decide if I would marry her; I wasn't wholehearted about it, but was inclined to it. I was alone, knowing no one in the church except the girl whom I could not see. The other people were all Roman Catholics and knew one another and me, but I was an outsider. If I married her I would be accepted into the society.'

The dreamer's comment was that this was a very vivid

and profoundly impressive dream, with a lot of feeling in it, and quite unlike many dreams that had seemed vague and far away. He felt that it was an encouraging dream, moving in the right direction. He was not, and had never been a Roman Catholic, and had broken away from all church connections since the age of twenty-one. The interpretation involves a double relating of the dream both to external social life and to internal psychic life. This man wanted to marry, but could not convincingly love; before he could achieve a marriage with a woman he must achieve a psychic marriage or integration with the internal woman, the Jungian Anima, the feminine emotional side of his psyche which had long been repressed. Because of this repression of emotion he felt alone, an outsider in human society, with no communion or emotional rapport with others, but he would possess that if he accepted and married, or integrated with, his repressed self. There is still some resistance to that, he is not wholehearted, but he is inclined to it, is moving in the right direction. The priest is the symbol of that unspoiled innermost core of the personality that is outside the tensions and conflicts of the disintegrated character-structure, and it presides over and directs the steady development towards wholeness. On entering the church the dreamer, who here represents the Ego, sees that he must bow, that is, he must yield up some of the defensive rigidity of his conscious attitude to life. This type of dream seems to turn up at just the decisive points in analysis, when a real step forward is being made. The human psyche of its own spontaneous accord relates the process of integration to religious symbolism.

It is certain that religious doctrine and rituals, quite apart from their objective and theological import, have a subjective significance by which they symbolise the inner processes of our psychological, moral, and spiritual development. The doctrine of the Trinity is surely the greatest symbolic representation we possess of that union of power and love

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which is not only the core of the integration-need in the individual, but for the Christian the ultimate truth of existence. God the Father, almighty, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, is power and reason, the eternal masculine element; God the Son is redeeming, self-sacrificing love giving itself freely for men, the eternal feminine element; out of the union of Father and Son who, as the traditional doctrine has it, are of one substance, proceeds God the Holy Spirit, creative energy. In the individual human being, as integration proceeds so energy is revived, nervous fatigues disappear, a new interest in life springs up, and the patient feels that he is living, perhaps for the first time in his existence. Much work remains to be done in correlating what can be learned about the psychic life of man from the investigations of the psychotherapist, and what man has always revealed of the deep dynamic strivings and yearnings of soul in his religious life.

It remains to say something about education and how it can help and not hinder in the development of psychic health and spiritual maturity. What should be the true aim of education, and particularly of the moral and religious education of the child? The problem is that of achieving a state of mind in which natural impulses both of assertion and affection shall be adequately controlled and directed to realistic ends in human life. The middle course has to be steered between the Scylla of over-control which is aggravatingly suppressive, and the Charybdis of under-control and anti-social behaviour. The difficulty is illustrated by that tendency to a swing between opposites in successive historical periods, from Puritan over-control to Restoration licence, and from Restoration vulgarity to the age of 'the perfect lady' of the eighteenth century. Two things are necessary to constructively good living: (1) a capacity to make sound ethical judgments, and (2) to have one's feelings and impulses back those judgments and not oppose them.

Thus there is a twofold educational task; first, the devel-

opment of conscious understanding and knowledge of moral and spiritual values, a true appreciation of the qualities of character and types of behaviour necessary for maintaining good personal relationships; secondly, the education of the emotional life so that we like and desire what our judgment pronounces to be good. We may say roughly that the first task is intellectual and the second emotional education. The tendency in the past was, if not to ignore emotional education, to assume that if intellectual education was adequate the emotions would follow on automatically. 'We needs must love the highest when we see it.' The trouble is that if we are in a state of emotional conflict we both love the highest and at the same time fear and resist it, and our pursuit of it becomes ineffective. It must be confessed that we find intellectual education much easier. It makes far smaller demands on the educator.

This matter has been so well put by Dr. Crichton-Miller that we quote him at length:

'We are seeking a method whereby the individual may achieve a valuation of truth as the fruit of experience in earlier years and as far as possible independent of hope and fear. I suggest that symbolism and inspiration are the two keys required. First symbolism; the child has necessarily to reach an adult attitude through symbolism, objectification, personification, and dramatisation. Otherwise he has to build up values in adult years on a purely rational basis. This latter process is so precarious that it should be forestalled. In other words the child must first be inspired with the love of truth. The coercion of a Loyola is to be avoided because it introduces rewards and penalties that we have already seen to be psychologically undesirable. The symbolism of Greek mythology is often suitable for children. The parables of Jesus are essentially valuable as objectifying ethical values. And many fairy tales convey moral truth in a form that the child can assimilate.'

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We interrupt the quotation here to observe that wise selection is necessary. Often Greek mythology is not suitable for the moral education of children, and the same must be said of many Old Testament stories. But the Christian Church has an unrivalled store of educational material in the Bible and the lives of great Christians. The writer thinks now with gratitude of the lives of great missionaries he read as a boy, and likewise of stories of heroes of science and secular history. To proceed:

‘But best of all methods is personification—hero worship in some form or other. It may be a parent or parent-substitute, such as a teacher or youth leader. It may be based on the father-complex, though it need not be so. (Note: surely also on the mother-complex.) What matters is the essential inspiration of an adult who, with or without the aid of symbol and drama, infects the child or adolescent with love of integrity and valuation of sincerity. The need is for a hero or heroine capable of generating an identification that involves imitation of behaviour, and thereby paves the way for personal valuation of ethical standards. It is strange that Freud . . . should have made so little of the educative possibilities of rapport between the hero adult and the child worshipper. In this relationship, which is becoming all too rare, the child not only imitates the adult and accepts his ethical values, but also seeks identification in the nature of the hero’s fantasies, beliefs, and subjective expectations. But this process of infection demands more than most adults are able or willing to give. It is much easier to enjoin and to indoctrinate; it is always easier to teach than to inspire; it is much simpler to generate fear and hope based on dogma than to infect the young with a love of integrity.’¹

The child’s imitation and absorption of, and identification

¹ ‘The Value of an Illusion’ in *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1947.

with, the character and personality-pattern of parents and influential adults in his formative years, is the basis of his emotional attachment to moral and spiritual values. That works both ways, for evil and good. The introjection of a bad parent, creating what is now spoken of as 'an internal bad object' by Neo-Freudians, is another of those facts that helped to create the idea that human nature is bad in itself. It is only now beginning to be seen how much more than was realised is environmentally imposed rather than biologically transmitted. This is unavoidable and it is because of this that we must recognise that personal relationship is the true instrument of moral education. The old saying that religion is caught, not taught, is an admission of this; and it is equally true that irreligion and anti-social attitudes are caught.

Moral convictions intellectually acquired later in life have not the same deep roots in emotional loyalty, while the influence of a sound parental example in childhood has many a time held a growing child fundamentally true to right values through years of uncertainty. The Church should make more careful and explicit use of the full personality-portrait of Jesus in the teaching of children. The Man of Nazareth makes an indelible mark on the child's imagination long before it can even begin to understand what the theologian means by the divinity of Christ. Scientific historians of the New Testament may tell us that no biography of Jesus can be written, and that the 'Lives of Christ' that were so popular at one time were imaginative constructions of liberal theologians who read into the New Testament what they wanted to find there. But that is beside the point. There does emerge from the Gospels the impression of a unique personality, and this is our most powerful educational instrument in training the young mind to religion. If the scholar cannot catch that impression himself and give us a picture of Jesus that is historically, psychologically, morally, and spiritually true, then his work is sterile at that point for

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practical purposes.¹ The basis of Christian education must then be found in the inspiration of the child by the values inherent in the character of the adults responsible for it, and imaginative identification with the figure of Jesus, not presented in some one-sided 'gentle Jesus, meek and mild' way, but in full-blooded life.

Later on, and into adulthood, the values of the moral and religious life to which emotional attachment has been secured, must be intellectually elaborated, explained, criticised, and subjected to frank scrutiny so as to foster independence and honesty of thought; and presented as rationally credible, and integrated into a philosophy of life, or religiously into a theology. The intellectual justification of our basic moral and religious loyalties is necessary, partly because man is a rational and thinking creature, but still more because our values must be refined and purified by a genuinely growing insight and understanding. We would say then that the goal of education, and especially of moral and religious education, is first of all mental health, and second, emotional attachment to the right values. It is not indoctrination into some intellectual form of belief, a creed. Creeds have their rightful place at a later stage when the intellectual understanding is awakened and is being trained to rational thinking, and they should be recognised as the attempt of human reason to grasp and state the truth that is implicit in the Christian life and experience.

Christian preaching and teaching can help tremendously to build up healthy and integrated personalities, in a variety of ways. (1) There is need to teach a combination of moral courage and Christian humility (not self-humiliation) that will prepare us to be willing to face our own personality problems instead of repressing them and projecting them, and so blaming others instead of correcting ourselves. We must learn to pull the beam out of our own eye before we try to take the mote out of our neighbour's eye. (2) Moral

¹ Cp. C. J. Cadoux, *The Life of Jesus* (Pelican Books).

and spiritual ideals should be taught as goals to be grown towards gradually, with sympathetic tolerance of each other's failures on the way instead of harsh condemnation. 'Judge not, that ye be not judged', said Jesus. They should not be taught as a Law to be immediately and perfectly obeyed, a demand to be met here and now without any regard for our capacity to meet it. The wind must be tempered to the shorn lamb. There is a danger of denunciatory and obsessional idealism in the pulpit which makes intolerant demands for a perfection that is beyond the reach of human nature. (3) Teaching and preaching should be positive, not negative. Men's sins, faults, and follies, if they are dealt with, must be approached in an explanatory and sympathetic way, so that the burdened hearer may feel: 'I could tell that man about my difficulty; I feel he would understand and help me'. So often people's faults are more anxiety-reactions than wilful and open-eyed sins. There is need for a thorough re-thinking of the practical application of the concept of sin in the light of our now deeper understanding of human nature. (4) There must be an adjustment of moral and spiritual demand to varying personal capacity. Jung believes that there are materialistic natures which are incapable of rising to great heights of spiritual experience and cannot develop the essentially religious attitude to life. Certainly innate capacity varies in every other direction, spiritual capacity is not the same in everyone, and some natures are inherently more gross than others. A sound characteristic that comes easily to one man may represent a great moral development for another. (5) Finally, a distinction must be made between the childish and the mature adult conscience, a subject to which a separate chapter must be devoted. Before we turn to that question the all-important problems of personal relationships must be studied.

Personal Relationship

1. *Character and Personal Relationship*

It has been indicated that integration and personal relationships must be considered together as twin aspects of the one whole of living. *Development towards maturity of character and an integrated personality is the subjective aspect, and personal relationship is the objective aspect of the fulfilment of human nature in the personal life. They are sought and found concurrently.* Our two basic emotional reactions to our environment, self-assertion and affection, are fused in the process of integration, to produce that combination of strength and sympathetic tenderness for which love is the true name. Love is more than tender feeling. It is strong, capable of service and sacrifice for those for whom we feel affection. In general human intercourse it is expressed as firm friendliness. In more intimate relationships it shows as determination, persistence, purposefulness over long periods of time in considerate care for those who are the objects of our affections. In the life of the community it reveals itself as a capacity for genuine public spirit and disinterested endeavour for the welfare of the whole. This going out of oneself and giving of oneself to others is only possible in so far as we are not distracted and forced back upon the service of self by internal fears, conflicts, and a sense of insecurity or instability in the personality itself. If we are secure and stable within, we have a high degree of resistance to environmental insecurity in adult life.

We cannot, however, develop the capacity to love in a social vacuum. To love, one must have someone to love. Macmurray points out that it is in the mutuality of a personal

relationship that we discover and realise our own personality. The fact that personality is essentially objective and mutual means that there can be no full integration in isolation. The opposite is also true; without some measure of integration, personal relationship lies beyond our power in any effective sense. Many a sufferer from neurosis fails to recognise that his lack of friends is due not to environmental necessity, but to his own lack of capacity to enter into and sustain real friendships. He mistakes his desire for friends for a capacity for friendship. The growth, and equally the frustration, of the self takes place in our human relationships with other selves, beginning with that most fundamental of all personal relationships—that of parent and child.

Human relationship has thus a double meaning. It is both an end in itself and a means for the education and development of personality. As we grow more and more mature our personal relationships become less and less means and more and more ends in themselves. This is a way of saying that human relationships develop from the organismal to the personal level whenever they are the media in which the persons related undergo a progressive maturing of character. Marriage is the great example of this. It often begins as an organismal relationship between two incompletely developed persons. They are, in a sense, at first joint functions in the whole of the marriage partnership. Each supplies what the other lacks, each is drawn to the other because of that fact, and each feels incomplete without the other; a dangerous condition of mutual dependency unless it is the starting point of growth. But mutual influence and stimulation may promote such growth, through years of shared experience, that in time true mutuality takes the place of mutual dependence. We shall consider this matter further presently.

There is another way of expressing the interdependence of integrated character and personal relationship. *Our personal relationships as a whole form an external manifestation of our character-structure.* Different people draw different

responses out of us, and different types of people attract us according to the needs that are part of our particular character. On the other hand, in the symbolism of our dreams our character-structure is presented to us, or illustrated, by bringing together a group of people to whom we are, or have been, personally related, and the group as a whole gives a picture of the complex state of the dreamer's personality. Significant people are used as symbols of the various character-traits that we either openly show, or repress, or even need to develop. *Our personal relationships are internalised in our character which appears as their subjective aspect.* A simple illustration of this may be given. A woman in whom frank, open, and healthy self-expression and normal assertion was prohibited by mother in early childhood developed a habit of external conformity with other people's expectations of her while remaining inwardly unreconciled, stubborn, and resistant. At one period in childhood this appeared in the form of sulking, a type of resistance against mother which was not open and straightforward, but smothered. This gave way to her being outwardly a good, obedient girl who became unconscious of the strength of her inward obstinacy. The weakened, compliant conscious self was quite dependent on mother, and later husband, until later still in widowhood she was forced to revive independent self-assertion on her own account. But her assertiveness only existed in the form of a repressed stubborn obstinacy and could only be revived in that form, so that she painfully oscillated between a compulsion to seek other people's advice in everything she undertook and the opposite compulsion to rush off and do things without seeking any advice at all. The practical result was often that in unimportant matters she could not make up her mind without discussing them and getting other folk to tell her what to do, while in important matters where she needed to consult more knowledgeable people she would say nothing to anyone and take ignorant action on her own. Under analysis she became aware of a

deep-seated feeling that it was naughty to have a mind of her own, which held her back from normal mental decisiveness. A more healthily spontaneous kind of self-assertion began to grow, though for a long time obstructed by the old self. At this point she dreamed that a certain aunt A came to see her and wanted to talk to her privately, but another aunt B seemed to be about and they could not get any privacy. Aunt A was a very determined woman who quite definitely had a mind of her own, and she symbolised the new development. Aunt B was an outwardly nervous and bewildered person who could be stubborn and obstinate, and she was the perfect representative of the old self that was still getting in the way. Thus our personal relationships are both external and internal. *We reveal our character in our attractions and repulsions to different types of people, and they in turn appear in our dreams as symbols of aspects of our inner life.*

This fact has serious repercussions on our ability to sustain proper relationships with other people. We shall become too compulsively dependent on someone who stands for a characteristic that we need but have not developed in ourselves. On the other hand, since it is probable that that characteristic is repressed by us as something not permitted or tolerated in ourselves, we shall feel not only an attraction but also a repulsion for that other person. We shall be ambivalent towards him or her, at one time possessively monopolising him or her, and at another becoming critical or quarrelsome and producing attitudes of rejection. It is because we fail to recognise the subjective implications of our objective relationships to other people that we often have much less success than we desire in friendship or marriage, and so little power to set matters right when they go wrong. When one tries to get two people who have quarrelled to make it up it is usual to find each strenuously maintaining that it is all the other person's fault, and not at all recognising the extent to which they each project their own faults on to the other.

2. Marriage

When we are pushed into personal relationships by our subjective needs and have no psychological insight about what we are really seeking, it is a blind and often disastrous attempt to solve our personality problems without changing anything in ourselves. An over-dependent girl brought up in submission to a dominant mother, who has always made all her decisions for her, may find that she can only get away from mother by marrying a very masculine, assertive, or dependable type of man. Both mother and husband are allowed to substitute for the development of self-reliance and independence of mind in herself. But the man is very likely to have been attracted to that particular girl for the opposite reasons. He inwardly senses his own aggressive hardness of attitude and needs the counteracting influence of someone whom he feels to be a specially affectionate, feminine type of woman. For a while she is a lovingly compliant wife and he is an affectionately dominating husband, but the position is dangerous and unstable. Sooner or later she may begin to grow restive and irritated as he plunges more onesidedly into aggressive and purely masculine pursuits, business ambition, sport, club life, and grows neglectful of wife and home and impatient and short-tempered about her demands for attention and affection. She may hit back at him by developing some nervous illness, thus showing that she can only exert power through weakness. On the other hand, he has always repressed affection in himself and over-masculinised his personality because he fears to appear weak, sentimental, unmanly. He secretly despises those very things that he sought in his wife, even though he needs them to balance his own character. That is why, after marrying her, he begins to pull away from her and neglect her. The more weak she appears the more he is driven to reject her because she represents the very thing he fears.

This marital situation can, of course, be reversed. The dominating woman does not dare to marry a man of forceful

personality. He would threaten her craving for superiority and need to domineer. Because she is losing her true womanhood in what Adler called the 'masculine protest against life' she must call to her aid a husband of gentle and sympathetic nature. He must supply what she lacks while she 'wears the trousers' and organises him and the children and everything and everyone she can get a hold over. Such women are often forces to be reckoned with in the life of a church or club or some other type of organisation, and may be full of 'good works' in their own narcissistic way, though everyone likes the husband much better than the wife. But tragedy awaits them if he does not happen to be a strong enough person to stand reasonably firmly rooted in himself. The wife may drive him more and more into his shell; he may become passive and ineffective, or else in a desperate attempt to save himself grow irritable and bad tempered. There will be stormy scenes, and he will grow to hate his wife and she will despise him because he presents a picture of that weakness she has always feared she might show in herself. If the husband who has always had to supply the love in the marriage should die, the widow is left only 'half a person', and an aggressive, unloving half at that, and she may from then on steadily degenerate in character, becoming a prey to critical, discontented, antagonistic moods, lapsing finally into hostile self-pity and grumbling, and a hypochondriacal old age.

The possibilities of such initially 'complementary matches' are almost infinite. The man who is 'brainy' cannot stand intellectual women because he needs someone to bring some feeling into his arid life. He may marry an affectionate and emotionally uninhibited woman who may, in fact, have a very good intelligence, but he is not aware of his secret desire to have the monopoly of brains and leave her to contribute the emotion that he needs yet inwardly fears and despises. He will depreciate her opinions, frustrate her self-expression, humiliate her in front of friends if she differs

from him on any point of view, and gradually break up all possibility of understanding between them. A quite different problem is presented by an over-refined girl who has been brought up to give way at all points to a vivid and somewhat flamboyant sister who was everybody's favourite. She withdrew into artistic and intellectual interests where she could feel an unobtrusive superiority, but lacked force of character. This girl with somewhat pale personality but latent powers becomes infatuated with a man in whom she sees only masculine strength, but in whom her parents and all her friends see only coarseness of nature. She will hear nothing against him and take no advice, and rushes into marriage only to become disappointed and disillusioned. Such tragedies are not to be met with blame and criticism; they arise out of deep-seated needs for personality development which, because they are not understood, can only express themselves and seek satisfaction in the dangerous form of blind compulsions. Situations of this kind can only be prevented if someone is at hand to give insight in time and in such a tactful way that it can be accepted and used.

It must not be thought, however, that 'complementary matches' are bound to end in friction and disaster. That will only happen when the two people concerned each leave the other to supply what is lacking in themselves, and, having no insight into the nature of their relationship, fail to use it for mutual stimulation towards maturity. The important fact is that *personal relationships are the true media in which we grow*. They can and should be used with insight as a conscious means of personality development, and that can be done if both are aware of what they are seeking in the other, and also aware of the need to develop that same quality or capacity in themselves. That is, in fact, very often done, not as a result of any special psychological knowledge, but simply as a result of the common sense, perception, and insight of two people who are at least sufficiently developed to be able to give and accept genuine mutual

stimulation and affection. A rather retiring woman may say: 'My husband has brought me out; I used to be too retiring, but he has got me used to mixing with people'. A sympathetic wife who is not lacking in strength of character may mellow her somewhat too overbearing husband if he cares for her deeply enough not to be afraid to be influenced by her.

There is, perhaps, no clearer way of expressing the interdependence of character-growth and of our relationships with one another than this of recognising that *personal relationships are the external manifestation of character; while in dreams, character is repeatedly presented as a picture of internalised personal relationships*. It enables us to bring together such facts as over-dependency, jealousy, and under-valuation of the self. One has a compulsive need for someone of the opposite sex (what Karen Horney calls a 'neurotic need for a partner') only if one is incomplete in oneself. Then one cannot allow the partner any freedom, cannot bear him or her to be out of sight, or away, or interested in something one is not interested in oneself. In extreme cases this may take the form of a neurotic anxiety that renders one unable to be left alone, a terrible fear accompanied by palpitation, trembling, and feeling 'all worked up inside' at the thought of either staying in or going out by oneself. In milder cases such dependency and possessiveness is rationalised as depth of affection, and it is thought that one person loves the other so much that he or she has no pleasure in anything that is not one hundred per cent shared by the partner. In yet other cases it shows as a too marked and narrow preference for the company of people who share one's own views, agree with one, have exactly the same interests and habits; along with feelings of anxiety, uneasiness, dislike for the stimulating company of people of different opinions and ways. When it is said that 'birds of a feather flock together', that can express not only a natural pleasure in the company of likeminded people, but an inability to stand alone unsupported.

Jealousy has roots in the feeling of incompleteness in oneself and the dread of losing someone who is necessary for the completion and balancing of one's own personality; whether that jealousy arises in friendships or in marriage. The problem is not essentially any different when it appears as jealousy of other people being praised, or preferred for some privilege of employment. We become jealous when we have not that requisite degree of surely founded inner strength that flows from a mature and integrated personality, so that we fear the loss of those external supports, either material or personal, which are our substitute for strength in ourselves. Social snobbery reveals the same problem. There are people whose peace of mind and poise of personality is for ever ruined by a need to feel superior to other people in some respect. They must have a better house, or car, or be better dressed, or send their children to a more expensive school; they must have successes or influential position to boast of. They are not really interested in what other people talk about and grow restless and inattentive in any conversation of which they are not themselves the subject or the leader. They must talk about themselves, and rarely see that they bore their listeners. They are victims of Karen Horney's 'neurotic competitiveness' because their own natural self-assertion is not securely possessed and integrated in their character. On the other hand, where it is the affectionate side that is repressed, life may become over sexualised, and it is impossible to treat anyone of the opposite sex in a simple straightforward way as a person; physical desires and feelings will keep intruding as an expression of a deep-felt need which generates a compulsive reaching out for what it is felt the opposite sex can supply.

All this is quite different from a normal good relationship with someone of the opposite sex, whether in marriage or friendship. *The truly personal relationship is primarily objective. It is based on the valuation of the other person for his or her own sake, and on a desire to appreciate and give, rather*

than to possess and get. Few, perhaps none, of us are so mature that our personal friendships and marriage are on that high level of objectivity. That is the goal towards which we advance as we grow more integrated and mature through the years. Certainly none of us is, or would want to be, entirely self-sufficient, which would deny the very essence of the 'person' which is to seek a shared life with other persons. The opposite of morbid dependency is not psychic isolationism, which is itself a neurotic defence against the personal contacts one fears to make because they would arouse conflicts of emotion that seem intolerable. Interdependence and mutual stimulation of persons is the normal. We seek wide human contacts and intimate friendships because without them we are ourselves not drawn out into the full development of all our potentialities.

There is a dependence on one another that is quite fundamental to human living. The problem raised is whether that mutual dependence is to be healthy and stimulating, or morbid and neurotic; whether we shall make it a substitute for personal development, or a means of personal development. It is a sign of strength that one should not be afraid of normal and healthy dependence, especially of the kind involved in marriage, which is the supreme case of personal relationship. Dr. Alan Maberly writes of

' . . . the problem of marriage which arises from the inherent incompatibility of man's conscious and unconscious aims in connection with it. Unconsciously he is attracted in conformity with a widespread physical and biological law towards his opposite type, not only in sexuality, but with every kind of physical and mental characteristic. Of this attraction (polar attraction) neither he nor his friends are immediately aware. It is the force behind infatuation, falling in love at first sight, and that instant inexplicable attraction that any two people may feel for one another at their first meeting, and for which

the victims find reasons readily, unshared by friends and relatives, who "cannot understand what they see in each other". Consciously, man is attracted by his like, by those who think as he does, with whom he feels at sympathy and at one. This sympathy may be intellectual, emotional, or practical, a common interest on whatever level it may occur. It leads to friendship and the desire for mutual companionship. Which of these attractions forms the best basis for marriage?¹

Dr. Maberly points out that like partners are both weak at the same point just as they are both strong at the same point. Thus they are not able to perform for each other the service that unlike partners are capable of, namely of each being strong where the other is weak. It is, perhaps, not possible to say dogmatically which of the two types of attraction is best. It is a question of the personality-needs of the people concerned. That an 'incompatibility of man's conscious and unconscious aims' exists, probably, in most or even all of us, is true. It is, however, a question as to whether it is really an 'inherent incompatibility'. That seems to deny the possibility of integration. It seems nearer to the truth to say that our conscious and unconscious aims are incompatible in so far as we have not yet achieved true wholeness of personality, but that they become increasingly compatible as internal conflicts, repressions, contradictions of character-trait, and immaturities are eliminated. Since no one can ever possess in full development *all* the possibilities open to human nature, it must always remain true that, even when we have reached the greatest possible maturity within the limitations of our individual constitutions, we still need one another in a healthy mutual interdependence to achieve the full richness of available experience in life.

Thus, two unlike partners may prove to be a much greater challenge to each other, and therefore a much greater stimu-

¹ *Commonsense and Psychology*, p. 58.

lus to personality-growth, than two like mates. It may argue some want of courage and adventure if we can only accompany with those who are almost exact replicas of ourselves. The fundamental complementariness of the opposite sexes must always remain to attract us to the 'unlike' rather than the 'like'. On the other hand, there must be points of similarity as well as difference, or two people will not be able to get any initial sympathetic understanding of each other. When two people who are mutually attracted are too one-sidedly unlike each other it reveals a dangerous degree of incompleteness in both of them. To make an ultimate success of such a relationship they will then need to have their eyes very wide open to the inner meaning of the attraction they feel, and consciously use their partnership as a medium for development towards greater wholeness each in himself or herself. *The more maturely integrated two people are the more they will be capable of feeling a dynamic attraction for each other on the basis of a high degree of similarity that also includes significant and stimulating differences.* Their respective personalities will then flower to their full potential.

The fact of basic importance is that when human relationships are not used as a medium for, and stimulus to, character development, they are being used as a blind search for wholeness and integration which is at the same time an unconscious escape from its real challenge. We merely allow others to function as substitutes for what we ought to develop in ourselves. In that case our relationship to others is immature, a survival of our dependence on mother in childhood. It is nowhere of greater importance to recognise that than in the sphere of the sex life, but if we are to understand this we must first deal with those mechanisms of symbolisation and projection by means of which the quest for integration is so largely carried on, not only in sexual matters, but throughout the whole field of neurotic symptom formation.

3. *Projection and Symbolisation*

We should not make a fetish of a technical term like 'projection'. There is nothing sacred and untouchable about it. It is simply a useful way of referring to certain facts about the way our minds work which call for close scrutiny and understanding. In the first place our experience of the way our own minds work is the basis of our interpretation of how other minds work. That is inevitable and the necessary starting point. It is as if our own ideas and feelings, our state of mind in general, formed coloured spectacles through which we view the world. If we look out through grey-tinted sun-glasses all the world looks grey and dull. So if we survey our human environment through an anxious mind everyone is liable to seem menacing and a possible source of danger to us. If we are hostile we easily assume that other people are unfriendly to us. If we are jealous we find it easy to think that other people will grudge us anything we get. The recognition of this fact may of itself serve to release a mind from much unnecessary fear. One young woman in the twenties, after a discussion of this question, came a week later to say: 'I've had a good week. I've realised that other people are not unfriendly to me as I always thought they were, and I've been able to feel much more friendly to them'. She had seen that her fears led her to misinterpret other people's attitudes to her. She felt endangered, and therefore resentful, and assumed uncritically that everyone was against her. There was a vicious circle of misunderstanding of others because of her fears and projection of her own hostile attitudes on to them.

If we fail to learn true objectivity in our judgments of people our own state of mind may remain too exclusively the basis of our beliefs about them. Normally, as we grow up we gradually learn to recognise that there are ways in which others differ from us as well as ways in which they are like us. We come to see them as they are. If, however, we are in emotional difficulties within ourselves and seeking some

way of escape from problems that we do not know how to solve, we may fall unawares into the trap of using our relationships with other people for that escapist purpose. We can ignore most of the differences and similarities between us and others and concentrate attention on some one particular difference or similarity that concerns us. We have some fault or bad quality against which we feel critical and intolerant and are quick to see it in someone else. All the big guns of our intolerant antagonism to that characteristic are opened up on the other person. We are not likely to be patient with a quality in them which causes us so much trouble in ourselves. That does not necessarily amount to projection. We can remain perfectly aware that the fault in question is ours as well as theirs and that we attack them because we dislike their kind of reaction in ourselves also. It is true that we might remind ourselves that 'people who live in glass houses should not throw stones'. We do, in fact, seek some relief from self-criticism in attacking others, and we are always much more intolerant of a given fault in others than we are towards ourselves. We tend to find excuses for ourselves, and at least credit ourselves with the intention of mending the fault, though we are not so ready to adopt that attitude to other people. We are quite capable of being tolerant and patient and understanding with other folk's faults provided they are not also our own. It is when they confront us with what we dislike, or what we know others dislike in ourselves that we grow scathing and condemnatory.

Similarly, we may recognise that some other person has an important quality of character or ability that we lack, and we can remain quite aware of our own lack while we admire, and seek to be stimulated by, the other personality. *So long as self-awareness remains there is no true projection. It is when we make a thoroughgoing escape from ourselves into other people that projection is an appropriate description of what we are doing.* We may find it so hard to tolerate the

perception of anything unlikable in ourselves that we come to ignore it, refuse to recognise its meaning as part of our own behaviour, rationalise it and justify it as called for by other people's wrong attitudes to us. In time we may become actually blind to our own failings and able to permit ourselves to see them only in other people. We affirm in them what we deny in ourselves; then we may truly speak of projection of our faults into other people, for we are really trying to get rid of something out of our own character, not by the only realistic method of undergoing a change in ourselves, but by the unrealistic and morally cowardly method of pushing it out into someone else. It doesn't exist in us, only in them.

Full-scale projection involves lack or loss or self-awareness, and in extreme cases it is resorted to as a means of ejecting out of our system something bad that has been long repressed from early childhood. Projection may then take glaring and even startling forms by combining with symbolisation, as we shall presently see. The attribution of our own bad impulses to others develops into paranoid externalisation of all badness. We are good: the world is evil. As examples of projection of a more usual kind, we may refer to the fact that the bossy person is usually particularly critical of bossiness in others; the suspicious person repeatedly feels that other people are suspecting him of something; the oversensitive person dreads hurting other people's feelings and will constantly apologise for any awkward word lest it be taken wrongly. An interesting example of projection is the feeling that some people get that, when they go into a room full of people, everyone is staring at them. Everywhere they go they feel that all eyes are turned on them, and that is because their own inner eye is always turned on themselves. They are always watching themselves with anxiety and dissatisfaction, or else with secret admiration, and feel that everyone else must be doing the same. When we come across a person who is intolerant of any criticism levelled at himself, and indignantly repudiates any fault he may be charged

with, we are apt to say that he could do with criticising himself more than he does. But the truth is not seldom that he does, in fact, criticise himself; he has an internal critic who is always nagging at him, and giving him little peace. He feels bad, hard, aggressive, or else inferior, inadequate, inside himself, and the external critic immediately becomes his own projected inner critic on whom he can now turn with fury and get his own back.

The most striking examples of projection, however, arise out of the attempt to eject long and deeply buried mental contents of which the conscious mind has become quite unaware. We have in several places referred to the theory of 'internal bad objects'. It is held that the adults who deal with us in childhood somehow grow into our mental make-up and become parts of ourselves. This is an example of the internalisation of our personal relationships dealt with earlier in this chapter. It is most vividly illustrated from dream material. The dreams of an adult whose parents have long since both been dead, or who have played no active or important part in life for the dreamer for many years, may nevertheless be found to revolve again and again round the figures of mother and father. It is as if mother and father were still alive in the dreamer's head and treating him in the same old way as they did when he was a child. In fact, mother and father have become part of himself; their behaviour pattern, or their attitudes towards himself, became stamped on his mind in the impressionable years and have become in part his behaviour pattern, or his attitude to himself. The internalised parent is often more uncomfortable to live with than the actual parent used to be. He or she may be a constant internal nagger or critic continually arousing guilt and fear; or sometimes the internalised parent is a dynamic but very unlikable behaviour pattern that the owner struggles to repress and keep unconscious.

This problem is most simply illustrated in the case of the violent-tempered parent who, by constantly presenting to

the child the picture of uncontrolled angry outbursts, rouses the same tendencies in the child's own mind. His anger, whenever roused, flows into the psychic mould of the image of the bad-tempered parent, and that image remains in the mind as an unconscious source of aggravating tendencies. But the child feared, hated, and despised the parent's bad temper, and turns those same attitudes against the internal provoking parental image. Modern theory maintains that a process which is the opposite of projection, namely introjection, takes place. The child feels unable to cope with the bad parent who is outside its own mind, but if that parent is introjected or taken into the mind, thus becoming part of the child's own mental life, he or she can be mastered by repression. Ever afterwards the child grows up to feel that it has some bad thing inside that it wants to get rid of, and this is a fertile source of projection and externalisation.

A schoolmaster who grew up under a drunken father was always fighting father in his dreams, fighting the internal tendencies to aggression; but he would vary these dreams with others in which his class of boys would run riot and he would have the greatest difficulty in reducing them to order. In practice he was a strict disciplinarian and clearly projected on to his class, in view of his dreams, his own liability to feel impulses that might break out of control. A married woman who grew up in a home where there was much quarrelling, and where one older sister in particular had a violent temper, repeatedly dreamed of this sister and of attacking her. At the time analysis of her emotional life began she was being frightened by hallucinations of leopards, which seemed to jump across the room in front of her. They were symbolic projections of her repressed leopard-like impulses springing from her introjection of the violent-tempered sister who was constantly in her dreams, and under discussion of their meaning they disappeared in three weeks. But then a fear of cancer emerged. It appeared that she had had this fear of cancer before, but it had died out at

the time she first began to see leopards, and now had returned as the leopards vanished. She readily recognised her fear of having a cancer as another projection of her internal bad object, her repressed aggressiveness, not out into space, but from her mind into her body. She had got rid of the leopards by recognising that the bad thing was inside her, but still could admit it to be in her mind, in her personality. As the cancer fear died away, dreams of her husband showing aggressive behaviour towards her arrived, another projection, and then temper outbursts against her husband. Now at last the bad thing was seen to be an emotional reaction of her own and could be dealt with as such. This is, of course, an example of projection at the stage of an actual neurosis, but what happens in neurosis is only a more clear and striking manifestation of processes that go on, usually unrecognised, in everyday life.

This example introduces us to the role played by symbolisation in conjunction with projection, and we can see that symbolisation is, in a sense, an attempt to escape from facing the real thing in oneself that needs to be dealt with. People can be used as symbols, and then it seems immaterial whether we say that some quality we desire to be rid of is projected into another person, or that person is used as a symbol of our undesirable quality so that we may not recognise it as our own. Both concepts are needed, for when we use another person as a symbol for something in ourselves we proceed to treat that other person as we want to treat the corresponding part of our own personality. This is clear when we come to consider, not bad qualities we want to be rid of, but rather some good quality that for various reasons we have been afraid to develop in ourselves. The simplest example is that of tender and affectionate feeling, which may be repressed in childhood in self-defence against an overpowering parent, feared as a weakness that would involve us in being exploited or dominated, and then sought in someone else because our personality cannot permanently

go short of this humanising quality. The undeveloped power of love may be projected into, or sought in, some gentle-natured friend, wife or husband over whom one then feels a need to exercise power and control, and towards whom one maintains an uneasy double attitude of possession and rejection. An interesting example in literature is the friendship of Jane Austen's Emma Woodhouse, an over-masculinised girl, for the weak but lovable Harriet Smith. Emma, because she cannot yet accept married love herself, is driven to try to control and manage Harriet's chances of marriage with results equally distressing to both of them.

4. *The Psychology of Sex*

We are now in a position to understand the inner meaning of sex in the life of a 'person'. The way has been prepared for this in earlier chapters. Instinct theory interprets personality and its phases of growth by sex. A truly human and personal psychology will interpret sex by the part it plays in the personal life, and the process of integration. Sex is one function among others in the whole of the personal life and must be understood by reference to the nature and needs of personality.¹ At every stage of existence above that of 'mechanism' the whole must govern the part, not the part the whole. In a person, sex and all other bodily functions have a twofold psychological significance in addition to their biological meaning; in the first place they are the means of direct and concrete self-expression of the personal life; and secondly, the body and its functions is utilised as a symbol of the personality and its functions, needs, and aims. This is demonstrably true of the functions of eating and

¹ 'In the case of the emotionally mature adult the libido seeks the object through a number of channels, among which the genital channel plays an essential, but by no means exclusive, part. . . . It is not in virtue of the fact that the genital level has been reached that object-relationships are satisfactory. On the contrary, it is in virtue of the fact that object-relationships are satisfactory that true genital sexuality is attained' (W. R. D. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*).

excretion, which early become battle-grounds on which a struggle of wills is fought out between the child, with his growing need of self-assertion, and the unwise mother who insists on the child's doing everything at the time and in the way that suits her convenience. Thus a resistant attitude to eating or excreting, loss of appetite or constipation, is a physical symbolisation of defiant self-assertion and stubborn withholding of co-operation. Childish stealing of food, or excretion at the wrong time and place (bed-wetting, soiling clothes) are symbolic expressions of a child's need to assert himself in his own way. It is quite usual for patients under analysis to give expression, by dreams of defecation, to the feeling that they both want to let out their repressed self-assertion and also to get rid of it as something bad. One very inhibited patient in the early stages of the recovery of self-assertiveness revived for two nights the early habit of bed-wetting, dropped that, and produced a dream of standing in a drawing room full of people with nothing on but a shirt, and defecating on the floor while he looked round defiantly as if to say: 'There you are, like it or lump it'. After that he passed on to the production in daily life of more adult and normal forms of self-assertion, which enabled him to be something much more positive than the tame 'Yes-man' that he had been.

This same process of symbolisation of personality and character problems by projection on to bodily functions takes place over sexual activity. Sex is both a means of expressing a real personal love-relationship between two people who have committed themselves to a life partnership¹ and also in itself a symbol of that personal relationship. Thus it often happens that people who, because of their disunities and conflicts of character, cannot achieve real personal relationship, and are unable really to love and to

¹ 'The real significance of the "genital" stage lies in a maturity of object-relationships . . . and a genital attitude is but an element in that maturity' (W. R. D. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*).

give themselves in care and loyalty and affection to another person, are driven by internal necessity to substitute the symbolic sex action for the spiritual unity it is intended to express. Thus arise sexual compulsions which, however, never bring genuine satisfaction to those who suffer from them, and leave a trail of misery behind them maybe in other lives.

In addition to this, because the assertive and affectionate sides of personality are so easily represented as masculine and feminine, sexual attraction and union becomes the greatest of all symbols of integration. Both sexual acts and sexual fantasies can symbolise the struggle to achieve a balance of character that will make it possible to enter into genuine personal relationships. Sex and religion together provide the most important symbols of the integration process, and they come together, as we have seen, in the dream where the achievement of wholeness within the self is expressed as the marriage of the masculine and feminine at the altar. The early 'approaches' of the two sides to one another are likewise expressed in dreams as talking together, dancing together, kissing or making love to a person who represents the necessary development of the inhibited function in the psyche. We may say that, from this point of view, dreams of people that we know are internal photographs of our projections. They will give us information about what such people mean for us from the point of view of character-growth and of what our reactions to such people are likely to be.

This is equally important in childhood and in adult life. The personal relationships of the child to its parents are interpreted by the orthodox Freudian theory in terms of the child's immature sexual needs. The child having passed through the oral, anal, and phallic stages, arrives at the Oedipal stage where it feels a sexual attraction for the parent of the opposite sex, and sexual jealousy against the parent of the same sex. If this stage is not passed through successfully there are left behind repressed incest wishes and aggres-

sions to cause trouble in later life. In all this a supposed biological instinct is given precedence over personality needs. It is much more likely that since the child's real business is to develop a well-balanced character in which assertion and affection combine harmoniously, its relationships to parents are really determined by its characterological needs and its need for good personal relationships, and that these set up whatever sexual feelings it becomes aware of. The child is drawn towards a parent because of the parent's personality, and it demonstrably reacts much more to the parent's character than sex, which explains the inverted Œdipus complex.

To illustrate this we may cite a typical case of a female Œdipus dream. A woman with a friendly father and a hard, selfish, aggressive mother, naturally loved her father most, but grew, in fact, like her mother, in self-defence. To be a considerate and affectionate person with mother simply meant being put upon as father was, so one had to be hard and defiant. Affectionate qualities were feared as weakness, and she came to hate her own sex, not only because mother was the cause of her troubles, but because she identified femininity quite mistakenly with weakness. It was father who exhibited the truly feminine qualities in her home, unfortunately in a rather weak way. She grew up an angry and aggressive person, liable to temper outbursts, and wishing she were a man, because she, again mistakenly, identified masculinity with strength. At the end of a period of emotional stress she dreamed that she married her father, but could not have intercourse with him because mother was present and kept interfering. That seemed to invite the Freudian Oedipal interpretation which, however, only confused the patient and brought no improvement. The dream was re-interpreted as follows: father is the true feminine quality of friendliness and affection that is in grave danger of being crushed out of you by your aggressive moods, which are your identification with mother. You realise that

that is the side of your nature that you must go in search of, and find, and unite with, which you do under the symbol of marrying father. But a secure union with the affectionate side cannot be maintained because the old aggressiveness, of which mother is the origin and symbol, is still present and keeps interfering. That interpretation brought real relief, the first calm week for some months, and from that point onwards the hatred of her own sex began slowly to die away and her temper to moderate. It was the turning point in treatment.

It is for such reasons that we regard instinct theory as an obstruction to analytical treatment, and a personal psychology is demanded. If sex were an entity in itself, a biological drive complete with its own innate energy demanding satisfaction, it is most likely that sexual attraction would be indiscriminate for all members of the opposite sex, and psychogenic homosexuality would be a puzzle. But it is not, in fact, at all indiscriminate. All men are not in the least sexually aroused by all women, nor all women by all men. Other factors in addition to sex must operate. The factor of 'organ pleasure' is a minor matter, and arousal of desire is determined by personality needs. Men and women are attracted to and aroused by definite types of the opposite sex, and the key to the attraction is to be found in the balance of characteristics in their personalities. Character problems are worked out in human relationships, blindly and compulsively, or else with insight, through and by means of the sexual appetite. A very dominant man is not usually sexually attracted by an equally dominant woman; he is more likely to abhor her while he finds himself drawn towards a more yielding and affectionate type of woman. In one such case an over-assertive, hard-driving, and ambitious man had fantasies of subduing strong and forceful women and making them fall in love with him; he was projecting his own hardness into these symbolic women and subduing it to the need for affection. At the same time they represented his hard dominant mother with whom he was strongly identified.

Thus he was trying both to correct his own hardness and to get love from mother. These fantasies alternated with others of making love to particularly feminine types of women, expressing his need to acquire a balancing force of affection to steady his onesided and overdriven self.

A young lad, who felt under-masculine by comparison with other lads, masturbated to the accompaniment of exhibitionistic fantasies to arouse a sense of power. Then he got to know a girl whose personality was less decisive than his own, and by comparison with whom he could feel strong. Still he was not specially attracted to her until one day she wept because she thought he did not care for her. The sight of tears at once made him feel the strong male, and while this friendship lasted the masturbation died away completely; but it revived at once as soon as the friendship was broken off. Psychogenic homosexuality tells the same story. The effeminate man will feel sexually attracted to the rugged he-man, from whom he seeks to acquire symbolically the masculinity he is short of. The aggressive woman will want to make love to a softer and yielding woman. It is passive homosexuality in the man and active homosexuality in the woman that is the serious problem, because it shows a serious unbalancing of the character. The active homosexual male tends to tire of men and seeks a woman, and the passive homosexual female tends to tire of a woman lover and wants a man. This, however, is only one aspect of the problems of masturbation and homosexuality.

The more mature and balanced, and better integrated, the character, the less sexual attraction is determined by subjective needs of infantile origin, and the more it is controlled by objective appreciation of the other person in a realistic way. It is a response to that other person's valuable individuality, and it is readily adapted to rational, social, and ethical considerations. It is the servant of the affection and care that is felt towards a person with whom one sustains a life partnership. In the true sense of the word, mature sexuality is a sacrament

of communion between two whole persons, a physical expression of a spiritual unity in the absence of which it would not be sought or desired. In the immature personality, sex becomes an aggravated compulsion, a blind exploitation of one's own body and other people's in the service of ill-understood subjective needs of an unbalanced character.

One final word may be said. In any group of people, personal relationships generate what the writer once heard aptly described as a 'field of force'. A variegated pattern of tensions, attractions, and repulsions between the individuals who make up the group exists, but is for the most part unacknowledged, hidden behind politeness and conventionally friendly attitudes, and is only in small part conscious to any particular member of the group. Any new individual coming into the group may well alter the entire balance of forces with unforeseen repercussions. The only way to get control of the dangerous frictions that do so often disorganise the life and activity of groups, clubs, churches, political organisations, classes, states, and in fact the whole world of mankind today, is to gain more and more insight into the dynamics of interpersonal reactions. It is in small groups, and first and foremost in the family, where most could be done to learn the important art of living together in good human relationships. Next to the family we ought to be able to look to churches as human communities where people are prepared to face up to the responsibilities and obligations for mutual understanding through which alone a truly communal life can be achieved.

Yet great moral courage, honesty of mind, and openness or freedom from anxiously self-defensive attitudes are necessary if this is to be achieved. The very virtues needed for working out good personal and communal relationships are often themselves developed only in the process of struggling through to mutual understanding. In the past the knowledge of the internal psychodynamics of the interaction of character and human relations has not existed. Without it

the only instrument available was ethical appraisal and criticism, and moral and religious condemnation and exhortation, which, like the guilt reaction in neurosis, is not enough to solve the problem unless understanding goes with it. To-day we have at hand the knowledge required; but have we the courage to use it? It will call us first of all not to run away into blaming other people, but to determine to see clearly what is our own contribution to the life of any group of which we may form a part. We can help each other in that task if we recognise that at bottom we all share the same basic human nature, all have the same fundamental problems, all suffer from the same kind of fears and anxieties and insecurities, and all tend to defend ourselves in much the same familiar ways; therefore we can afford to be tolerant and sympathetically understanding towards one another so that together we may find out how to lay the foundations for a better life for future generations. In this, as in the art of physical healing, we shall expect God to work through that order of nature which is the expression of His creative purpose, and will see that psychological insight can and must be dedicated to the realisation of the Divine purpose for mankind.

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THE education of the conscious mind or, to speak more accurately, the ego, raises the question of conscience and allied facts such as the feeling of guilt, and the idea of punishment for wrong doing, wrong feeling, and wrong thinking. These questions are of equal importance to religious and social work, and psychotherapy. Among the most persistent features of neurosis are the tyrannous conscience, the emergence of anxiety in the form of guilt, and the need for self-punishment. The possibility of a serious overlapping of neurotic guilt and moral and religious judgment calls for investigation. All forms of religion have, historically, fostered the sense of guilt as a necessary spiritual discipline leading to repentance and forgiveness of sins. On the other hand, modern psychology looks upon the feeling of guilt with critical eyes and seeks to eliminate it in the interests of mental health. Again, we note that in the past religious thinkers have had no adequate psychology to work with and must often have encouraged neurotic guilt without recognising it, while it is equally true that some psychoanalysts of too narrow vision have failed to recognise the reality of moral and spiritual functions in human nature, and have undermined the ethical sense without seeing what they were doing.

Such a charge cannot be indiscriminately levelled against psychotherapists. Dr. Max Levy-Suhl of Amsterdam points out that Freud himself repudiated the charge. 'Even in his last lectures in 1932 he returns to the question and defends himself against the thesis that Psychoanalysis has neglected "the higher and nobler emotions in Man"'. In the *Ego and*

the Id (1923) he has even more definitely rejected the statement that his teaching ignores the higher, moral, spiritual side of human nature . . . For almost half a century we see Freud's scientific spirit engaged on the task of explaining psychoanalytically the ethical problems of guilt and the need for punishment, of remorse and the conscience, and also the religious idea of the sinner and murderer, which is unconsciously alive in all of us.¹ If it be objected that Freud does not so much explain, as explain away, these things, Levy-Suhl quotes Freud as saying: 'We have learnt that libidinal impulses are adapted to undergo pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject's cultural and ethical ideas of the individual' and 'repression proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision: from the self-respect of the ego' ('On Narcissism' in *Collected Papers*). Again, as to conscience, Levy-Suhl writes: 'According to Freud's admirable but up to then not yet analytic description in *Totem and Taboo*, the conscience is the inner perception of the rejection of certain wish-feelings existing in us. This rejection does not need to appeal to anything else "than that it is sure of itself"'. An especial psychic function, thinks Freud, continually observes the actual ego and measures it against its ego-ideal, the conscience. That man has the capacity of observing himself, of objectifying himself, made a deep impression on Freud.¹

1. *The Morbid Conscience*

There is room, then, for a sympathetic examination of the question of conscience and guilt from both the psychological and religious points of view. The psychotherapist repeatedly comes upon a kind of conscience that can only be called morbid. This is a simple statement of fact and is not unacceptable or difficult to interpret from the religious angle.

¹ Dr. Levy-Suhl, 'The Role of Ethics and Religion in Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 27, 1946.

Neurotic sufferers constantly feel guilty over trifles that are absurd from any rational point of view. A man who grew up to be afraid of both parents because of their critical and condemnatory attitudes to him in childhood, finds that after he is married he feels compelled to ask his wife's permission to take a piece of cake at tea-table. He feels guilty if he takes it without asking. Another man, brought up to believe that cinemas and theatres were 'of the devil', sinful places that a true Christian would not be seen entering, thought his way out of these narrow ideas though he still did not go to the cinema, saying to himself that he was too busy. As a married man in the twenties he went to see *The King of Kings*, a film of the life of Jesus, and going up the steps caught himself guiltily feeling: 'I hope no one sees me going in here'.

Such examples of irrational guilt reveal a conscience that needs re-education, both emotionally and intellectually. That conscience itself has to be educated is not an idea foreign to religious thought. But these examples are deceptive small signs of a deeper uneasiness over repressed, hostile, demanding, loveless, self-centred attitudes, and this opens up the problem of conscience from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. Freud's teaching is contained in his theory of mental structure, the Id, Ego, and Super-ego. He begins with the hereditary biological stuff of human nature, the source of our fundamental energies and needs, the Id or impersonal It. He pictures the mental life of an infant as the clamorous Id striving for satisfaction of its primitive physical-emotional wants. As development proceeds, consciousness emerges, awareness of an outer world and of the self in relation to it, and as 'selfhood' slowly elaborates, the 'Ego' or 'I' is created. At first it is an instrument for adapting Id-impulses to the outer environment, to ensure their proper satisfaction, but problems soon arise. The environment has its own attitudes to the child and will not always tolerate the frank expression of its desires. The important parts of this en-

vironment are first mother, second father, and then brothers, sisters, teachers, and the larger social world in general. The parents, however, are of fundamental importance. The child does not come into the world with a ready-made conscience equipped with a complete set of standards. For a long time right and wrong have no properly ethical meaning. Right is what Mummy will let you do, wrong is what Mummy gets cross about and scolds or slaps you for. In its crude beginnings conscience is a safety device to help the child to keep on the right side of mother and father. Its foundation is largely fear, but not altogether that. Love of parents plays a part. It is necessary for the child to have love-objects if its capacity to love is to grow. But fear plays a part even in the love-life of the child. He is so dependent on parental support for safety and comfort, and dependent on their drawing affection out of him to balance the necessary growth of self-assertion, that fear of loss of parental love is the worst fear that can disturb him. A child will spontaneously imitate the adult he likes, and fear to lose the regard and approval of the adult he needs, as well as fear adult retaliation and punishment of forbidden behaviour. Gradually he takes into himself the demands, ideas, standards, and values of parents and other adults who may be important to him.

These 'introjected' parental demands which reflect the practical 'do's and don'ts' that the child must take account of, are the stuff of which his early conscience is made. He has, as yet, little moral insight of his own. His conscience is not really his own conscience, but has been accepted ready-made. So there arises within the Ego what Freud aptly called a Super-ego whose main function is to compel the child to toe the parental line, to prevent the outbreak of 'naughty' impulses, the indulgence in behaviour that would bring on the child punishment and loss of parental love. Fear always plays a large part in the Super-ego since it enforces the child's subordination to standards of feeling and action that are not its own. In two ways this childish

conscience may grow into a tyrannous internal policeman keeping the child, and later the adult, in a state of constant anxiety. The more strict, narrow, condemnatory, and domineering the parent is, the more harsh will be the Super-ego which represents the repressive parent in the child's inner life. If it is not challenged and modified it will be found years later existing as an independent personality, a foreign body, an internalised parent inside the adult self destroying all peace of mind and self-confidence. Thus a woman of thirty-six, herself married and a mother, dreams that she lays the table for tea, her mother comes in, tastes some cake and says: 'You shouldn't have made it this way'. She turns on her mother and says: 'You're always finding fault, can't you say something good about me for a change?' This woman is liable to feel over almost anything she does: 'It's wrong, I shouldn't have done it that way', and then gets guilty feelings. On the other hand a child may be confronted with a gentle and loving mother who, however, reacts to any disobedience by being hurt and looking pained or reproachful, thus making the child feel 'such a cad'. Its very affection is used to enforce submission, for mother knows best and seeks only the child's good, but does not recognise that her desire to have a submissive child is disguised as love.

In either of these cases resentment is aroused in the child, and few parents realise how natural it is that the child should feel angry at mother or father on many occasions. They cannot tolerate open expression of the child's anger without retaliating with accusations of rudeness, naughtiness, and some form of punishment. Instead of being worked out and got rid of, the hostility is suppressed, controlled, ultimately repressed. The more aggressive parents will sometimes say: 'I'll knock it out of him', not realising that in fact they only knock it into him, so that later on it will come out against his own children to carry on the bad work. The child grows up with a permanent aggressive resentful attitude held in check by a severe parent-modelled Super-ego; his child

becomes the symbol of his own inner naughty, bad self, and has to be harshly dealt with. The dilemma is that the super-ego cannot be just cast out forthwith, because it is a necessary defence against infantile, dependent, greedy, aggressive impulses, yet it is itself a tyrant who inhibits free development.

If the child is of a naturally forceful and dynamic temperament he is all the more likely to clash with parents, especially from the second year of life when the self-assertive needs begin to manifest more openly. How to dispose of pent-up aggressiveness may well become a serious problem. The child cannot let it out both because he fears the consequences and loves the very parents who provoke him. To feel hostile to those we love, need, and fear to lose, is one of the most painful conflicts with which human nature has to deal. Even the wisest parents may not succeed in preventing this problem arising in the mind of a very energetic child whose inner thrust towards independence and self-assertion must be both maintained and controlled. It has to be kept alive and given scope or the child will suffer serious inhibition and his whole personality will lose vitality and forcefulness; he would then react to any attempt at positive self-expression with guilt, and suffer from serious moods of depression. *Guilt, in the last analysis, is always attached to some form of over-assertion toned with hostility*, though this may take a multitude of forms. Sometimes it appears openly as bad temper, irritability, sulking, heated argumentativeness, negativism, the compulsion to oppose; at other times it is rationalised as hard-driving ambition, the urge to control others for their own good, a passion for efficiency and organisation, criticism and denunciation of others' faults, and so on. Yet aggression must be controlled because we cannot live as members of society in good relations with other people on the basis of unbridled self-assertion, and it isolates us and deprives us of love-objects so that our own affections wither. Some children find the process of growing up to balance

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assertion and affection a much harder business than others, and they are the children who most frequently meet with impatient blame from unimaginative and psychologically ignorant parents, just in the very situations where they most need tolerant and patient understanding. Their feelings of guilt are thereby all the more increased along with their resentments, while they get no help in solving their problem.

As smothered resentment and aggression grow and are further repressed by fear and guilt, a hidden vicious circle arises. The child feels increasingly menaced by bad impulses from within. He has an internal rebel capable of generating even murderous fantasies. What to do with all this aggression becomes a predominant preoccupation. While some of it seeps out as irritability and temper flare-ups, much of it may be turned back against the bad self and used in self-suppression, self-blame, self-punishment. As one man put it: 'All my life I've given myself a bad time; otherwise I would have given other people a bad time'. With this 'turning of aggression against the self', the conscience or super-ego becomes a really vindictive, destructive, inner dictator. In the early years of adolescence this kind of conscience may be brought into play to control the increasing psychobiological drive of the rapidly growing organism. A girl in the middle teens dreamed: 'A boy named B broke into our house to steal, and I got hold of him by the scruff of the neck and threw him out. I turned to Mummy and said: "Mummy, you must be firm with that boy"'. Then I was in school, and the Headmistress came in and said she was asking father to remove me from the school for disobedience. I was going to work at Woolworth's'.

The boy symbolised the dreamer's adolescent urge to a too purely individualistic and anti-social form of self-assertion, the desire to have her own way without consideration for other people. But that is seen as an urge to indiscipline which she turns on fiercely, throws it out (repression), has it punished by authority (conscience), and seeks more con-

structively to balance it by bringing up the feminine affectionate side, mother, who is at the same time a controlling super-ego figure. Yet, finally, it is fulfilled in the imaginative achievement of independent status and adulthood; she is out to work and earning. Many a parent who complains of awkwardness and selfishness in an adolescent child knows little of the moral struggle that is going on in the child's own mind all the time. An unsympathetic and intolerant environment in the home will goad it into conflicts of great severity and the creation of a ruthlessly repressive persecuting conscience in a guilt-laden mind as the only alternative to becoming an anti-social person. The terrible depths of pathological guilt into which the human mind can be driven, and the destructive ravages that ensue in the personality, must be seen and investigated at first hand to be understood. There is nothing more obstructive to healthy development than neurotic guilt resulting from early antagonisms to parents having proved impossible of normal resolution in the ordinary processes of growing up. For the psychotherapist this kind of conscience is an enemy to be destroyed, so that the self can be set free for a healthy attitude to itself. It is one of the four major neurotic character-trends, yet at the same time it is a defence against even worse psychic dangers, the aggressive and dependent infantile parts of the psyche it tries to beat down.

One grave danger involved is that the mind may be driven to seek relief from self-torture by projecting its guilt-laden bad feelings on to other people and attacking its own 'sins' there. The result is the self-righteous and aggressive type of puritan who must be everyone else's conscience, and is intolerant and critical. Such an external attitude always hides intense repressed feelings of personal guilt. This is common in the obsessional type of character, and we have noted that it may find an outlet in denunciatory preaching. It should be said that true moral feeling is contained in, even if distorted by, the super-ego. The total self knows that

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aggression is bad and destroys love and personal relationship. The trouble is that the super-ego is blind, automatic, indiscriminate; it makes no allowance for the fact that originally the aggression was a legitimate and natural reaction of self-defence against a threatening environment. But it is also bad because it does not solve the aggression problem. Its aggravating tyranny generates more aggression. The most it can achieve is repression, not elimination, of the trouble, and, in fact, the reaction of guilt may be maintained as a substitute for a change of character and the yielding up of resentment.

2. The True Moral Conscience

Genuine moral insight has to be disentangled from the compulsive super-ego. The true moral conscience of maturing ethical insight grows alongside, or intermingled with, the super-ego, and we may say that the task of moral growth is the replacement of the super-ego by a mature adult conscience. We gradually learn not only to accept, but to question, and to question not merely rebelliously, but in a fair-minded and objective way. The function of moral judgment is one aspect of the function of judgment in general. The mind can not only observe, but test, criticise, adapt means to ends and recognise the adequacy or inadequacy of the means adopted. Such judgment operates in practical matters building up what we call the utilitarian values, but it also operates to realise aesthetic, moral, and spiritual values, and it can be trained and educated by the study of the results of such judgment in other people, other times, and other cultures. Gradually the realisation comes that values are not just the precipitate of private and individual whim and fancy as the ancient Sophists taught, but that there exists a system of values that is objective in the sense of not being dependent on the individual as such; it is revealed rather in the consensus of human experience. That

system of values is not the same as the particular codes of conduct or custom in which it finds 'a local habitation and a name' in different centuries and climes. Much of that is of only transient relevance, the product of historical and cultural conditions that change and pass. As our private individual conscience casts off the super-ego which embodies much that is mere social code and custom belonging to the last generation, it grows towards the perception of that objective system of value which is the statement of what the universal experience of mankind finds to be good in living in personal relationship. The question as to whether values are self-evidencing, or in themselves a manifestation of the ultimate spiritual reality of God, is the point at which the question passes from the psychologist to the philosopher and theologian.

Thus the function of moral judgment, like all other functions, is potential and latent in the infant, and has to be stimulated and educated by the impact of the world on the mind of the growing child. Moral training can only begin with the discovery that other people will say 'Do' to some of our behaviour tendencies and 'Don't' to others. For a considerable time little more is possible than the automatic and blind acceptance of externally imposed standards, but gradually the capacity to reflect on the distinction others make between 'good' and 'bad', is developed. Then personal moral insight becomes possible in increasing measure. Such growth is not bound to proceed to any degree of maturity. Many people never outgrow their father's politics, or their parents' morality. The beginnings of true independent judgment, and the quest for truth in one's own first-hand experience of life, may be early stifled by fear.

It is lamentable that many parents assume that the child is wandering from the path of virtue unless he continues to echo all the parents' views about morality and religion. They do not want him to think for himself, but to be indoctrinated with their own beliefs. Since parents are, after all,

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only grown-up children, they are not by any means always as mature as they could be, and there is no reason why the child should blindly believe all that mother and father say. Nor, of course, is there any reason why he should blindly reject all that they say. One of the greatest blessings a child can have is parents whose character and conduct exemplify definite values, but who are sufficiently mature to know that they do not possess a monopoly of wisdom, who do not get over-anxious or angry if disagreed with, and who rejoice to see the child learning to think for himself. Such a child will be able to grow up to use his own mind seriously and without anxiety. He will take over from the parents all that is worthwhile, not because that is what they believe, but because he has thought it out and recognised that here is something valuable and true.

The growth of a mature adult conscience can then proceed apace. If the super-ego never entirely disappears it weakens progressively as the adult conscience develops, and the twenties will be entered with a valuable combination of independent ethical judgment plus a willingness to learn from other people. The alternatives are a continuance of blind submission to parental views, repeated in blind submission to doctrines externally imposed by state or church authority, through the tyranny of a rigid super-ego. There is an inability to consider new views with an open mind, stereotyped and unprogressive thinking that cannot move with the times, and a stagnation of soul; or else blind revolt that leads to hostile and prejudiced opposition to everything that parents stood for, as in the case of the young man who, on his twenty-first birthday, went to church and communion for the last time, and on leaving said to himself: 'I have now finished with everything I was brought up to believe; from now on I will think and act for myself and go my own way'. Such revolt is in many ways better than fear-created bondage, but it rarely leads to constructive development because the breakaway is largely intellectual and fails to appreciate

the unconscious situation of conflict between submission and rebellion.

This prevents integration and fills the personality with tension and anxiety. Furthermore, the child who grows up a rebel is robbed of the chance of taking over what is valuable from the past. It is uprooted and loses continuity with tradition, and is insecure. One cannot just cut off one's whole early life and start afresh on the threshold of adulthood and have deep, strong foundations. Real tragedy is found where parents have given the child all too little that is really valuable on which to build.

The great majority of people have, in adult life, a conscience that is a curious mixture of super-ego and independent moral judgment. The proportions of the mixture will vary with the all-round maturity or immaturity of the whole personality. People can be enlightened and progressive in some things and astonishingly conservative, conventional, and rigid in others. The pastor and preacher is in an important strategic position to help people to cultivate the habit of honest, realistic, thinking on political, social, moral, and religious issues. The Church has a duty to break down the taboos that fear creates on vigorous objective thought. It should stimulate people to the constant examination and re-examination of all accepted ideas, beliefs, habits, conventions, and institutions, not to foster a negative spirit of rejection of the past, but to cultivate the spirit that will 'Prove all things and hold fast that which is good'.¹ It is not a New Testament requirement that adults should be Yes-men and Yes-women, but rather 'that we may be no longer children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men . . . but speaking the truth in love, may grow up in all things into him which is the head, even Christ'.²

At least one of the meanings included in the teaching of

¹ 1 Thessalonians v, 21.

² Ephesians iv, 14.

the Christian tradition that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God, the Word of God made flesh, is that in Him we see the objective system of value incarnated, manifested. The figure of Christ does in fact retain its hold on the affections of the most diverse minds, many of whom reject the traditional theological formulations of his significance, provided they approach him reasonably free from emotional bias. He remains the figure of supreme importance for the awakening and education of true moral insight and evaluation in human beings. We must return presently, if only briefly, to the question of the final authority for our moral and spiritual values.

St. Paul's reference to being 'carried away by every wind of doctrine by the sleight of men', reminds us of one of the dangers that faces the super-ego-ridden adult. He is secretly dominated by something that represents external authority which he dare not challenge by his own independent insight. Thus he is liable to fall victim to domination by any new external authority that can exert its claims over him with sufficient force. His super-ego is projected on to it, and he becomes a tool of reactionary power-seekers in politics, or of an ultra-conservative traditionalism and ecclesiastical vested interests in religion. The super-ego is rooted in and bound hand and foot to the past, it is not drawn to the future, and it is the enemy of true progress and enlightenment. To say that is not to revert to the culturally fashionable 'religion of progress' that dominated Europe at the end of last century and the beginning of this one. It is rather to call ourselves to the duty of dealing vigorously and constructively with practical issues as they meet us from day to day, so that individual personality and the corporate community life is kept in a state of healthy growth.

3. The Feeling of Guilt

The previous section on the true moral conscience raises the pressing problem of authority, external and internal,

immediate and ultimate, but before we discuss this matter we must deal with the question of conscience and guilt in its special relationship to religion. In assessing guilt feeling it should be clear that it contains an extremely large element of fear of punishment, going back to fear of parental retaliation for behaviour which, in actual fact, is more often a matter of disturbing parental convenience and prejudice than of any really moral issue. Furthermore, guilt is a form of anxiety, and the stronger it grows the more it weakens the capacity for constructive effort, diverting the mind into morbid self-recrimination and away from genuine change and moral improvement. This aggravates the personality and arouses fresh resentment and aggression. Thus it is very questionable whether guilt has any really moral or religious significance. Guilty feeling is not the same thing as ethical condemnation, healthy self-criticism of a courageously objective kind with determination to bring about changes of character. It is rather a nuisance and a distraction; it inhibits positive moral effort and forms a preoccupation with a negative attitude to the self. Fear may have a secondary use as a restraint, for social purposes, on anti-social tendencies not yet dissolved away.

As Professor J. G. Mackenzie says:

‘The prohibitive conscience never disappears. It has an adult function. In the adult it exercises restraint; not the restraint that is enforced by fear, but the restraint that induces reflection on any contemplated activity. It still condemns wrong doing, but not through the repressing factors of fear and guilt, but through a healthy shame and humility which leads to the spontaneous correction of faults. . . . Guilt feelings are always morbid. The healthy reaction to wrong doing is repentance, which includes both sorrow for our wrong doing and the modifying of the offending tendencies. The pastor should not attempt to arouse guilt feelings; his work is to stimulate the posi-

tive conscience. Guilt feelings inevitably alienate the soul from God.¹

He quotes a wise passage from Father Grou's *Manual for Interior Souls*:

‘The truly devout man does not perplex himself; he goes on courageously; he is not over-scrupulous. If he falls into a fault he does not agitate himself; he humbles himself at the sight of his weakness; he raises himself up and thinks no more about it. He is not astonished at his weakness, at his falls or his imperfections; he is never discouraged. . . . If he were to fall a hundred times a day he would not despair, but would stretch out his hands lovingly to God, and beg of Him to lift him up.’

How different is this from the self-torture, sometimes leading even to a desperate reaction of self-hate, in which the sufferer will hit or hurt himself, where a tyrannous super-ego rules. In super-ego guilt there is vindictive and destructive self-attack which, in extreme cases, can even lead to suicide, the final act of punishment, aggression, and suppression aimed against the bad self; which only shows that in the end the guilt reaction has failed to change aggression into love. In true repentance there is moral courage to see oneself objectively and give up offensive attitudes and the whole strategy of anxious self-defence of which they are a part, so as to grow into a life based on trust and love.

Mackenzie points out another important factor in super-ego domination when he writes:

‘Practically every sufferer from guilt of a morbid kind is more afraid of evil than he is in love with good; and is very apt to spend all his moral strength not in trying to be good, but in trying not to be bad . . . A great deal of pastoral direction should aim at lessening the intolerance of this prohibitive conscience . . . The wise spiritual direc-

¹ *Nervous Disorders and Character*, p. 58.

tor never humiliates his penitents nor loses patience with them; he knows that humiliation makes a man look down on himself, whereas true humility makes the individual look up to God.¹

He defines, as follows, the mature adult conscience that should replace the dying super-ego:

‘The developed conscience is always positive. The conscience is that principle which co-ordinates and regulates our behaviour tendencies according to the ideals we have consciously or unconsciously accepted. Its content has been assimilated, not merely introjected. To that content the mature mind has a spontaneous relation. It becomes the guide to action, and contains the standard of moral judgment by which the mind judges spontaneously as to what is right and wrong, good or bad, just or unjust. The negative or infantile conscience is entirely prohibitive and compulsive. The positive conscience is integrated with the rest of the personality; the prohibitive conscience lies over against the behaviour tendencies as though it were external to the child.’²

It is much to be hoped that this whole problem of the moral conscience will be made a subject for thoroughgoing co-operative study between psychotherapists, theologians, and philosophers. The results must be of profound importance for the understanding of human personality.

4. Authority and Authoritarianism

The discussion of conscience and its standards of value has already raised the question of authority, and once again we find a normal and a neurotic attitude to authority liable to be confused together. The neurotic attitude to authority has been glaringly illustrated in the political life of our time

¹ Op. cit., pp. 21 f.

² Op. cit., pp. 56 f.

by the Nazi mentality, but it is by no means confined to that expression. It is best studied under the general name of 'authoritarianism' and seen as a definite type of character that is liable to be developed under certain circumstances, and which can find expression variously in parental, political, industrial, educational, and religious activity according to circumstances. The authoritarian character is always at bottom profoundly insecure and seeks safety in dependence on and submission to some absolute external authority that is not questioned. A defence against the feeling of weakness is then sought by identification with that authority, giving one the right to act authoritatively oneself and enjoy the feeling of power. This is bound to raise the final metaphysical question of man's relationship to the ultimate reality, which, when it is viewed as personal, becomes the religious question of man's relationship to God. There is a sense in which that cannot be other than a relationship of dependence, just as the child cannot be other than dependent on the parent. The question is, however, whether that is the aspect of the relationship which is the important one for the personal, moral, and spiritual life. The authoritarian character will certainly say 'Yes', and the Christian religion has often taken extreme authoritarian forms, though these have always been balanced by non-authoritarian forms which stressed rather the freedom of the relationship into which God calls man to Himself.

The problem is closely bound up with two different facts. In the first place, all authoritarians labour under the tyranny of a ruthless super-ego and have been brought up from infancy to think of authority in terms of external compulsion rather than as inwardly recognised and accepted truth. In the second place, a general socio-political and cultural movement towards authoritarianism is always generated in times of upheaval and rapid change. General insecurity revives in everyone something of the feeling of the helpless child and the urge to seek security in parent-figures and parent-substitutes such as public opinion, a fixed moral tradition, the

State, God; and one authority may be pitted against another in a desperate effort to preserve some independence. It is often thought that to challenge authoritarianism, especially in moral and religious matters, is to advocate licence, the right of the individual to think anything he likes and do as he pleases; but that rests on a mistaken view of the nature of true authority.

The problems of authority and freedom will be raised afresh by each generation, for they are not open to abstract and purely intellectual solution. In a mathematical calculation the mind can function impersonally, and maturity of character is of little moment. But in these matters our thinking is controlled by our character-structure and influenced deeply by unconscious motives. That does not mean that thought cannot be trusted, but that its trustworthiness is related to the maturity of the thinker. We shall never all agree on questions of authority and freedom, for we are all at different stages of life and experience, and these problems look different at each stage. Thus no final intellectual solution can be reached. The solution lies in the process of living. Authority and freedom are not opposites that are mutually exclusive so that we must choose between them; they are opposites that must be reconciled in the living adjustment of growing personality to the ultimately real.

From one age to another the emphasis changes. The medieval world was one of authority. The modern world came into being with the struggle for freedom. Today the pendulum swings back again to authority. In chapter four we glanced at the social and cultural changes that have spiritually uprooted modern man. Writing on the teaching of Berdyaev, Dr. Lampert says:

‘Man today lives in fear; his life is as it were suspended over an abyss and he is threatened on all sides. He has lost the hopes that so recently he tried to substitute for the Christian faith. He no longer believes in progress, in

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humanism, in science, in salvation to be brought by democracy and democratic civilisation; he knows the injustice of capitalism, and has become disillusioned about the utopias of ideal social orders; he is eaten away by cultural and spiritual scepticism. In this atmosphere there have arisen new forms of pessimistic and nihilistic philosophy.¹

We are not asking whether this loss of faith is justified, but noting that it has taken place, if not for all, then for so many. The evidence lies in the rise of political totalitarianism, the vogue of the existentialist philosophy, the flourishing of Neo-Calvinist trends in theology, and the revival of interest in the great, but neurotic, Kierkegaard.

Dr. Dorothy Emmet, writing in *The Christian News-Letter* for 1st October 1947, says:

‘The preliminary stage leading to the different kinds of Existentialism is the same; it is realising what Kierkegaard called *Angest*, in German *Angst* . . . What the word expresses is the sense of a fundamental metaphysical insecurity; not dread of anything in particular, but the dread which comes over us if we realise that in the last resort the moral and theoretical props by which we have supported ourselves go down, and we are faced with—*Nothingness*. Some existentialists, notably Heidegger, in Germany, and J-P. Sartre, make a great deal of this contention that the final metaphysical fact is Nothingness. . . . They mean that we come up against a final sense of meaninglessness. This comes when we see through the theories, the inherited traditions, the clichés, which had concealed our fundamental ignorance and insecurity.’

It would be a mistake simply to dismiss the Existentialists as a small group of intellectuals. They are a symptom of the times, an expression of a subtle mood that exists in many

¹ E. Lampert, *Nicolas Berdyaev and the New Middle Ages*, pp. 59 f.

who know nothing of this philosophy, a mood generated by the course of world-history, both intellectual and political, in the last hundred years.

Dr. Carl Jung writes:

‘The disintegration and weakening of the health-giving institution of the Christian Church continues at an alarming pace, and the loss of any secure authority is gradually leading to a religio-philosophical as well as to a socio-political anarchy. Before the first world war there were already symptoms of the mental change which was taking place in Europe. The medieval picture of the world was breaking up, and the metaphysical authority which was set above this world was fast disappearing . . . The authority of goodness and justice has always been anchored metaphysically. Where has it disappeared to now that it has slipped its anchor? Is it in reality only brute force that has the casting vote in everything? Is the highest court only the will of the man who happens to be in power?’¹

These quotations make clear what is the mental atmosphere of the modern world in which a movement towards authoritarianism has developed so strongly.

It is a world divided against itself, with life split into the sacred and the secular. The Church is left to preach love in the abstract, while states pursue the paths of power-politics where idealism and love are feared as weakness. Our civilisation reproduces the basic neurotic conflict which divides assertion and affection and sets them against one another. Thus, in a world that longed for, but could only pay lip-service to, the Christian way of life, fear, insecurity, and mounting aggression form a vicious circle threatening destruction. We are left to the mercy of our fear of weakness and defensive lust for power. The world, having been geographically and economically unified, gives us no chance to export our aggression, so we release it on each other and

¹ C. G. Jung, *Essays on Contemporary Events*, p. 28 and pp. 69 f.

consume ourselves. The unsolved problem of aggression in our civilisation is the real source of that loss of faith in human nature, man's despair of himself, that underlies authoritarianism. Our age found in Kierkegaard a mirror to its own mood. He longed to be a Christian, but was riddled with neurotic hate, generated in revolt against the tyrannical authority of a morbidly religious father, a hate worked out constantly from the malicious satire of his youth on to the bitter destructive attack on the State Church just before his death. Only the absolute authority of God could hold his hate in check. His tortured life is an apt symbol for the tortured soul of Europe and the world today. We may place Kierkegaard and Europe together and admire their genius, sympathise with and share their spiritual aspiration and struggle, and above all pity their chronic inner conflicts which are our own.

It is not surprising then to find the authoritarian point of view revived in theology, between the two world wars, led by such men as Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr. Labels confuse thinking, and none of our theologians would call himself a pure Barthian. There has been much vigorous and independent criticism of this trend; nevertheless, in practice it has brought to the fore again ideas and words that had fallen into disuse in liberal thinking. Our 'obedience to God' is called for, acceptance of 'the historic faith' is demanded, the Bible is again handled as 'the authoritative Word of God'. We note such book titles as *The Authority of the Bible*, by Professor C. H. Dodd, *The Authority of the Biblical Revelation*, by Principal H. Cunliffe Jones, and *The Authority of the Old Testament*, by Professor A. G. Hebert. There has been an increased emphasis on the Church and churchmanship in Free Church circles, and an increased stress on sin, repentance, judgment, and forgiveness in preaching. It would be foolish to take a merely negative attitude to this development. Every important historical movement has an element of truth and necessity in it, or it would not arise.

When 'freedom' becomes a catchword for people who are the slaves of their fears and passions, then for true liberty, 'the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free',¹ we get the spurious substitute of rank individualism, a 'go-as-you-please-and-do-as-you-like' attitude of political, economic, and moral anarchy. The earlier political liberalism said much about 'enlightened self-interest', but it was still 'self-interest' that lay at the heart of its passion for freedom, and the disintegrating force of self-interest necessitated a swing of the pendulum towards authoritarianism. In our age there have been many individuals talking of self-expression who did not stop to consider whether they had any self particularly worth expressing; and who would have been all the better for recognising some fundamental moral and spiritual obligations.

Today, however, we have to scrutinise with particular care the nature of authority. We may begin by quoting Principal Cunliffe Jones:

'There are various senses in which the word "authority" is used . . . For our purposes they may be limited to three. There is the final authority in which power and right are united; there is the educative authority which has right so far as its truth has not been assimilated, but no power; and there is the authority of power, hardly to be found in complete isolation from right, but not primarily dependent on it. It is the first meaning of authority—its final claim and hold upon us—with which we are concerned here. In what sense is the Bible finally authoritative for the Christian theologian so that he has no right to dissent from it? The answer is that the Bible is finally authoritative in so far as it shares in the authority of God, and the purpose of this study is to try to get clear principles that will enable us to understand that sharing.'²

¹ Galatians v, 1.

² *The Authority of the Biblical Revelation*, p. 13.

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This raises the crucial issue of the relationship between power and right in authority.

It would appear that in political and social authority there must always be some element of power to coerce in order to prevent the anti-social few from destroying the rights of the many and disrupting the life of the community. Democracy accepts, as the reasonable safeguard against the abuse of such power, that it must be given by, and be capable of being recalled by, popular consent. The question that concerns us is whether power has any place at all in authority of a moral and religious order. Is the authority of God to be conceived in terms of power as well as right? Is 'the final authority that in which power and right are united?' No one can question the authority of truth. If it is true that two plus two are four and I insist on believing that they are three, I shall go bankrupt; or if I insist that they are five I shall meet with strong reactions in making financial demands on other people. If I do not accept the truth when I know it, or recognise it when I see it, I bring disaster on myself. But does that mean that behind the truth there lies a personal power that punishes me, pays me out, if I do not accept it?

Authoritarian religion loves to dwell on the idea of power in God, and revels in such ideas as wrath, obedience, submission, surrender. It sees the relationship between God and man, Creator and created, in terms of superiority and subordination. This reaches its extreme development in the Barthian view of God as the 'wholly Other', the great gulf fixed between God and man, and man as standing before God as nothing but a condemned sinner. This, however, hardly seems to ring true to the atmosphere of the teaching of Jesus, for whom God was Father, not Potentate. 'But Jesus called them unto Him, and said, Ye know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. Not so shall it be among you; but whomsoever would become great among you shall be your minister; and whomsoever would be first among you

shall be your servant; even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister.'¹ 'No longer do I call you servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends.'² The parable of the prodigal son, and the incident of the washing of the disciples' feet, stress the same truth. In St. Matthew xx Jesus expressly repudiates the idea of authority as power. In replacing it by the idea of friendship as defining the true relationship between Himself and His disciples, the pattern of the relationship between God and man, He defines it as a personal relationship. God, who could coerce, lays aside His power in dealing with man because of His grace and love. In a fully personal relationship the exercise of power is out of the question. Force and coercion would at once destroy the relationship as personal and make it utilitarian at best. Power is only a source of compulsion and is quite irrelevant in the realm of the spiritual. That is why Christ went to the Cross. For us the ultimate authority can only be the truth itself as the expression of God's nature manifested in creation and redemption. Principal Cunliffe Jones writes: 'Positive freedom consists of the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality in obedience to the living God.'³ In this sentence the writer would only substitute for 'obedience' the words 'in communion with'. Not that 'obedience' is necessarily wrong. When I accept a truth and act accordingly, I do in a sense obey it, but the term implies submission to a superior power which dictates, and that is just the very idea that is excluded from the notion of a personal relationship. The 'Power' of God is seen manifested, primarily, not as authority and rule, but as creative activity, the eternally manifesting 'energy' that *is* the Universe. In so far as power enters into a personal relationship, it does so to support, not to compel. Ideally, the power of a father should be used, not to enforce obedience, but to create conditions in which

¹ St. Matthew xx, 25 ff.

² St. John xv, 15.

³ Op. cit., p. 14.

the child can grow to maturity, the lesson of the parable of the Prodigal Son.

The core of abiding truth in all authoritarian teaching is that pure subjectivism is bad. If the Sophist dictum, 'man is the measure of all things', means that all truth and all values are relative to each individual's whim and fancy, then truth and value cease to exist; but this would be a stupid denial of the facts. The fundamentally important thing about man is that he can only fulfil himself by living objectively in a true relationship with realities beyond himself; and he is not free to think and feel anything he pleases. Man is only free to think and feel *truly* about whatever aspect of reality he is dealing with; that goes for both science and religion. By this we mean 'morally free'; he is, of course, psychologically free to think and feel falsely, but if he does he destroys himself. Purely subjective thought and feeling, because it is not controlled by the authority of external facts, of things as they actually are, has no genuine reference to external reality, and is, therefore, phantasy and neurosis. Thus pure subjectivism means living in a private world of our own, ego-centricity, loss of natural healthy personal contact with the reality of what is beyond ourselves, the retreat of the insecure soul into itself. This self-incarceration leads to moral and spiritual death, and, clinically, in the last resort to schizophrenia. It is a morbid development.

Subjectivity and ego-centricity, phantasy and pure individualism, believing what you want to believe and doing whatever pleases you, lead to social and spiritual maladjustment. It is the path followed by those who are afraid that facing facts will shatter their neat, small securities. This life based on fear and self-defence is ultimately what is meant by neurosis. In the language of the New Testament, it is the branch severed from the vine and withering. On the other hand, objectivity, going out of and beyond oneself, free and unafraid, to sustain an honest and true relationship to the reality that is beyond ourselves, our neighbour, our universe,

our God—that means life and not death. It may mean giving up some of our cherished opinions and prejudices, it may mean altering some of our habits, and sacrificing some of the emotional attitudes and character traits that we cling to, but that is all gain for they are the very things that frustrate our real life, which is then free to develop on the basis of love and trust instead of fear. The classic and all-sufficient description of this life is: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbour, as thyself'. The religious life is to escape from the prison of subjectivity and self-concern, and to relate ourselves truly to God and our fellow men, to the objectively real.

Here, then, we see *the truth about authority, which is not the same thing as the spirit of authoritarianism. Thou shalt know the world as it really is, is the basis of science. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself, is the basis of society, morality, and religion.* The christian faith, based on the revelation in Jesus Christ of God as the ultimately real, does not raise in principle any fresh issue at this point. We are not free to think and feel as we please except at the price of denying our true life. *We must conform our thought and feeling to the true nature of the reality beyond ourselves. We must think true thoughts and feel true feelings, for we cannot really live at all in any other way. The authority we must all accept is that which is involved in the discipline of being ourselves real, in relationship with the reality of God, man, and the universe. Life, in the long run, defeats, undermines, and destroys itself if we try to live otherwise.*

What is disturbing, however, is the prevalent desire, in a turbulent period of history, to accept and teach an authoritarianism of an external kind, that of submission to an imposed standard of orthodoxy; a hunger for an authority to lean on, to be protected by and to identify oneself with. We should distinguish between authority and authoritarianism. *Authority, the right to demand our acceptance, is inherent in fact, and in truth which is the accurate mental representation*

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of fact and reality. We acknowledge the authority of what is real when we say you can't fly in the face of facts. Once I see the truth about anything, I am no longer free to believe anything else. I must give up my errors and misconceptions and have already done so, in large part, in recognising the truth. Authoritarianism on the other hand is a mood, an emotional attitude or need, a character trait. It shows as an urge towards subordination of the self to another, towards obedience and acceptance of what is imposed as law or belief. It gives up the right of independent personal thinking, and forgets that truth as our teachers or creeds present it is always truth imperfectly grasped by some human mind, thus standing in need of constructive critical examination. This, of course, holds good for the Bible, whose authority is not in essence different from the authority of truth anywhere else. The Bible is truth in earthen vessels, but we cannot accept as finally and unquestionably authoritative, the statement of Biblical truth given by any particular theologian, creed, Church or period of Christian history. If we did, real thinking and progressively deepening understanding of the truth would come to an end. It is always the ultimate danger of authoritarianism and rigid orthodoxy that it stifles thought. The same will hold true of the enforced Marxist orthodoxy of the Communist Party in Russia. Authoritarianism is usually found going along with an unrecognised fear of being weak, and fear of love as if it were the same as weakness, and either a conscious or unconscious desire to dominate and impose oneself on others, to 'be', instead of to 'bow to', the authority: and all this disguises, and overcompensates for, a deep hidden dependency of an infantile kind. Authoritarianism, in short, is a problem for psychological investigation. The authority that is vested in reality and truth is a plain fact of existence.

The emotional problems that lie hidden within authoritarianism are as old as human nature and they have exerted a specially strong influence on the development of Christian

theology and ecclesiastical practice. An informative account of this matter is to be found in Dr. Erich Fromm's analysis of the thought of Luther and Calvin in *The Fear of Freedom*. The general atmosphere of the mind of Jesus in the Gospels appears to the writer to be strikingly non-authoritarian. The parable of the Prodigal Son and the story of the woman taken in adultery are examples. Emphasis is laid on learning the truth for oneself through experience and suffering. 'Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more', was Jesus's attitude to the adulterous woman: not the heavy hand of authoritarian judgment, but the wise, understanding acceptance of love, once she had learned the truth. In the same spirit Jesus taught by parables to provoke His hearers to seek their meaning. By contrast the Church has been deeply dyed with authoritarianism, stressing sin, condemnation, repentance, punishment, and forgiveness, the pride and rebellion of man against God and His Law, the duty of submission and obedience. No doubt room must be made for all these ideas in a complete account of man and his relationship to God; it is largely a question of the atmosphere in which they are propagated.

All this has flowered again in our time as part of a general movement of reaction against the *laissez-faire* individualism of the pre-1914 world in both politics and theology. In Karl Barth, Hitler encountered an even more radical and uncompromising authoritarianism than his own. The reiterated emphasis on 'the mighty acts of God in history' typical of some theological trends, seems to betray a need to be overawed into a submission that one would not otherwise make. It seems foreign to the spirit of 'I call you not servants but friends'. The essence of the Gospel faces us with the tremendous authoritative reality of God in Christ, but is quite non-authoritarian in spirit and presentation. The philosophy of personality and personal relationships as seen in John Macmurray and Martin Buber, along with the difference that psychotherapy points out between the false or

infantile conscience or super-ego and the mature adult perception of moral values, is but an elaboration in our time of the essential spirit of Christ. To whatever extent we believe on authority, or bow in obedience to authority, other than the authority of the reality and truth we experience for ourselves, to that extent we live at a childish, immature, and sub-personal level. The essence of a person, as Kant taught, is that he is an end and not a means. *A personal relationship is one in which between persons there is neither constraint nor enforced demand on either side, but freedom. They exist primarily not to serve each other, a utilitarian value, but to have communion with each other, each valuing the other as an end in himself.* No question of rights, obedience, or fear can arise in love.

That *Christianity teaches a personal relationship between God and man* as the essence of religion is implied in St. Augustine's famous phrase 'Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee'. We exist to enjoy God rather than to obey Him. Professor Mackenzie writes:

'The enjoyment of God should be the supreme end of spiritual technique . . . The relationship to God and man and to our moral ideals should be one of spontaneity. It is not our submission God wants, but our spontaneous love and fellowship; a mere submission . . . transforms that which ought to be the outcome of a free and spontaneous choice into a compulsion, and no man is safe whose morality is a compulsion. "Henceforth I call you not servants but friends"; that is the relationship between God and man which spiritual technique should make its supreme end to cultivate. "If you love me you will keep my commandments." Christian morality springs out of this spontaneous love relationship between God and man.'¹

¹ Op. cit., pp. 36 f.

Now it seems that is not the conception of man's relationship to God that is characteristic of authoritarian religion and theology, which Mackenzie caricatures as belief in a God 'who snoops around for sinners', and is 'an outsize of the threatening parent'. Man's attitude to Him must be that of awe, repentance, submission, obedience, and God's will is a Law. It is the theology of Mr. Barratt of Wimpole Street. It is human paternalism of the kind that is rooted in the fact that the great majority of parents find it so much easier to discipline their children than to inspire them. We project on to the Deity our own limitations as parents, our own desires to exercise power and be obeyed. He has been dressed up in all the neurotic jealousy for His rights and hypersensitiveness about being ignored from which we ourselves suffer. He has had ascribed to Him our own childish hunger for praise and admiration and worship. *The most dangerous type of anthropomorphism is that which describes God in terms of our own immature emotional life. It is not the picture of God that Jesus gave us.* Just as such attitudes are destructive of real personal relationships between man and man, so are they between man and God.

What gives authoritarianism its hold over men? The question can only be answered by taking into account the unconscious motivations that play so important a part. These differ from one person to another. The temperamental dominator is likely to become authoritarian in religion finding thus an acceptable sublimation of his power-drive. He does not want, if he has a well-developed social sense, to be nakedly aggressive in his own interests, but he can allow himself to be aggressive for God. He does not recognise the secret satisfaction he gets out of identifying himself with an unchallengeable absolute which gives him the right, so he feels, to demand unquestioning submission from other people. Yet again the person of vigorous nature who has had to fight too hard for freedom, especially against a Jehovistic father, is always left with a severe inner conflict between a

guilt- and hate-laden drive to rebellion and total independence, and a counter-demand for the suppression of these bad things in himself by submissive obedience to authority. This is in origin an ambivalent reaction to one and the same father, but easily lends itself to resolution temporarily by a split which directs the rebellion against the earthly father and the submissive obedience to the heavenly one.

The writer knows of at least one case where a deep-seated feeling of inferiority and weakness, very much bound up with physical inferiority to other boys at boarding school, led to a mental retreat into compensatory religious fantasy and a power-concept of God. The operation of such a motive might be traced in some aspects of the later politico-religious outlook of the Hebrews in the Old Testament. We have already seen that authoritarianism may be rooted in the super-ego form of conscience, since this originates in the external authority of the parents. What father and mother are to the 'naughty' child, that child may well grow up to be towards itself and then to its own child in turn. One of the saddest experiences that come the way of a psychotherapist is to hear from a patient how much he suffered under the bad temper, criticism, and unreasonable punishments of his father, and then to discover that he is constantly betrayed by blind, compulsive outbursts into treating his own child in the same way and with the same disturbing results. Those who remain inwardly subordinated people reproducing compulsively the attitudes of their parents, though with a strong sense of guilt and fear, have a secret longing to play the part of the all-powerful parent to counteract their feeling of fundamental weakness. The exercise of power and domination is the only form of strength they really know, and they do not understand that love is far stronger. Such an adult becomes as intolerant of other people as his super-ego is of himself, and he seeks relief from self-attack in puritanical censoriousness of others. Such people fall naturally into authoritarian views in religion and politics.

This is too slight a description of motives to be more than suggestive. There is need for searching investigation of detailed case-material of analyses of guilt and conscience, both mature and morbid; and for a close study of what Mackenzie refers to as 'rigoristic ethics, the doctrine of æternal punishment, religious scrupulosity, and the penal theories of atonement',¹ and, we may add, the theory of original sin and the facts of religious guilt and authoritarianism, in the light of such important psycho-analytical theories as that of 'bad internal objects', the introjected bad or repressive parent figure against whom the mind has to defend itself. This is a large field for research. Ultimately, behind all forms of authoritarianism and repressive conscience lie fear of oneself, fear of other people, fear of life, and so in the end fear of God. The real business of religion, certainly of Christianity, is to lift us above fear to that freedom of love which casts out all fear and builds life on the basis of freedom, trust, affection, and spontaneous, unforced, personal relationship. In that sense the true religious life is the antithesis of, and the answer to, neurosis.

¹ Op. cit., p. 59.

Psychology and Ethics

It has been indicated in the Preface that the plan of this book is to deal with practical applications of psychology first and allow theoretical issues to grow out of them. There is one question of general theoretical importance about which, finally, something must be said, if only to remove some prejudices and misunderstandings that exist. It is the relation of psychology to ethics, a problem raised by the last chapter. It was raised also in a valuable constructive criticism offered by Principal H. Cunliffe-Jones, whose words we take the liberty of quoting:

‘What is the place of psychology in human life? I don’t know, and I suspect that no psychologist does either. This is a pity, because until the function of the psychologist in the understanding of human life is cleared up we shall continually be falling into confusion. I give you full credit for not wanting intentionally to absorb everything into psychology. But I am not clear that in effect you do justice to the independent standing, not primarily of religious truth, but to begin with of history, politics, and ethics. . . . The psychologist has a right to suggest that some apparently historical, political, or ethical problems are not such, but must be handed over to the psychologist; and many such claims would be justified. But there remain large areas of human life where to apply psychological standards is to distort and not to illuminate reality.’ (Private communication.)

This is fundamental and must be answered if applied psychology in any field is to be more than a mere matter of

technique and method. The issue is not a simple one, but raises a variety of others.

1. The first of such issues is the question whether psychology is a science, or how far it is a science, or how far it can go as a science. We are bound to distinguish between psychology as a science, and psychotherapy as an art of healing or a method of emotional re-education of the personality that must make use of other disciplines as well as that of scientific psychology. This distinction will be elaborated in dealing with the other questions.

2. The second issue raised, by implication, by Principal Cunliffe-Jones, is whether we are to regard the field of psychology as an area or as an aspect of human life. If it is an area then, as he says, 'some apparently historical, political, or ethical problems are not such, but must be handed over to the psychologist . . . but there remain large areas of human life where to apply psychological standards is to distort and not to illuminate reality'. That would be a true account of the matter so long as we are thinking of psychology as a pure science dealing with mental mechanisms, what they are, and how they work. The answer to the first question, however, has already suggested that the clinical psychologist or psychotherapist, and therefore any psychologist concerned with practical applications such as the social or pastoral psychologist, is not a pure scientist concerned only with the study of mental processes to find out what they are. The psychotherapist finds a mind functioning badly and has to help it to function differently. For him, psychology does not deal with an area or a part of life split off from the whole, and isolated for special investigation. For the therapist, psychology deals rather with one aspect of the whole of personality in its relationship with life. Any given problem will have its psychological aspect, but also its historical, social-cultural, ethical, and religious aspects. The psychotherapist who knows nothing but scientific psychology will not be a good therapist. Dr. E. B.

Strauss, in a paper in *The British Journal of Medical Psychology* entitled 'Quo Vadimus?', writes: 'No system of dynamic psychology which eschews teleology, pure ethics, and, ultimately, ontology, can be of much service to tortured humanity or contribute a great deal to the social psychiatry of the future'. For good or ill, psychology is knocking at the door of sociology, ethics, and religion; or ought we to say that the practical needs of treatment have opened the way for sociology, ethics, and religion to knock at the door of scientific psychology? Dr. Strauss speaks of 'the importance of a sound psychology linking up with a sound theology'. He is a Roman Catholic and goes much farther than most psychiatrists would go, but issues are raised which point towards the need for an ultimate integration of all aspects of our knowledge of man as a 'total person'.

• 3. The third question is raised by Principal Cunliffe-Jones's reference to 'psychological standards'. Can we speak of psychological standards and, if so, in what sense? The psychotherapist finds that something is wrong with the way a certain mind functions, and it has to be set right. What does he mean by wrong and right? His primary concern is with mental health. Mental ill health shows itself in disturbing anxiety-states, incapacitating inhibitions on natural powers, and compulsively maladjusted relationships with other people. Mental health is revealed in a capacity to function normally as a co-operative, friendly, confident, creative human being. Neurosis is manifested in behaviour which is often anti-social and, in effect, selfish. This character aspect of neurosis is far more important than the physical symptoms which are a by-product of emotional conflicts. The neurotic is frequently aware of this and dislikes his own reactions. He will say: 'I think too much about myself, I know I am difficult to live with, I try to be different, but I do not seem able to manage it'. Social, ethical, and religious values have already forced their way into the evaluation of mental health and ill health. Psychology as a pure science

cannot determine values, but psychotherapy cannot define its aims without reference to moral values.

One might say that psychotherapy implies a pragmatic test of value. Whatever is conducive to, or is an expression of, mental health is good, and what is not so is bad. This may take us some way. The writer once heard Dr. J. A. Hadfield say, in a lecture, 'our aim, in the bringing up of children, should be the mental health of the child and not its indoctrination into our beliefs'. But this only raises again the question: 'What is mental health?' The accepted definition of health is that it is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity. If it is negatively defined as freedom from crippling emotional conflicts, we still do not escape ethical questions. We cannot lay down the elimination of all mental conflict as the *sine qua non* of mental health. The perfectly integrated personality in which no more conflict survives is an ideal goal, but certainly not a practically attainable one in this life. So long as we live and do not stagnate we have to deal with an ever-changing environment and produce ever-changing reactions and adjustments to it. We are never so mature as to be able to do that without some inner conflicts and transitional anxiety. It is this process that promotes our further development, which does not necessarily come to an end till vitality dies away in old age, and perhaps not even then. Integration is not, for us, a final fact, but a developmental process. We arrive at a further stage of integration after a period of struggle, and, if happiness is the affective tone of an integrated personality, then for a time we are happy and even deeply at peace within ourselves. But life calls us to sacrifice this peace, to plunge into another period of testing and readjustment in order that we may move on to greater maturity. We cannot therefore say that the absence of conflict is the same thing as mental health.

We must distinguish between normal and pathological

conflicts. An example of a normal conflict would be when a mature mind has to choose between two incompatible duties where it is not clear which has the greater claim. A pathological conflict reflects, not a real difficulty in external realities, but a state of neurotic self-contradiction within the mind from which flow contradictory reactions to life. The normal conflict is ultimately solved by a definite decision. The pathological conflict drags on and degenerates because no decision can be reached except through, and by means of, a radical change of personality. In practice, however, our actual conflicts are not always so easy to label. Because none of us is perfectly mature, every conflict-situation in real life is liable to bring to light our hidden weaknesses. Development is a transition from immaturity to maturity, and it is always in progress. One may say that a normal conflict is one which we can solve fairly easily because it does not touch upon any hidden immaturity in us; while a pathological conflict is one in which our immaturity comes into play. Concerning most of our conflicts we ought to ask, not, 'Is this normal or pathological?' but 'To what extent is this normal, and to what extent is it pathological?' Life is continually plunging us into situations that arouse conflicts and produce anxieties in us by playing upon our unrecognised infantile characteristics, forcing us to face up to the need for further development. That is how we grow. If mental health is to be a practically applicable concept it must stand for something that falls short of such perfect maturity as would be beyond the reach of anxiety-reactions. It is no good making 'normality' and 'mental health' stand for an unrealisable ideal.

We may say, then, that the healthy mind is one which has enough tension-capacity to stand conflicts and the anxieties they bring. *Mental health is revealed in the ability to endure conflict and even suffering, and grow by means of it. Considered from a purely psychological standpoint, mental health is the capacity to learn by our experience of life, whatever it*

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is, the capacity to grow and not to stagnate, to make constructive use of mental tensions, moral challenges, and spiritual distresses.•No complete account of mental health can be given without taking social, ethical and religious factors into account. Physical, psychological, and spiritual suffering have a positive part to play in human life. Thus Jung writes:

‘You deprive a man of his best when you help him to get rid of his complexes. You can only help him to become sufficiently aware of them and to start a conscious conflict with himself. In this way the complex becomes a focus of life. . . . The task of coming to terms with his philosophy of life is one which psychotherapy inevitably sets itself, even though not every patient probes to the deepest levels. . . . The possession of complexes does not in itself signify a neurosis, for complexes are the normal focal points of psychic happenings, and the fact that they are painful does not show that there is a pathological disturbance. Suffering is not an illness, but the normal counter-pole to happiness. A complex only becomes pathological when we delude ourselves that we have not got it. A philosophy of life as the most complex structure in the psyche is the counter-pole to the physiologically conditioned psyche, and as the highest psychic dominant it ultimately determines the latter’s fate. It is the guiding force in the life of the therapist and forms the essence of his therapy. As it is primarily a subjective system, however strictly objective one may be, it may, and very likely will, be destroyed time after time in collision with the truth of the patient; but it revives, renewed by what has happened. Convictions easily turn into self-protective devices; if this happens they tend to become rigid; and that is contrary to the sense of life. The test of a firm conviction is its elasticity and flexibility; like every other exalted truth, it thrives best by the admission of its errors. I can hardly conceal the fact that we psychotherapists

ought really to be philosophers or philosophic physicians.
... What we experience could be called religion *in statu nascendi*.¹

This passage contains some difficulties. The term 'complex' is slipping out of use because it is too static a term for the description of the active, dynamic life of the psyche. Further, it seems questionable to say: 'You deprive a man of his best when you help him to get rid of his complexes'. The complex itself, the still surviving infantile and immature characteristic of our psychic functioning, can hardly be called our 'best'. Otherwise the passage states a truth of the greatest importance. To become aware of our immaturities, to 'start a conscious conflict' with them, to accept suffering as 'not an illness', but the birth-pangs of a more mature and integrated self, and to do all this in the light of a 'philosophy of life' which is not a rigid defence against new truth, but an ever-deepening wisdom and insight which grows with our maturing, all this is, surely, the real meaning of living. If Jung is right, we must say that, far from psychology desiring to absorb everything into itself, it is, in its practical applications, discovering that therapy opens out into the whole mystery and meaning of life, and that it courts frustration if it does not seek to work closely with other disciplines, such as history, sociology, politics, ethics, and religion.

4. One more question must be raised, namely the difference between the motive and the truth of a belief, and the motive and social value of an action. Psychologists run some risk of assuming that where they can reveal the presence of an unsatisfactory motive for a belief or act they have destroyed their validity. That is not so. A true belief can be held from a bad motive, and a false or mistaken belief can be held from a good motive; also, unselfish conduct can have selfish motives even though its quality suffers from that fact. Such

¹ C. G. Jung, *Essays on Contemporary Events*, pp. xvi and 38 ff.

discrepancies call for removal, but they show that, in itself, the truth of a belief must be tested by independent scientific or philosophical enquiry, and the value of an act must be tested on social and ethical grounds. Not to recognise that is to risk falling into a general 'psychological cynicism'.

The probing into unconscious motives, necessarily undertaken in analytical work, has sometimes led to the superficial impression that psychoanalysis does not accept the genuineness or even decency of any human thought or action; and the fact that neurosis is traced to repression has led some sophisticated moderns to champion the cause of unbridled instinct. So the impression exists that psychoanalysis undermines ethics by explaining it away. Professor C. H. Waddington writes of scientific trains of thought that seem 'to rob ethical statements of any claims to intellectual validity', and mentions: 'The psychoanalytical . . . which seemed to imply that man's ethical system is a mere product of his early sexual reactions to family life, and has no more generality than that has'.¹ This idea is due far more to shallow popularisations of earlier results of psychoanalytical research than to a serious study of the subject.

Repression is automatic and unconscious. It occurs because the ego lacks the integrative capacity and strength to deal effectively with some aspect of the conflict between an anxious clinging to an infantile position and the developmental urge to grow up. This usually happens in childhood when the ego is weak, and may be considered as a pre-moral means of dealing with conflicts at a time when an adult moral conscience has not yet come into being. But it does constitute a defence against a personality problem by shutting it out of consciousness instead of facing it and working through it. As adults we must accept responsibility for our repressed conflicts and be prepared to endure their revival and resolution. Only thus can we become fully moral and mature persons.

¹ C. H. Waddington, *Science and Ethics*, p. 9.

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Aggressive tendencies, for example, may have been repressed and over-compensated by compulsive unselfishness so that the person does not now believe he is aggressive. If the repression is lifted and the aggression returns to consciousness, two moral possibilities arise. The aggression can be suppressed by conscious efforts of self-control for the sake of other people; and, further, it can be analysed and worked through, which is the more radical solution. We must, then, distinguish between repression, which is an automatic act, and suppression, which is a conscious act. By suppression is meant the same as conscious moral self-control. Failure to grasp that distinction led to the stupid mistake of believing that psychology taught that children should be allowed to do as they like. Psychology rather teaches that the child who is left to its own devices without adequate parental help is most likely to become a prey to anxiety. It is a mistake to talk of 'repressing' children. Children may be 'suppressed', which is as bad as leaving them without any guidance at all, for the suppressed child is forced to repress its problems within itself, and the ground is prepared for neurosis. Conscious self-control, that is, conscious self-direction by rational moral choice based on an adequate understanding of values, will best be taught to children by the influence of parental example, and it is a cheap evasion of the responsibilities of parenthood to fall back on the easy methods of authoritarian suppression or lazy negligence that leaves the child to fend for itself. Thus to say that repression is bad does not cancel out the need for conscious moral control.

The impression that psychoanalysis involves universal scepticism about human motives and teaches that ideals are only a camouflage for thoroughly uncivilised and selfish desires, requires closer examination. It involves at least four problems: (a) mixed motives; (b) the importance of ideals; (c) the overvaluation of the unconscious, and (d) finally the Freudian account of motivation. (a) It is certainly not true

that psychotherapists hold all motives to be bad and ideals to be only illusions. What they do hold is that human motives are always mixed, which is no more than has always been understood. The Old Testament prophet held that the heart was deceitful above all things. The analyst is only more thoroughgoing in his analysis of motivation and calls on us to face the full truth about ourselves which is, in itself, a highly moral procedure. There is no morality in self-deception. A man can, for example, champion a socially oppressed minority for the two different reasons that, in the first place, having grown up under a dictatorial father, he is inwardly a rebel, and, in the second place, because he genuinely understands and feels for the minority and its cause. If he is not aware of the first motive, and it is one that is likely to be hidden from him, his championship will be less effective than it might be owing to the unconscious importation of bitterness and probably rash judgment. But the good motive is not any the less good or real because another one exists. It is only through the investigation of our mixed motives that we can make any true progress in character.

(b) The importance of conscious ideals is not by any means overlooked in the best analytical therapy. The therapist would be foolish to destroy or weaken the conscious ideals of a patient, for the simple reason that treatment is going to make the patient aware of the existence of many infantile, demanding, self-centred, and hostile desires in himself. If these were to flood back into an ethically undermined consciousness with its moral sense blunted, the patient would have nothing by means of which to cope with the uprush. If, for example, an anti-social aggressive ambition tainted with jealousy and revenge was early repressed for fear of retaliation, and has been hidden beneath the reaction-formation of compulsive generosity, and analysis brings this back into consciousness, then a conscious mind that had lost its moral values might accept it instead of dissolving it away, and turn into a hard and unsympathetic personality. The psycho-

therapist is not concerned to eliminate symptoms by making people merely healthy animals. The aim is not merely to get rid of symptoms and lift repressions, but to produce a balanced, socially, and personally integrated human being in whom released infantile tendencies have undergone maturation.

(c) The over-valuation of the unconscious mind, which in turn seems to underestimate the importance of conscious moral choice, did to some extent characterise the early stages of the development of psychoanalytic theory. The unconscious was explored first, and for a time it seemed as if psychoanalysis were teaching that life is entirely dominated by unseen forces and that conscious moral choice were a deceptive fiction. One cannot expect a pioneer movement to say everything at once. But the onesidedness of early theory was corrected when attention turned from the repressed unconscious to the analysis of the ego and the formation of character. Freud's first view of conflict was that it was a battle between instincts; later he came to teach that it is a battle between instincts and the moral super-ego. Modern psychodynamic theory is more and more working out a balanced picture of the functioning of the human mind.

(d) Finally, the question must be asked whether Freud's own account of motivation does not undermine ethics. There is truth in that contention. Freud rendered inestimable service to mankind, and his insights into human nature have done more than those of any other one man to put us on the pathway to understanding. He did not regard his own theories as final. In 1926 he wrote: 'Only a few years ago I should have had to clothe the theory in different terms. I cannot, of course, guarantee even today that its present form will remain the definitive one'.¹ Perhaps his greatness is seen most of all in the fact that many of his theories are becoming out-moded by developments for which he himself provided the starting points. A conspicuous example of this is the way

¹ S. Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis*, p. 10.

in which object-relationships are thrusting instinctual satisfactions into the background. Since, however, much of the standard literature of psychoanalysis (including not only Freud's own writings, but such books as *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, by O. Fenichel) still expounds Freud's own theory of motivation, a theory which is not by any means always clearly repudiated by writers who are responsible for new developments, it is necessary to say that it is impossible to accept Freud's views as they stand. His doctrine of instinct reduced all human motives finally to the quest for physical pleasures, instinct gratification, and 'organ-pleasure' which consists of the enjoyable state of relaxation consequent on the discharge of physiological tensions set up by the appetites. This is pure psychobiological hedonism and is, to say the least, an inadequate account of human motives. Had Freud been a philosopher he would have been familiar with the already existing refutation of hedonism. He regarded morality as only externally imposed as a matter of social expediency, communalised self-interest. An innate capacity for altruistic feeling does not exist for Freud; it has to be manufactured by such devices as the theory of 'aim-inhibited instinct'. But a person who has no innate capacity to feel for others, no social sympathy, is an amoral psychopath, not a normal human being. In the normal person morality is the expression of our basically social nature which can only fulfil itself in good personal relationships and of our natural capacity for critical judgment and the perception of values, however dependent that is on social and parental education. An ethical standpoint is essential for good psychotherapeutic treatment. On this point Jung would seem to be a better guide than Freud. He teaches that in the bi-polar structure of the psyche one pole

'... belongs to a "higher" psychic order. It is not something elementary and conditioned physiologically, but rather, as experience shows, some highly complex deter-

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minant, such as rational, ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other traditional factors which cannot be scientifically proved to have any physiological basis. . . . A philosophy of life, as the most complex structure in the psyche, is the counter-pole to the physiologically conditioned psyche, and as the highest psychic dominant it ultimately determines the latter's fate'.¹

The entire question of the place of psychology in human life is too big an issue to be pursued further here. Maybe the time is not yet ripe for the full answer to be given. What is important is that we should be aware of the problems involved, and for the rest *solvitur ambulando*. Let us use the best psychological knowledge we have and keep our eyes wide open to its relationships to truths from every other quarter. The minister may use psychology as the handmaid of religion and ethics, and the social worker may use it as a guide in his practical service to people; and all of us must use it as a valuable discipline of self-knowledge, lest we should make the intellectual quest of the whole truth, a means of running away from ourselves and our personal problems.

¹ *Essays on Contemporary Events*, pp. 37 and 39.

Bibliography

It is taken for granted that those who intend to wrestle with the subject will ultimately master all the voluminous writings of Freud and Jung, even though theory is all the time moving beyond them. It is not unlikely that in twenty years' time psychodynamic theory will have been so entirely rewritten that all the standard books of the present time will be of mainly historical interest. Adler is easier reading than Freud and Jung, but gives a stimulating and valuable common-sense psychology of human behaviour in a social setting. The following list of books is a bare minimum.

1. S. FREUD

Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis
The Ego and the Id
The Question of Lay Analysis

ANNA FREUD

The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence

E. GLOVER

Psychoanalysis

2. C. G. JUNG

Modern Man in Search of a Soul
Psychology and Religion
Essays on Contemporary Events

J. JACOBI

The Psychology of C. G. Jung

3. A. ADLER

Individual Psychology

Bibliography

KAREN HORNEY

The Neurotic Personality of Our Time
New Ways in Psychoanalysis
Self-Analysis
Our Inner Conflicts

ERICH FROMM

The Fear of Freedom
Man for Himself

4. MELANIE KLEIN

The Psychoanalysis of Children

KLEIN and RIVIERE

Love, Hate, and Reparation

5. To these may be added four books of a more general nature:

W. McDUGALL

Outline of Psychology

R. S. WOODWORTH

Psychology, a Study of Mental Life

R. H. THOULESS

General and Social Psychology

G. W. ALLPORT

Personality: A Psychological Interpretation

6. On the psychology of religion no satisfactory work of a psychoanalytical type yet exists. A good general book is:

R. H. THOULESS

An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion

J. G. MCKENZIE

Nervous Disorders and Character—while not primarily about the psychology of religion, has much that bears on the subject.

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7. Constitutional psychology. All theories in this field are very tentative. Those who wish to explore the subject should at least read:

C. G. JUNG

Psychological Types

E. KRETSCHMER

Physique and Character

W. H. SHELDON

The Varieties of Temperament

8. F. ALEXANDER AND T. M. FRENCH

Psychoanalytic Therapy—an important account of the possibilities of planned short psychotherapy.

The Ronald Press Co., New York.

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